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ABSTRACT
Kennedy, Kendall J. PhD, Purdue University, May 2018. Essays on the Economics
of Education. Major Professors: Timothy Bond and Kevin Mumford.
This dissertation is composed of three independent chapters in the field of the
economics of education. The first chapter studies the impact of grade retention on
a broad group of conventional estimation strategies in the economics literature. The
second chapter studies the effects of a widespread negative incentive policy on educational choice. The third chapter studies the effects of the same policy on teen
behavioral and health outcomes.

The first chapter investigates how the high prevalence of grade retention in the
United States causes bias in a wide variety of conventional estimation strategies.
Over the past four decades, ninth grade repeating has increased four-fold. Despite
its prevalence, few economists have attempted to account for grade repeating when
estimating returns to education and experience. I document the rise in grade repeating and show that 10% of the increase in ninth grade repeating can be attributed
to changes in compulsory schooling laws (CSLs). I show that, because CSLs affect
both grade repeating and educational attainment, CSL-based instrumental variables
estimates of the returns to education are biased by up to 38%. Additionally, grade
repeating causes endogenous measurement error in potential labor market experience.
Solely through this measurement error, I show that the residual black-white wage gap
is overstated by 10%, the wage returns to a GED relative to a high school diploma
are understated by 15%, and the labor supply gap between GED recipients and high
school graduates is overstated by 33%.

xi
The second chapter studies how No Pass, No Drive policies affect teen educational
choices. Since 1988, 27 states have introduced No Pass, No Drive laws, which tie a
teenagers ability to receive and maintain a drivers license to various school-related
outcomes – most commonly, enrollment and attendance. Truancy-Based No Pass, No
Drive policies target only attendance teens that fail to meet a minimum attendance
requirement lose their drivers license. However, these policies allow students to drop
out of school without facing this penalty. These policies increase the annual dropout
rate by between 32 and 45 percent (1.4 to 2 percentage points). Enrollment-Based No
Pass, No Drive policies, the largest group of policies, which target both enrollment
and attendance, have negligible effects on dropout rates, but decrease the Averaged
Freshman Graduation Rate (AFGR) by more than one percentage point. However,
this lower graduation rate stems from students delaying their dropout decision by up
to two years. As a result, these students are retained in the ninth and tenth grades,
increasing ninth grade enrollment by 2.8 percent relative to eighth grade enrollment
the year prior; this causes an artificial reduction in the graduation rate, rather than
a reduction in the true likelihood that a student will graduate.

The third chapter studies how No Pass, No Drive policies affect teen health and
labor outcomes. Using difference-in-differences estimation, we identify the causal
effect of these policies on teen behavioral outcomes – teen births, traffic fatalities,
and teen employment. We find that the largest group of NPND polices cause a small
increase in teen births, with large effects on black teen births (6 percent) and hispanic
teen births (21 percent). These policies also cause a reduction in teen-involved fatal
traffic accidents by 3 percent, with larger effects for white teens (15 percent). This is
caused by the revocation of driver’s licenses, as the reduction in fatal traffic accidents
is constant during and outside of school hours, and is larger (12 percent overall)
in later years as enforcement technology improved. NPND polices cause a shift in
teen employment – overall teen employment rates are not affected, but white teen
employment decreases due to a 1 percentage point increase in white school enrollment.

xii
This is offset by a 5 percentage point increase in black teen employment, where black
teens fill the new job openings created by white teens enrolling in school. Our results
demonstrate that increasing school retention and decreasing teen drivers’ licenses
reduce fatal traffic accidents and increase teen births, and we provide suggestive
evidence of existing racial frictions in youth labor markets, which can be reduced by
lowering dropout rates.

1

1. HIDDEN SCHOOLING: REPEATED GRADES AND
THE RETURNS TO EDUCATION AND EXPERIENCE
1.1

Introduction
Grade repeating in elementary and secondary school is surprisingly common in the

United States; the NLSY97 reports that 23% of Americans born in the early 1980s
repeated at least one grade at some point in their academic career. Even more surprising is which grades are being repeated. 50 years ago, grade repeating was almost
exclusive to Kindergarten and the 1st grade, but from the 1980s to today, researchers
(Haney et al., 2004; Heubert & Hauser, 1998; Planty et al., 2009) estimate the annual
9th grade retention rate at between 5 and 15% per year in each year.

This sudden rise in 9th grade retention has largely been ignored by the economics
literature, but its effects are potentially quite problematic. 9th grade retention, and
grade retention in general, is unobserved in many popular microdata sets, and not
reported by default in any popular microdata set. This means that estimation of the
returns to education is incomplete, omitting any effects of repeated grades. Instrumental variables estimation using compulsory schooling instruments is particularly
affected by this issue, as compulsory schooling laws are one of the primary causes
behind the rise in 9th grade repeating. In addition, the typical measures of labor
market experience face large and potentially endogenous measurement error when
failing to account for grade repeating in any grade. The most common measure of
labor market experience is a simple proxy, Age − Educational Attainment − 6. For
grade repeaters, however, this measure does not correctly state the number of years
a person has been out of school, because educational attainment does not include repeated grades. Thus, failure to account for repeated grades in calculating experience
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can create bias in other estimates, if repeating rates are correlated with the variable
of interest.

In this study, I examine how repeated grades, particularly in the 9th grade, affect
estimation when controlling for educational attainment and labor market experience,
even when education and experience are not of primary interest to the researcher. I
show that instrumental variables estimates using quarter of birth and/or compulsory
schooling law instruments are biased by up to 38% when failing to account for 9th
grade repeating. Furthermore, I show that estimates of the residual black-white wage
gap are overstated by 10% when failing to account for repeated grades in the measure
of labor market experience. The wage gap between GED recipients and high school
graduates is overstated by 18% and the employment gap is overstated by 34% when
failing to account for repeated grades.

I first construct a set of 9th grade repeating rate estimates using state-level enrollment data from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), and compare
these estimates to administrative data on repeating rates, as well as to another potential repeating rate estimate from the Current Population Survey (CPS) October Supplement. I then move to an examination of compulsory schooling laws. Compulsory
schooling laws (CSLs) have been both directly (Acemoglu & Angrist, 2000; Lochner
& Moretti, 2004) and indirectly (e.g. quarter of birth as in Angrist and Krueger
1991) used as exogenous sources of variation in estimating the returns to education. I
demonstrate that increases in CSLs from 1965 to 2014 caused a 0.7 percentage point
increase in the annual 9th grade retention rate; changes in CSLs are responsible for
approximately 11% of 9th grade retention in the United States over the past 50 years.

Since 9th grade retention is closely tied to educational attainment, omission of
9th grade retention from IV estimation of the returns to education can cause substantial selection bias. Using the Children of the National Longitudinal Survey of
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Youth 1979 (CNLSY), I examine the interactions between compulsory schooling and
9th grade repeating in IV estimation of the private returns to education. Using only
CSLs as instruments causes an 8% positive bias in the wage return to education, but
using quarter of birth instruments causes a 38% positive bias in the wage return to
education. Moreover, these are lower bounds for the selection bias caused by failing
to account for endogenous 9th grade repeating, as weak instruments cause upward
bias in the corrected IV estimates.

Education and experience are two of the most popular controls in studies using individual-level data, but both of these are mismeasured in the presence of repeated grades and can introduce considerable bias. By default, nearly all popular
datasets define “Education” as educational attainment, which is the highest level of
education an individual completed.1 Failing to account for repeated grades in measurement of education has the potential to create bias if repeated grades have a
non-zero return. More concerning, however, is the measurement of experience; typically, experience is replaced by a proxy “Potential Experience” variable, calculated as
Age−Educational Attainment−6.2 This experience measure overstates the true level
of “potential experience” for grade repeaters, meaning that if the primary variable of
interest is correlated with grade repeating, the inclusion of “potential experience” as
a control introduces endogeneity into the model.

Using the NLSY97, I estimate the bias caused by mismeasurement of potential
labor market experience in two areas of interest – estimation of the residual blackwhite wage gap (as in Bound and Freeman 1992) and estimation of the returns to a
GED (as in Cameron and Heckman 1993). Black students are 2.5 times as likely as
1

The US Census, the American Community Survey (ACS), the Current Population Survey (CPS),
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID),
and many others report educational attainment as the default education variable.
2
When actual labor market experience is observed, researchers conventionally still use this potential
experience proxy. Observed labor market experience (e.g. lifetime weeks worked) is highly endogenous, as it is directly caused by labor force participation and employment decisions. (Eckstein &
Wolpin, 1989)
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white students to repeat grades; I show that for early career male workers, the residual black-white wage gap is overstated by 10% when failing to account for repeated
grades. GED recipients are 3.5 times as likely as high school graduates to repeat
grades; I show that the wage return to a GED is understated by 18%, relative to a
high school diploma, and the employment gap, measured by annual hours worked, for
GED recipients is overstated by 34%, relative to a high school diploma when failing
to account for repeated grades.

These findings have wide-reaching implications. 9th grade repeating is endogenous with compulsory schooling instruments, suggesting a need to revisit previous IV
estimation of the returns of education, both for labor market outcomes such as wages
and employment and for non-labor market outcomes such as crime and health. Studies controlling for education, and particularly for experience, need to be cognizant
of the prevalence of grade repeating in the United States. The typical measure of
experience used in the economics literature faces substantial measurement error, that
has an incredibly high potential to introduce endogeneity.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 explains how repeated
grades bias estimation of the returns to education and experience. Section 1.3 discusses the data sources used in this study. Section 1.4 describes the construction of
estimates and presents stylized facts for the 9th grade repeating rate over the past
50 years. Section 1.5 presents theory and results regarding 9th grade repeating and
compulsory schooling instruments. Section 1.6 presents results from estimation of
the residual black-white wage gap and returns to the GED using a corrected measure
of potential labor market experience, and provides a discussion of potential solutions to mismeasurement of labor market experience. Section 1.7 provides concluding
remarks.
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1.2

Repeated Grades Bias

1.2.1

Compulsory Schooling as Instrumental Variables

Compuslory schooling laws are generally considered an exogenous source of variation for educational attainment, making them a prime candidate for instrumental
variables estimation of the returns to education. Acemoglu & Angrist (2000) use
years of compulsory schooling, calculated as the minimum dropout age minus the
mandatory school entry age, as an IV in the estimation of the private and external
wage returns to education. In addition, they use quarter of birth as an alternate set
of instruments, similar to J. D. Angrist & Krueger (1991), which operate on the same
margin; both CSLs and quarter of birth affect the age and grade at which a teenager
can legally drop out of school. A teenager facing a minimum dropout age of 16
would historically be expected to drop out around the 10th grade; depending on their
quarter of birth, this teenager may drop out before, during, or after the 10th grade.
Both of the aforementioned studies estimated the effects of education on wages; other
studies have used CSLs as instruments in estimating the effects of education on crime
(Lochner & Moretti, 2004), health and happiness (Oreopoulos, 2007a), employment
and poverty status (Oreopoulos, 2007b), and many other outcomes.

9th grade repeating causes two issues with the IV estimate of the returns to education: first, the IV’s effect on educational attainment is weakened by 9th grade
repeating. CSLs may not cause 9th grade repeaters to increase their educational attainment; they instead repeat the 9th grade, meaning that CSLs are more likely to
face weak instrument bias in the presence of 9th grade repeating. Second, and more
concerning, if there is any return to repeating the 9th grade, CSLs are invalid instruments. To illustrate this, consider the following simple form of a 2SLS estimation of
the returns to education:

Ed Attainmenti = α0 + α1 CSLi + λXi + ui

(1.1)
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d
Yi = β0 + β1 Ed Attainment
i + ΓXi + εi

(1.2)

Compulsory schooling laws (CSLi ) are a vector of instruments indicating quarter×year
of birth and/or years of compulsory education (between 9 and 12 in my sample). If
9th grade repeating has an effect on the outcome Yi and is endogenous with CSLs,
then the correct regression model is instead:

Ed Attainmenti =α0 + α1 CSLi + λXi + ui

(1.3)

Repeat 9thi =δ0 + δ1 CSLi + ΩXi + vi

d
d
Yi = β0 + β1 Ed Attainment
i + β2 Repeat 9thi + ΓXi + εi

(1.4)

If the IV is exogenous to 9th grade repeating, then 2SLS estimation of equations
1.1 and 1.2 will return a consistent estimate of the return to educational attainment,
even if 9th grade repeating has a return to the outcome being tested. However, in
Section 1.5.1 I demonstrate that changes in compulsory education cause a 0.7 percentage point increase in 9th grade repeating. This may appear to be a small change,
but the 1st stage regression in equation 1.1 typically returns an estimate in the range
of 0.07 to 0.1. This suggests that no more than 7-10% of the population increases
their educational attainment as a result of CSLs, and that the effect on 9th grade
repeating is within an order of magnitude of the effect on educational attainment.3

In IV estimation, the bias caused by omission of an endogenous variable has the
potential to be quite large, particularly if the 1st stage estimate is weak or small.
The IV estimate of the returns to education in the presence of endogenous 9th grade
repeating, as in equations 1.1 and 1.2, can be expressed as:
3

A smaller percentage of the population increases their educational attainment due to CSLs if some
increase their attainment by more than 1 grade.
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β̂1IV

=

d
dY
dCSL
d
dEdAttainment
dCSL

p

−→

β1 dEdAttainment
+ β2 dRepeat9th
dCSL
dCSL
dEdAttainment
dCSL

β1 ∗ α1 + β2 dRepeat9th
dCSL
(1.5)
=
α1

Equation 1.5 provides a clear illustration of the selection bias caused by 9th grade
repeating; given that the 1st stage point estimate α1 is only between 0.07 and 0.1,
even a small effect of repeating the 9th grade (β2 ) would cause massive selection
bias – 10-14 times as large as β2 ×

dRepeat9th
.
dCSL

This bias is entirely unique from the

typical concerns with CSLs as IVs – that they are weak instruments (Bound et al.,
1995) and that they are only estimating a local average treatment effect (LATE)
(Imbens & Angrist, 1994). Instead, 9th grade repeating causes selection bias due to
the CSL instrument being endogenous in the second stage regression. In Section 1.4
I show that 9th grade repeating did not become prevalent until the mid-1980s. Thus,
this is less of a concern for studies using older data. However, any modern study is
susceptible to CSLs being invalid instruments.

1.2.2

Repeated Grades and Potential Labor Market Experience

Repeating any grade, not just the 9th grade, can cause severe, endogenous measurement error in estimating the returns to experience. Labor market experience,
strictly defined, should be measured as the lifetime number of hours or weeks worked.
However, this measure is highly endogenous, as selection into labor force participation and employment is correlated with numerous unobservable characteristics (e.g.
Eckstein and Wolpin 1989). Most economic studies are not interested in a precise
estimate of the returns to experience, instead wishing to control for potential endogeneity of labor market experience with the other variables of interest in the model.
To control for experience without introducing the selection bias from labor force participation and employment, conventionally researchers use a “potential experience”
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proxy variable, calculated as Age − Educational Attainment − 6.

The intuition behind this potential experience proxy is readily apparent. An individual’s potential labor market experience is the number of years of their adult life
that they have not been in school; a 30 year old college graduate has 30 − 16 − 6 = 8
years of potential labor market experience, while a 30 year old high school graduate
has 30 − 12 − 6 = 12 years of potential labor market experience. However, in the
presence of repeated grades, this intuition fails. A 30 year old high school graduate
who repeated a grade is measured as having 12 years of potential labor market experience, but in reality they only have 11 years of their adult life that they were not
in school, having graduated from high school a year later than their peers.4 If grade
repeating is correlated with the variable of interest, then measurement error in this
potential experience proxy variable biases the primary estimate of interest, as labor
market experience is systematically overstated for grade repeaters.

1.3

Data

1.3.1

Aggregate Repeating Rate Analysis

I compile a dataset of state-level 9th grade retention rates for analyzing recent
trends in repeating and for demonstrating the endogeneity of compulsory schooling
laws with 9th grade repeating. For this, my main data source is the National Center
for Education Statistics’ (NCES) Annual Reports Program Historical Tables on elementary and secondary enrollment. This provides enrollment counts in each grade,
Kindergarten to 12th grade, from 1965 to 2003. I link this with the NCES’s Elementary/Secondary Information System (ELSi) from 2003 to 2014 to form a complete
4

Early and late entry into elementary school cause similar measurement error to repeated grades. If
early and late entry are correlated with the primary variable of interest, this measurement error is also
endogenous. My analysis avoids this issue by directly observing the year each individual completes
their schooling, but other analysis should follow the recommendations I suggest in Section 1.6.3.
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panel of state-level enrollment by grade from the 1965-66 school year to the 2013-14
school year. For analysis on compulsory schooling, I use a list of compuslory schooling law changes from 1965 to 2005 from Oreopoulos (2006). This is combined with
changes from 2003-2014 taken from Mackey & Duncan (2013), and verified with information from The Education Commission of the States.

Data directly measuring repeating rates are generally nonexistent. However, there
are two incomplete sources of data that I use to verify the validity of my repeating
rate estimates. First is a list of repeating rates reported in Heubert & Hauser (1998).
These repeating rates are reported for 27 states in various years from 1979 to 1997 –
there are only 81 observations in this dataset, meaning each state reports repeating
rates an average of 3 times. I combine this with data from the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education from 1998-2012 to form a dataset of
97 observations of state-reported 9th grade repeating rates with which I can compare
my estimates. I additionally compare my estimated repeating rates with the Current
Population Survey’s (CPS) October Education Supplement.

1.3.2

Returns to Education and Experience

I use the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97) and the Children
of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (CNLSY), as these are two of the
only microdata sets in which I can observe grade repeating. The NLSY97 surveyed
8,984 12 to 18 year olds in 1997 and reinterviewed them every year from 1997 to 2011,
after which the survey became biennial. Importantly, the initial survey included an
educational history, which included grade enrollment by year. I use this history, along
with grade enrollment by survey year, to construct measures of repeating for the 9th
grade and for any grade. I also observe a full employment history including wages,
employment status, hours worked, and weeks worked. Following Bound & Freeman
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(1992), I omit individuals who do not have an ASVAB test score. The CNLSY is a
continuation of the NLSY79, which surveyed the children of women in the originial
NLSY79 sample. This sample includes 11,521 individuals born between 1970 and
today, and includes the educational history and labor market outcomes of these individuals. I restrict my sample to only include individuals who had completed their
education by the most recent survey in 2014, the youngest individuals in my sample
were born in 1997. These public-use data are then merged with NLSY restricted
geocodes, provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, for determination of the compulsory schooling laws each individual faced. Summary statistics for all data are
provided in Table 2.2.
Panel A of Table 2.2 shows summary statistics for enrollment changes. My preferred estimates of the annual 9th grade retention rate, the 8th to 9th grade enrollment
change and the 9th to 10th grade enrollment change, are on average 6% across states
and years, 1965-2013. In less than 5% of the sample, the 8th to 9th grade enrollment
change is negative and the 9th to 10th grade enrollment change is positive – these
are omitted from my analysis. Panel B describes the CNLSY used in analysis of
compulsory schooling laws. The CNLSY oversamples black individuals; they account
for 34% of the observations. The average level of compulsory attendance is about 11
years, and the average educational attainment is 12.3 years. The CNLSY only identifies which individuals ever repeated the 9th grade; as a result, I am unable to identify
individuals who repeated more than once. Panel C describes the NLSY97 sample
used in analysis of black-white gaps and the returns to the GED. Here, I can observe
all grade repeating, as well as individuals who repeated multiple grades. About 4% of
the sample repeated the 9th grade at least once, and 24% of the sample repeated any
grade.5 Finally, Panel D describes the frequency of different minimum dropout ages
from 1965 to 2014. Dropout ages below 16 are extremely rare, only occurring in two
states (MS from 1979-93, AR from 1977-80). The most common minimum dropout
5

The mean of 9th grade repeats is about 5%, because 0.7% of the sample repeated the 9th grade
multiple times. 6.6% of the sample repeated multiple grades.
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age is 16, with 18 becoming more popular; 24 states had a minimum dropout age of
18 in 2014, compared with only 4 in 1965.

1.4

9th Grade Repeating Rates

1.4.1

Estimation

Administrative and nationally representative survey data on grade repeating rates
are generally quite rare. At the national level, Haney et al. (2004) use enrollment
data from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) to examine attrition
between grades, that is, students who do not proceed normally to the next grade due
to retention or dropping out, from the 1960s to 2000s. They show that the average attrition rate between the 9th and 10th grades grew from about 3% in the late 1960s to
12% in 2000. The attrition rate between the 9th and 10th grades can be approximated
as 9th grade retention rate + 9th grade dropout rate − 10th grade retention rate.6
They do not directly compare the attrition rate to 9th grade retention rates, but suggest a rise in 9th grade retention as the predominant cause of this attrition change. In
contrast, Hauser et al. (2007) use the Current Population Survey (CPS) to assemble
annual repeating rate estimates for the United States – they claim that annual 9th
grade retention rates were only between 2.2% and 4.2% from 1995 to 2005. State-level
retention rates are rarely available, with administrative data coming from a study by
the National Research Council (NRC) in 1999, as well as from the Massachusetts
Department of Education (MADoE). In this section, I fill this gap in the literature
by assembling a state-level panel dataset of 9th grade repeating rate estimates, and
testing their accuracy against the highly incomplete, but otherwise accurate administrative data to determine the proper dataset for use in this study and in future work
6

The 9th to 10th grade attrition rate can also be affected by movement between private and public
schools, death rates, and immigration, but these are have much smaller effects than retention and
dropouts.
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on 9th grade repeating.7

I assemble state-level repeating estimates from the two sources used in Haney et
al. (2004) and Hauser et al. (2007): the NCES enrollment data and the CPS October
Education supplement. The NCES data come from two programs – enrollment by
grade (1st-12th) and state from 1965-2003 is from the NCES Annual Reports Program Historical Tables, and enrollment by grade and state from 2004-2014 is from
the NCES Common Core of Data. These enrollment counts only cover public schools,
which make up over 90% of all students in the United States. Although these enrollment data do not directly measure 9th grade retention rates, the growth in enrollment
between 8th and 9th grades and the attrition between 9th and 10th grades may be
reasonable estimates of retention.

Due to the repeated survey structure of the CPS, it provides a direct measure
of 9th grade repeating rates. I first restrict my sample to only include individuals
enrolled in the 9th grade in the first year they were surveyed. I then observed their
grade in the second year they are surveyed; 9th grade repeaters are enrolled in the
9th grade in both years.8 I then average these 9th grade repeating rates within each
state-year pair to assemble a panel dataset of 9th grade repeating rates from 19762016.

For the NCES and CPS estimates to be valid estimates of the true 9th grade
repeating rate, they should be highly correlated with and similar in magnitude to the
7

Smaller-scale studies of 9th grade retention have used nationally representative survey data in a
limited number of years (Planty et al., 2009) or analysis of school district-level data on repeating
(Allensworth and Easton 2005 and many others). These estimates are generally in the 5-15% range,
are likely more accurate than my cohort-level enrollment-based estimates, but are available for far
fewer years or are not suited for analysis of national trends.
8
Some 9th graders observed for the first time may already be repeaters. However, if the CPS is a
valid dataset for 9th grade repeating analysis, the proportion of individuals who were already 9th
grade repeaters in the first year surveyed would represent the proportion of the 9th grade population
who are repeaters for a given state-year pair. Those who repeat the 9th grade for a 2nd time should
be representative of the population that repeats the 9th grade more than once.
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true rate. To begin, I examine the correlations between the NCES and CPS estimates
of the 9th grade repeating rates and the true 9th grade repeating rates from the NRC
and Massachusetts DoE. Correlations and p-values from the test H0 : ρ = 0 are shown
in Table 1.4.9

Table 1.4 clearly shows a weak correlation between the CPS estimate and the true
repeating rates from the NRC and MA, while showing strong correlations for the
enrollment change estimates from the NCES, particularly for the 9th-10th grade enrollment change. While none of these estimates show perfect correlation with the 9th
grade repeating rate, the NCES estimates are potentially valid, but noisy, measures of
the true 9th grade repeating rate. However, these correlation tests do not verify that
these estimates are comparable in magnitude to the true 9th grade repeating rate,
only that annual and between-state variation is proportionate. To test similarity in
magnitude, I perform a series of OLS regressions without constants. A valid estimate
of the 9th grade repeating rate will have a high R2 and a coefficient estimate near 1.10

Table 1.5 shows results from regressions of the true 9th grade repeating rates
from the NRC and MA on my 9th grade repeating rate estimates. Columns (1) and
(2) show similar results – the NCES estimate is 12-14% larger than the true 9th
grade repeating rate on average, but shows a high R2 , the 9th grade to 10th grade
change explains nearly 75% of the variation in the true 9th grade repeating rate.
Column (3) shows the CPS estimate is 24% smaller than the true 9th grade repeating
rate on average, and explains substantially less variation in the true repeating rate
than the enrollment change estimates. Column (4) presents an alternative way to
rank these estimates – the 9th-10th grade enrollment change explains the majority
9

All correlations and regressions impose that the 8th to 9th grade enrollment change is non-negative
and the 9th to 10th grade change is non-positive. For the <5% of observations violating these
assumptions, the enrollment change is set to 0.
10
The R2 from a regression without a constant is not directly comparable to the R2 from regressions
with a constant, as imposing the point (0, 0) in the regression modifies the interpretation of residuals.
Nevertheless, in comparing three models without constants, R2 provides a meaningful basis on which
I can rank the validity of my estimates.
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of the variation in the true repeating rates, the 8th-9th grade change explains a
smaller portion of the variation, and the CPS estimate has no explanatory power in
comparison to the other two estimates.11 Given that the R2 in column (4) is only
slightly larger than in column (1), the 9th-10th grade enrollment change appears to
be a strong estimate of the true 9th grade repeating rate, while the 8th-9th grade
enrollment change is a still a meaningful, but noisier estimate.

1.4.2

Stylized Facts

From Table 2.2, the average 9th grade repeating rate in a US state from 1965-2014
was about 8% per year. However, the 9th grade repeating rate has not been stable
over time. Figure 1.1 shows enrollment by grade for the 1977 and 2014 graduation
cohorts, for all public school students in the United States.12 The 1977 cohort in
Graph (a), who entered the 1st grade in 1965 and were in the 9th grade in the 197374 academic year, is representative of historical enrollment patterns in the United
States. The 1st grade is substantially larger than the 2nd grade, as many students
are retained in early elementary education for non-academic reasons, i.e. to aid in
their social and behavioral development. Enrollment is relatively stable from the 2nd
grade until high school, with minor fluctuations between grades and a small increase
in 9th grade enrollment relative to 8th grade enrollment. Then, enrollment drops
from the 9th to 12th grades, as students are legally allowed to drop out of school –
usually, around age 16 in the mid-1970s.

The 2014 cohort in Graph (b) shows a markedly different pattern. 1st grade
enrollment is no longer substantially larger than 2nd grade – this is likely due to
the growing popularity of Kindergarten; socially and behaviorally underdeveloped
children now are likely to repeat Kindergarten, not the 1st grade. As in the 1970s,
11

The 8th-9th grade enrollment change and 9th-10th grade enrollment change are highly collinear
(ρ = 0.66), so the relative magnitudes of these two point estimates may be inaccurate.
12
According to Kena et al. (2016), 90.3% of all US Elementary and Secondary students are enrolled
in public schools.
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enrollment is stable in elementary and middle school. However, the 9th grade is substantially larger than the 8th grade, or any other grade for the 2014 cohort; There
are over 350,000 more 9th graders in the 2010-11 academic year than 8th graders in
the 2009-10 academic year (9.7% larger), and over 250,000 more 9th graders in 201011 than 10th graders in 2011-12 (6.8% larger). The decline in high school is not as
steep for the 2014 cohort as for the 1977 cohort, due to higher compulsory schooling
requirements and increased graduation rates over the past 50 years.

Figure 1.2 shows the 9th grade repeating rate estimates calculated in Section 1.4.1
from 1965-2014. The top line shows the 8th-9th grade enrollment change estimate,
and the bottom line shows the 9th-10th grade enrollment change estimate. These two
estimates are not exactly equal in magnitude, the 8th-9th grade change is generally
1 to 2 percentage points larger than the 9th to 10th grade change, but the pattern
is highly symmetric. Taking the 9th-10th grade change as the preferred estimate of
the 9th grade repeating rate, from 1965 to the early 1980s the 9th grade repeating
rate was 2-5% per year. In the 1980s, the rate grew dramatically, reaching a peak
of 11.4% in 1998, then rapidly declined after 2003. The center line shows the enrollment change from 8th to 10th grade; this shows no discernible trend and is generally
near 0, verifying that the estimated growth in 9th grade repeating is not caused by
immigration, moving from private to public school, or changes in dropouts in the
9th or 10th grades. If the estimated growth in 9th grade repeating were caused by
immigration or moving from private to public school, we would see an increase in the
8th to 10th grade enrollment change. If it were driven by an increase in the 9th grade
dropout rate or a decrease in the 10th grade dropout rate, we would see a decrease
in the 8th to 10th grade enrollment change. Overall, these estimates show that 9th
grade repeating more than tripled from the 1960s to the late 1990s; the growth in 9th
grade repeating is one of the greatest educational trends of the past 50 years, and yet
it has been largely ignored by the economics literature.
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1.5

Compulsory Schooling

1.5.1

Compulsory Schooling Law Effects on 9th Grade Repeating

The literature on the causes of the rise in 9th grade repeating is remarkably sparse;
the only study to posit potential causes, Haney et al. (2004) proposes three reasons
why 9th grade retention rose from the 1970s to the 2000s. First, states in the 1970s
began tying promotion to “minimum competency testing;” this tested students on
basic reading and arithmetic skills, and caused increases in both the dropout rate
and 9th grade retention rate (Kreitzer et al., 1989; Shepard & Smith, 1989). Second, academic requirements for promotion and graduation were strengthened in the
1980s. Third, high-stakes testing tied promotion to performance on annual standardized tests.13

I argue that these institutional changes may have been the driving force behind
the growth in 9th grade retention, but that none of these changes would have caused
such a dramatic increase in retention without an external force preventing students
from dropping out of school. A 9th grader who is told he or she will be retained in
the 9th grade for an additional year would have a strong incentive to drop out of
school, as they would be forced to forgo an extra year in the labor market to achieve
the same educational attainment as their non-retained peers. Compulsory schooling
laws make it illegal for these students to leave school in the 9th grade – from 1965 to
today, only two states (Arkansas and Mississippi) ever had a minimum dropout age
below 16, and after 1994 no state had a minimum dropout age below 16.

A first-time 9th grader will typically enter the 9th grade at age 14, so a minimum
dropout age of 16 creates a binding enforcement mechanism that causes a retained 9th
grader to actually repeat the 9th grade instead of dropping out of school. Although no
13

This is considered a separate change from minimum competency testing as high-stakes testing
tests students on skills appropriate for their grade level, while minimum competency testing tests
far below grade level.
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on-track 9th grader was legally allowed to drop out of school, in the 2004-2005 school
year 9th grade dropouts made up over 23% of all dropouts in the country (Sable et
al., 2007). The existing literature has ignored the role of compulsory schooling laws
(CSLs) on 9th grade retention; this is especially surprising, since there were many
compulsory schooling law increases across the country from the mid-1980s to mid2000s, when the majority of the rise in 9th grade retention occurred. Figure 1.3 shows
the average minimum dropout age faced by an American high school student from
1965 to 2014, calculated as the average dropout age across states, weighted by state
enrollment in grades 9-12.

Figure 1.3 shows that the typical high schooler faced a minimum dropout age of
16.3-16.5 from 1965 to the mid-1980s. Over the next 20 years, the dropout age grew
by about 1 year, peaking at 17.2 in 2005, then falling slightly to an average minimum
dropout age of 17.1 today. Overall, states changed their minimum dropout age a total
of 61 times in this time period. The minimum dropout age is likely to continue to
rise, as in President Barack Obama’s 2012 State of the Union Address, he “call[ed]
on every state to require that all students stay in high school until they graduate or
turn eighteen.”

I estimate the causal effect of changes in compulsory schooling laws on the 9th
grade retention rate using difference-in-differences estimation with the estimating
equation below:

% Changes,t = β0 + β1 M in Drop Ages,t + γt + λs + εs,t

(1.6)

In equation 1.6, the % Changes,t refers to the 9th grade repeating rate estimate
in state s and year t, M in Drop Ages,t refers to the minimum dropout age in a
state-year pair, and λs and γt are state and year fixed effects, respectively. β1 is the
coefficient of interest, the causal effect of an increase in the minimum dropout age
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on 9th grade retention.14 This specification has the advantage of being immune to
between-cohort population changes. For example, the large population growth in the
West and South over the past 50 years does not affect the level of the outcome variable.
Given the regression specification, the standard identifying assumption for differencein-differences estimation applies: states not changing their minimum dropout age
have parallel trends in 9th grade retention to states changing their minimum dropout
age prior to the law change.

Table 1.1 shows the results from estimating equation 1.6. Columns (1) and (5)
of Table 1.1 show that states with higher minimum dropout ages have greater 9th
grade retention. In the difference-in-differences specifications in columns (4) and (8),
one extra year of compulsory education increases the 9th grade retention rate by
approximately 0.7 percentage points – an 11.5% increase relative to the mean 9th
grade retention rate of 6.1%.15 This suggests that while the expansion of compulsory
schooling laws is not entirely responsible for the rise in 9th grade retention, compulsory schooling law changes still played an important role. Continuing to raise the
minimum dropout age may additionally erase the recent reductions in 9th grade retention rates (from 11.4% in 1998 to 5.3% in 2012).

To test the identifying assumptions of the difference-in-differences model, I perform the conventional event study-style test of lags and leads of compulsory schooling
law changes. I estimate the following model:

% Changes,t = α +

5
X

βk 1(CSL Increaset+k ) + γt + λs + εs,t

(1.7)

k=−5
14

This equation does not estimate the overall effect of compulsory schooling on 9th grade retention,
as there are no states without compulsory education. As a result, I am unable to test whether
without compulsory schooling laws, 9th grade retention would not exist.
15
Standard errors are estimated as heteroskedasticity-robust, as this (or clustering at the stateyear pair, which is equivalent) is conventional in the CSL literature (J. D. Angrist & Krueger,
1991; Acemoglu & Angrist, 2000). Nevertheless, clustering may be appropriate – Table A.1 in the
Appendix compares standard errors from robust standard errors, overlapped multiway clustered
standard errors as in A. C. Cameron et al. (2011), and standard errors clustered at the state level.
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In equation 1.7, the term 1(CSL Changet+k ) is an indicator for an increase in
the minimum dropout age in year t + k – states that change their minimum dropout
age multiple times within 5 years are omitted, as it is not possible to assign treatment status in this event study structure for these states. This leaves 33 minimum
dropout ages changes used to verify the parallel trends assumption. The endpoints
1(CSL Increaset−5 ), 1(CSL Increaset+5 ) are cumulative, meaning that all observations 5 or more years away from a CSL change are assigned the same treatment
status. Finally, βt−3 is normalized to 0. Figure 1.4 shows the coefficient estimates
{β−5 , ..., β5 } from the regression in equation 1.7.

Figure 1.4 shows no discernible pre-existing trends in the 9th grade retention rate,
aside from possibly a small deviation at (t − 5). Looking at the preferred 9th grade
retention rate in Graph (b), Figure 1.4b shows a small, but noticeable increase in
9th grade retention, corresponding to a reduction in the 9th-10th grade enrollment
change, immediately upon changing the minimum dropout age. This effect may only
be temporary, as the coefficient estimate reverts to its pre-law change level within 3-4
years, but if so, this temporary reduction is strong enough to cause a 0.7 percentage
point increase in the 9th grade retention rate on average.16

Next, I perform the same analysis to test for CSL effects on the change from 7th
to 8th grade, from 10th to 11th grade, and from 11th to 12th grade. Table 1.6 shows
results from estimation of equation 1.6 on these three outcomes. The change from
7th to 8th grade is a placebo test, as CSLs should not have any effect on promotion
from 7th to 8th grade. I would see positive effects on the changes from 10th to 11th
and from 11th to 12th grades if CSLs prevent on-track high schoolers – that is, those
who are promoted to the next grade – from dropping out of school.

16

This temporary reduction may also be caused by states with multiple CSL changes in a short
timespan being dropped from the sample.
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All 3 of the outcomes in Table 1.6 are unaffected by CSL changes. This is unsurprising for the 7th to 8th grade enrollment change, but is somewhat unexpected for
the other two outcomes. CSLs are generally thought of as dropout prevention tools,
and their use as instruments in IV regressions of the returns to education hinges on
the idea that CSLs, by preventing teenagers from dropping out of school, increase
educational attainment. Given these findings, it is crucial to reexamine the validity
of CSLs as instruments in the modern era using data that allows observation of both
educational attainment and grade repeating.

1.5.2

Correcting IV Estimates of the Returns to Education

Most publicly available microdata do not allow the researcher to observe repeated
grades in any form. However, some longitudinal surveys track each individual’s grade
enrollment in each year, allowing the observation of repeated grades. Other surveys
ask a detailed history of grade repeating. For this analysis, I use the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 Children and Young Adults (CNLSY), which provides
a wide time horizon, covering individuals born between 1970 and 1999. In this period
I observe a large number of CSL changes – 28 states change their CSL in this time
period. The CNLSY surveys individuals biennially, but in each survey asks a history
of grade repeating. Each individual who ever reports having repeated the 9th grade
is coded as a 9th grade repeater.17

J. D. Angrist & Krueger (1991) use quarter of birth as an instrument in their
well-known estimation of the effects of education on wages. Acemoglu & Angrist
(2000) modify this instrument, using quarter of birth interacted with year of birth,
and supplement this by directly including compulsory education as an instrument.18
17

A small number of individuals may have repeated the 9th grade more than once; however, the
question asked in the CNLSY does not permit the observation of these multi-time repeaters.
18
Acemoglu & Angrist (2000) note that related literature (e.g. Imbens and Angrist 1994) shows 3
quarter of birth instruments cause the 2SLS estimate to be strongly biased toward the OLS estimate
due to its 1st stage weakness, while the quarter of birth interacted with year of birth produces
estimates largely unaffected by weak instrument bias.
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I replicate their methodology in the CNLSY, estimating the private returns to education, beginning with the following OLS estimating equation:

log(W agei ) =β0 + β1 Ed Attainmenti + β2 Rep 9thi + β3 Blacki +

(1.8)

β4 Hispanici + β5 F emalei + λit + γis + εi
In equation 1.8, I modified Acemoglu and Angrist’s OLS estimation in two ways:
first, I included black, hispanic, and female individuals in the sample. This analyzes
a different population, thus resulting in a different local average treatment effect than
that found by Acemoglu and Angrist, but inclusion of these groups will estimate a
LATE that is closer to the population-level average treatment effect. Second, I control for whether an individual repeated the 9th grade. In OLS estimation, this is
unlikely to change the estimate of β1 by a significant amount. Selection bias caused
by correlation between educational attainment and grade repeating may exist, but
the effect of grade repeating on wages is likely to be quite small. I also control for
state of residence γis and birth year λit , as in Acemoglu & Angrist (2000).

OLS regressions provide a comparison for the 2SLS estimation of the effects of
educational attainment on wages. As 9th grade repeating is likely endogenous in
equation 1.8, as is educational attainment, I use compulsory schooling and/or quarter
of birth as instruments for both of these endogenous variables. Compulsory education
instruments are three indicators for each level of compulsory education, defined as
CEis = M inimum Dropout Ages − School Entry Ages for state s, with a minimum
of CE = 9 and a maximum of CE = 12. Quarter of birth is as in Acemoglu &
Angrist (2000), with an indicator for quarter of birth interacted with a year of birth
fixed effect. The three 2SLS regression equations are given below:
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Ed Attainmenti =α0 + α1 CEis + α2 QOBi × λit + ηXi + ui

(1.9)

Rep 9thi =δ0 + δ1 CEis + δ2 QOBi × λit + ψXi + vi

d
d
log(W agei ) = β0 + β1 Ed Attainment
i + β2 Rep 9thi + ΓXi + εi

(1.10)

The controls in Xi are identical to those in equation 1.8, except regressions with
quarter of birth instruments do not contain separate year of birth fixed effects due to
collinearity. I estimate the selection bias caused by CSL instruments by comparing
β̂ IV when correctly accounting for 9th grade repeating to β̂ IV when not accounting
for 9th grade repeating. Table 1.7 presents results from these regressions.

Columns (1) and (2) of Table 1.7 show comparisons of OLS to IV regressions
ignoring 9th grade repeating. Panel A shows results for compulsory schooling law instruments – binary indicators of the number of compulsory years of education in each
state-year pair. Column (2) shows a much larger effect of education on wages than
the OLS estimate, typical for compulsory schooling instruments as the local average
treatment effect (LATE) is larger than the average treatment effect, even with selection bias in the OLS case (see Imbens and Angrist 1994 for details). Columns (3) and
(4) show comparisons of OLS to IV regressions accounting for 9th grade repeating.
Unfortunately, the 1st stage shows that these compulsory schooling instruments are
weak, with an F-statistic of only 3.4 when not accounting for 9th grade repeating
and 1.584 when accounting for 9th grade repeating. A comparison of column (2),
omitting 9th grade repeating, to column (4), including 9th grade repeating, shows
that the omission of 9th grade repeating from the model specification causes approx-
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imately 8% bias in the returns to education.19

Panels B and C of Table 1.7 show results using quarter of birth instruments. I
show that quarter of birth instruments are strong as predictors of educational attainment, as asserted by Imbens & Angrist (1994) and Acemoglu & Angrist (2000). This
results in a slightly smaller estimate than in Panel A, as weak instruments positively
bias the IV estimate of the returns to education. Including 9th grade repeating in
the estimation, however, results in a markedly lower estimate of the wage return to
education. Although the instruments in column (4) are weak, with an F-statistic of
only 2.7, this should bias the return to education upward, in the direction of OLS
selection bias (Bound et al., 1995). Omission of 9th grade repeating thus causes at
least 38% bias in the estimate of the private wage return to education when using
quarter of birth instruments.

Inclusion of compulsory schooling law and quarter of birth instruments in Panel
C reveals a similar pattern – omission of 9th grade repeating in this specification
causes 23% upward bias in estimation of the returns to education. Although the
returns to repeating the 9th grade are unbelievably high – it is unreasonable to think
that repeating the 9th grade causes wages to increase by 80-100% – this is the result of instrument weakness in predicting 9th grade repeating, and suggests that, if
anything, the estimate of the return to education is still too large after accounting
for 9th grade repeating. Weak instrument bias is in the direction of OLS selection
bias. OLS estimates of the returns to education face positive selection bias from
endogenous variables such as ability and household income, so IV estimates using
weak instruments will be positively biased. Overall, unless accounting for 9th grade
repeating, compulsory schooling instruments are invalid and create severe bias.
19

Point estimates in both column (2) and column (4) should both be upward biased due to instrument
weakness. However, I cannot determine which estimate faces larger bias.
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1.6

Repeated Grades and Experience

1.6.1

Black-White Wage and Hours Gaps

In this section, I consider how poor measurement of potential labor market experience biases estimates of the black-white wage and employment gaps. To understand
the channel by which measurement error in experience biases these estimates, consider
the regression model estimated by Bound & Freeman (1992):

log(W agei ) = β0 +β1 Blacki +αEd Attainmenti +γExperiencei +ηU rbani +εi (1.11)
The terms Ed Attainmenti and Experiencei are indicators for each level of educational attainment and potential labor market experience, respectively. Potential
labor market experience is calculated as min(Age − Ed Attainment − 6, Age − 18) to
explicitly account for selection into college attendance. However, repeated grades are
not accounted for in this measure of experience. The key consideration here is not
that estimating equation 1.11 will result in a biased estimate of γ, but rather that
the primary coeffiecient of interest, β1 , may be biased.

I use the NLSY97 to reexamine the early career black-white wage gap, accounting for repeated grades. In the NLSY97, blacks are almost twice as likely as whites
to have their potential labor market experience misstated due to grade repeating;
in 2010, 16% of whites and 31% of blacks had repeated at least one grade, causing Age − Ed Attainment − 6 to overstate their experience. Since experience has a
positive effect on wages, systematically overstating the level of experience for black
workers more than for white workers will result in a residual black-white wage gap
that is too large. Some of the residual black-white wage gap estimated by Bound and
Freeman can likely be attributed to differences in repeating rates by race, not to labor
market discrimination. I replicate their regression model, but remeasure experience
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as min(Age − Ed Attainment − Repeated Grades − 6, Age − Repeated Grades − 18)
to accurately measure potential labor market experience: that is, the number of years
since each individual completed their schooling. Table 1.8 reports results from estimating equation 1.11 and an analogous returns to employment regression for early
career (2000-2005, ages 18-25) and slightly later career (2006-2011, ages 22-31) workers.

In Panel A, column (1) finds a 21% gap between black and white wages, close to
the 18% estimate that Bound and Freeman find for workers in the 1980s. However,
when controlling for repeated grades in column (2), the gap closes by 2.4 percentage points; failing to account for repeated grades overstates the residual black-white
wage gap by 13% for early career workers. Columns (3) and (4) show a similar
pattern, with smaller bias in column (3). This is due to 2 reasons: first, most collegeeducated workers in the sample begin entering the labor force from 2006-2011, and
college-educated workers of any race are unlikely to have repeated grades. There is
still a racial gap for college graduates, however; 14% of black college graduates in
the NLSY97 repeated a grade, while only 5% of white college graduates repeated a
grade. The second, and likely more important reason for the smaller bias in column
(3) is because mismeasurement in experience is less important for older workers. In
column (1), most individuals who repeated grades have their experience overstated
by 25-100%. In column (3), since these workers now have 5-10 years of experience,
experience is overstated by only 10-20%. The bias caused by misstating experience
is less important for older workers, as it constitutes a smaller portion of their overall
experience level.

Panel B shows no bias in the black-white employment gap caused by mismeasurement of experience. This is because experience appears to have little effect on
employment status. The full set of experience indicators for the black-white wage
gap and black-white employment gap are shown in Tables A.2 and A.3 – only two of
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the experience level indicators in columns (1) or (3) are significantly different from
the baseline level of 0 in Table A.3. While experience has large wage returns (8-10%
per year), it has small employment returns (0.5% per year), causing little to no bias
in the black-white employment gap regressions. Repeated grades are an important
consideration in future estimation of black-white wage differentials. The substantial correlation between grade repeating and race cause grade repeating to be key in
ensuring an unbiased estimate of the residual black-white wage gap.

1.6.2

Returns to GED

Grade repeating, as one might expect, is highly correlated with education. Table
1.9 shows the proportion of individuals in the NLSY97 with each level of education
who repeated at least one grade in elementary and secondary school.

S. Cameron & Heckman (1993) estimate the returns to a GED in the NLSY79,
finding that the GED is not equivalent to a regular high school diploma, and that
in fact GED recipients are remarkably similar to high school dropouts who do not
receive a GED. Table 1.9 confirms that this is true, showing that the grade repeating
rate for GED recipients is almost identical to that for high school dropouts. Overall,
GED recipients’ repeating rates are 3.5 times as large as the repeating rates for
high school graduates. The incredibly high grade repeating rates of non-high school
graduates cause substantial measurement error of potential labor market experience
when estimating wage and annual hours worked returns, whether comparing high
school graduates to GED recipients or to high school dropouts. I estimate the bias
caused by this measurement error in the NLSY97 by replicating the OLS estimation
of S. Cameron & Heckman (1993) as below:

log(wagei ) = β0 + β1 GEDi + β2 Dropouti + β3 HSDiplomai + β4 Associ
+β5 Experiencei + β6 U rbani + β7 Blacki + β8 Hispanici + β9 ASV ABi + εi

(1.12)
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In equation 1.12, the primary variables of interest are the coefficients on educational attainment, β1 , β2 , β3 , and β4 . I have set the baseline level of educational
attainment as a bachelor’s degree; this is unconventional, but is done to make coefficient estimates comparable across specifications, regardless of whether I account
for grade repeating or not. Since the overall grade repeating rate is quite low for
bachelor’s degree recipients (6.1%), the baseline return to education will be largely
unaffected by accounting for grade repeating. If I had instead followed S. Cameron
& Heckman (1993) and set high school dropouts as the baseline, the coefficient estimates on high school diplomas and bachelor’s degrees would appear biased, not the
coefficient estimate on the GED. Here I follow the conventional potential labor market experience measure, Experience = Age − Ed Attainment − 6, and correct for
grade repeating by letting Experience = Age − Ed Attainment − Grade Reps − 6.20
This regression only includes men, and has controls for urban status, race, and standardized ASVAB score. Table 1.10 presents results from this estimation, with wages
and hours worked as outcomes.

Panel A of Table 1.10 shows the effects of educational attainment on hourly wages.
Column (1) presents estimates with the conventional experience measure; high school
graduates earn 14% less than college graduates, while GED recipients earn 37% less
than college graduates – a GED recipient earns 27% less than a high school diploma
recipient, similar to the earnings of a high school dropout. Column (2) shows the
difference when only accounting for 9th grade repeating – the wage penalty from a
GED is reduced by 1 percentage point, but a Chow test shows this difference is not
significant. Column (3) shows the returns to a GED when properly accounting for
all repeated grades. The GED is still far less valuable than a college degree and
high school diploma, but the gap is smaller than in column (1). GED recipients earn
32.7% less than college graduates, while high school graduates still earn 14% less than
20

S. Cameron & Heckman (1993) use lifetime weeks worked as their primary experience measure.
As mentioned previously, this measure is not subject to measurement error from repeated grades,
but is endogenous with factors influencing labor force participation, and is rarely used today.
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college graduates; this makes the wage gap between GED recipients and high school
graduates only 22.2%, not 27% as suggested in column (1). A similar bias is present
for high school dropouts; estimates of the wage return to a GED are biased by 10.4%
and estimates of the wage return to dropping out of high school are biased by 10.9%
when failing to account for repeated grades. As a result, studies where the baseline
educational attainment is chosen as less than a high school diploma overstate the
wage returns to completing high school.

Panel B shows the effects of educational attainment on annual hours worked.
Cameron and Heckman test annual hours worked to demonstrate that GED recipients are similar to high school dropouts in their labor supply decisions on the intensive
margin (hours worked while employed).21 College graduates and high school graduates work similar hours; high school graduates work only 2-3% fewer hours than
college graduates in all 3 specifications. However, GED recipients work far fewer
hours than college and high school graduates. Column (1) shows a 16.2% labor supply gap between GED recipients and college graduates and a 20.4% gap between high
school dropouts and college graduates. This translates to a 14% gap between GED
recipients and high school graduates and a 18.3% gap between high school dropouts
and high school graduates. However, accounting for repeated grades changes these
gaps substantially; accounting for 9th grade repeating reduces the labor supply gap
for GED recipients by 21%, and accounting for any repeated grade reduces the hours
gap by an additional 10.7%. Overall, failure to account for repeated grades causes no
bias in labor supply estimation for high school graduates, but causes 33.9% bias in
labor supply estimation for GED recipients and 22.9% bias for high school dropouts.
These findings suggest that while the bias caused by grade repeating in OLS estimation of the returns to education may be smaller than in IV estimation, it is still
crucial to account for repeated grades in any estimate of the returns to education.
21

This measure of annual hours worked also partially includes labor supply on the extensive margin.
It includes the decision to work a part-time or full-time job, as well as changes in employment status.
Observations of 0 hours worked in a year are dropped.
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1.6.3

Age as an Alternative Experience Measure

My results on the black-white wage gap and the returns to the GED demonstrate
that the conventional measure of potential labor market experience may bias estimates in the presence of grade repeating. However, the ideal solution of directly
accounting for repeated grades in the construction of potential labor market experience is impossible in many datasets. The Census, ACS, CPS, and other data sources
do not measure grade repeating, so an alternative measure of labor market experience
is needed that is not affected by grade repeating.

I propose that researchers should simply control for age. Age is highly related
to the conventional measure of potential labor market experience (as it is perfectly
collinear with potential experience and educational attainment), but does not suffer
from endogenous measurement error. As a result, it can serve as a proxy variable for
labor market experience without being affected by repeated grades.

I test whether the inclusion of age can improve our estimates when grade repeating is unknown by comparing my previous estimates to estimates controlling for
age in lieu of a more conventional experience measure. Table 1.2 shows results from
the black-white wage and employment gaps. Here, rather than using the experience
measure in Bound & Freeman (1992), I use Age − Educational Attainment − 6 and
Age − Educational Attainment − Repeated Grades − 6.22 I compare these estimates
to estimates when only controlling for age.

Columns (1) and (4) in Table 1.2 show the black-white wage and employment
gaps using the conventional experience measure, and columns (3) and (6) show the
gaps correcting for repeated grades. Columns (2) and (5) control for age instead of
potential labor market experience. Controlling for age does not affect the estimate
22

The point estimates and repeated grades bias when using this experience measure are almost
identical (18-20% black-white wage gap, 13% bias) to the previous estimates in Table 1.8.
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of the black-white wage or employment gaps, relative to the conventional experience
measure. None of the experience measures cause statistically significant changes in
the residual black-white wage gap estimate, although the 13 to 14% difference between the wage gap in column (3) compared to the gaps in columns (1) and (2) has
economic significance. In estimation of the residual black-white wage and employment gaps, age is no worse as a control than potential labor market experience.

In Table 1.11, I test whether age reduces the bias in estimating the returns to the
GED. Columns (1) and (3) of Table 1.11 are identical to columns (1) and (3) of Table
1.10, except for the pairwise test statistics. Column (2) shows results controlling for
age instead of a conventional labor market experience measure. The wage return
to the GED in Panel A is significantly greater when controlling for age than when
controlling for the conventional labor market experience measure. Controlling for age
results in a slightly greater estimate of the wage return to the GED than controlling
for experience and repeated grades, but this different is not significant. Age improves
the accuracy of the estimate of the wage return to the GED, compared to the conventional measure of potential experience. Panel B shows a similar pattern to Panel
A; controlling for age in estimating the labor supply gap between GED recipients
and high school graduates results in extremely low bias (6%), while controlling for
potential labor market experience results in substantially greater bias (34%).

My findings suggest that researchers concerned about bias from repeated grades
should, at minimum, test whether the use of age in lieu of labor market experience
affects point estimates. When repeated grades cause small (e.g. black-white wage
gaps) or no (e.g. black-white employment gaps) bias, the use of age as a control
variable should not affect the estimate of interest. However, when repeated grades
cause substantial bias (e.g. returns to GED), the use of age improves the accuracy of
the estimate of interest, and should be the preferred proxy variable for labor market
experience.
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1.7

Conclusion
Repeated grades are an important, yet widely overlooked issue in the economics

of education. The tripling of 9th grade repeating rates from the 1970s to the late
1990s is of critical importance to any researcher attempting to measure educational
attainment or labor market experience, but a lack of detailed data on grade repeating
has caused much of the contemporary literature in labor economics to inadvertently
introduce bias into their estimates. Compulsory schooling instruments in particular
have become less valid for individuals born in the past 40 years. Efforts need to be
made to circumvent their endogeneity with 9th grade repeating. IV estimation of the
returns to schooling can cause bias of at least 38% when failing to account for the
simultaneous effects of CSLs and/or quarter of birth on 9th grade retention.

Similarly, a modification of the common experience measure, Experience = Age−
Educational Attainment−6, is needed to avoid the accidental introduction of endogenous measurement error into related estimates. Failing to correctly measure potential
labor market experience causes 13% bias in the black-white wage gap for young workers, 10-11% bias in the wage return to a GED or dropping out of high school, and
23-34% bias in the labor supply gap for GED recipients and high school dropouts. All
in all, these findings suggest that solving this measurement error problem is crucial
for future work, as any research investigating people who finished their schooling in
the 1980s, 1990s, or 2000s is subject to this repeated grades problem.

Applied researchers must be cognizant of this measurement error problem and
modify their measure of experience to avoid bias. When using longitudinal data,
such as the PSID or NLSY, the solution is simple – grade repeating can be explicitly
accounted for in the measure of labor market experience and can be controlled for in
the primary regression model. However, when using cross-sectional data, the solution
is more complicated. Age is likely a better proxy for labor market experience than
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the conventional measure of Age − Educational Attainment − 6, as it does not suffer
from endogenous measurement error. Controlling for age eliminates the bias in the
returns to the GED, while not worsening the bias in the black-white wage gap. I
suggest that researchers using cross-sectional data should control for age instead of
experience, or at minimum, as a robustness test, to avoid bias from repeated grades.

(4)
0.744∗∗∗
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Y
2352

(3)
2.844∗∗∗
(0.207)

9th-10th Change

variable between 14 and 18. Regressions are robust to omitting state-year pairs with a minimum dropout age below age 16 (< 1% of all state-year pairs) and to inclusion
of indicators for each level of minimum dropout age, 14 to 18.

Notes:

2352

2352

Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

State FE
Year FE
Observations

Dropout Age

(2)
0.361∗∗
(0.158)
Y

(1)
2.707∗∗∗
(0.202)

8th-9th Change

Table 1.1.: CSL Effects on 9th Grade Retention
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(2)

-0.104∗∗∗
(0.00948)
Standard
9003

-0.210∗∗∗
(0.0187)

(4)

-0.104∗∗∗
-0.104∗∗∗
-0.0539∗∗∗
(0.00948)
(0.00947)
(0.00799)
Age
Std. + Reps. Standard
9003
9003
12240

-0.175∗∗∗
(0.0279)

(3)

-0.0540∗∗∗
(0.00799)
Age
12240

-0.209∗∗∗
(0.0187)

(5)

2006-2011

-0.0531∗∗∗
(0.00800)
Std. + Reps.
12240

-0.197∗∗∗
(0.0187)

(6)

Grades-6. Individuals enrolled in school are dropped from these regressions, as well as women and non-white, non-black individuals.

Notes: Data source is the NLSY97. All regressions include controls for educational attainment and urban status. Experience in columns (1) and (4) is included as AgeEducational Attainment-6. Column (2) controls for Age instead of Experience. Experience in columns (3) and (6) is included as Age-Educational Attainment-Repeated

Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

Experience Control
N

Black

Black

-0.198∗∗∗ -0.200∗∗∗
(0.0279) (0.0279)
Panel B: Outcome = Employment Status

(1)
Panel A: Outcome = log(Wage)

2000-2005

Table 1.2.: Black-White Wage and Employment Gaps, Experience and Age
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Table 1.3.: Summary Statistics
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Panel A: Enrollment Changes and Repeating Rates
Mean St. Dev. Min
Max
% Change 7th - 8th
-0.957
2.629
-23.54 25.31
% Change 8th - 9th
6.427
6.797
-16.35 47.10
% Change 9th - 10th
-6.075
5.377
-38.16 19.00
% Change 10th - 11th
-8.123
4.439
-28.75 19.79
% Change 11th - 12th
-6.927
4.473
-27.53 18.48
CPS 9th Grade Rep. Rate (%)
3.651
6.882
0
100
Heubert and Hauser (1998) Repeating Rate 11.648
4.359
2.6
21.0
MA 1995-2012 Repeating Rate
7.533
0.747
5.7
8.5
Panel B: CNLSY
Mean St. Dev. Min
Max
Educational Attainment
12.348
1.910
8
20
Black
0.341
0.474
0
1
Female
0.559
0.497
0
1
Hispanic
0.204
0.403
0
1
9th Grade Repeaters
0.051
0.219
0
1
Compulsory Attendance (Years)
10.946
1.248
9
12
Age
23.204
4.196
15
42
(Continued on next page)
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Table 1.3.: (Continued)
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Mean
0.118
0.466
0.0725
0.0960
0.248
0.0499
0.376
0.773
0.211
0.195
0.491
23.02

St. Dev.
0.322
0.499
0.259
0.295
0.432
0.264
0.717
0.419
0.408
0.396
0.500
5.549

Min
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
14

Max
1
1
1
1
1
4
6
1
1
1
1
34

Panel C: NLSY97
GED
HS Diploma
HS Dropout (no GED)
Associate’s Degree
Bachelor’s Degree
9th Grade Repeats
Any Grade Repeats
Urban Status
Black
Hispanic
Female
Age
Panel D: Minimum Dropout Age Frequency
14
15
16
17
18

Freq.
0.612
0.163
62.24
16.20
20.78

Notes: Enrollment changes in Panel A include all states and years from the 1965-66 academic year to
the 2013-14 academic year. Other rates are described in the text. Panels B and C include all individuals
in the CNLSY and NLSY97, respectively, with valid educational attainment, state of residence, race,
sex, and wage information. Individuals with educational attainment less than 8 are omitted. Additionally,
individuals who never provide a valid grade repeating history are omitted. Panel D provides the frequencies
of minimum dropout ages across all state-year pairs in the United States (omitting AK, HI, and DC) from
1965-2014.
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Table 1.4.: Pairwise Correlations, Repeating Rate Estimates
(1)
% Change
8th-9th
NRC & MA Rep. Rates
0.262
p − value, ρ = 0
0.0143

(2)
% Change
9th-10th
-0.392
0.0002

(3)
CPS
0.084
0.4873

Notes: P-values are shown for H0 : ρ = 0. The CPS correlation in column (3) has 24 fewer observations, due to the
existence of some NRC repeating rates before the introduction of the CPS October supplement in 1976.
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Table 1.5.: Repeating Rate Estimates and True Repeating Rates
NRC & MA Repeating Rates
(1)
9th-10th −0.877∗∗
(0.0528)

(2)

0.889∗
(0.0662)

8th-9th

CPS
N
R2
∗

p < 0.10,

97
0.74
∗∗

p < 0.05,

97
0.65
∗∗∗

(3)

(4)
−0.635∗∗
(0.156)
0.214∗∗∗
(0.152)

1.31∗ 0.0166∗∗∗
(0.174) (0.164)
73
73
0.44
0.79

p < 0.01

Notes: Significance stars test H0 : β = 1 or H0 : β = −1 for the appropriate estimate. The CPS regressions
in columns (3) and (4) have 24 fewer observations, due to the existence of some NRC repeating rates before the
introduction of the CPS October supplement in 1976.
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Table 1.6.: CSL Effects on Non-9th Grade Promotion

Dropout Age
Observations

(1)
% Change
7th - 8th
0.0987
(0.0863)
2352

(2)
% Change
10th - 11th
0.0717
(0.107)
2352

(3)
% Change
11th - 12th
0.0898
(0.110)
2352

Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes:

Data on enrollment changes are from the NCES Annual Reports Program Historical Tables and CCD. All

specifications include dropout age as a continuous variable between 14 and 18.
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Table 1.7.: Compulsory Schooling Instruments with 9th Grade Repeating
Outcome = log(hourly wage)
No Repeat Control
With Repeat Control
OLS
2SLS
OLS
(1)
(2)
(3)
Panel A: Compulsory Schooling Law Instruments
Ed. Attainment

0.0595∗∗∗
(0.00212)

0.130∗∗
(0.0535)

9th Repeater

2SLS
(4)

0.0594∗∗∗
(0.00217)

0.120∗
(0.0720)

-0.00558
(0.0160)

-0.0599
(0.339)

K-P F-statistic
[3.414]
Panel B: Quarter×Year of Birth Instruments

[1.584]

0.0640∗∗∗
(0.00211)

0.0646∗∗∗
(0.00215)

0.0841∗∗∗
(0.00888)

0.0328∗∗
(0.0155)

1.009∗∗∗
(0.165)

Ed. Attainment

0.116∗∗∗
(0.00704)

9th Repeater

K-P F-statistic
[37.875]
Panel C: Quarter×Year of Birth and CSL Instruments
Ed. Attainment

0.0640∗∗∗
(0.00211)

0.115∗∗∗
(0.00695)

9th Repeater

K-P F-statistic
Observations

7511

[36.986]
7511

[2.773]

0.0646∗∗∗
(0.00215)

0.0935∗∗∗
(0.00789)

0.0328∗∗
(0.0155)

0.793∗∗∗
(0.131)

7511

[2.898]
7511

Robust errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Data source is the CNLSY. All regressions include controls for sex, race, and state of residence at age 16.
Estimates in Panel A control for year of birth. Year of birth is included in the set of instruments (along with quarter
of birth) in Panels B and C, and is not included in OLS estimates in Panels B and C.
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Table 1.8.: Black-White Wage and Employment Gaps, Corrected for Repeating
2000-2005
(1)
(2)
Panel A: Outcome = log(Wage)

2006-2011
(3)

-0.208∗∗∗
-0.184∗∗∗
-0.214∗∗∗
(0.0281)
(0.0282)
(0.0181)
Panel B: Outcome = Employment Status
Black

Black
Account for
Repeating
N

(4)
-0.201∗∗∗
(0.0181)

-0.0921∗∗∗
(0.00978)

-0.0929∗∗∗
(0.00976)

-0.0627∗∗∗
(0.00769)

-0.0618∗∗∗
(0.00769)

N
8463

Y
8463

N
13229

Y
13229

Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Data source is the NLSY97. All regressions include controls for educational attainment and urban status. Experience in columns (1) and (3) is included as min(Age-Educational Attainment-6, Age-18). Experience in columns (2)
and (4) is included as min(Age-Educational Attainment-Repeated Grades-6, Age-Repeated Grades-18). Individuals
enrolled in school are dropped from these regressions, as well as women and non-white, non-black individuals.
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Table 1.9.: Grade Repeating Rates by Educational Attainment

9th Grade
All Grades

Dropouts
16.4
72.6

Repeating Rates in NLSY97 (%)
GED HS Grads Associate’s Bachelor’s
18.4
1.3
1.5
<1
73.6
21.1
16.8
6.1

Notes: Grade repeating rates by educational attainment are shown. Many individuals repeated multiple grades in
their academic careers; this is not displayed in this table, but is accounted for in my later analysis.
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Table 1.10.: Wage and Labor Supply Returns to GED and HS Diploma, Corrected
for Repeating
Experience Correction
(1)

(2)
9th Grade
None
Repeating
Panel A: Outcome = log(Hourly Wage)

(3)
Any Grade
Repeating

GED

-0.374∗∗∗
(0.0306)

-0.361∗∗∗
(0.0315)

-0.327∗∗∗
(0.0330)

Dropout

-0.436∗∗∗
(0.0379)

-0.430∗∗∗
(0.0380)

-0.393∗∗∗
(0.0396)

HS Grad

-0.139∗∗∗
(0.0193)

-0.139∗∗∗
(0.0193)

-0.135∗∗∗
(0.0193)

Chow Test χ2 : GED=(1)
1.41
2
Chow Test χ : GED=(2)
Panel B: Outcome = log(Annual Hours Worked)

11.68∗∗∗
5.51∗∗

GED

-0.162∗∗∗
(0.0240)

-0.134∗∗∗
(0.0247)

-0.121∗∗∗
(0.0259)

Dropout

-0.204∗∗∗
(0.0297)

-0.190∗∗∗
(0.0298)

-0.166∗∗∗
(0.0311)

HS Grad

-0.0259∗
(0.0152)

-0.0260∗
(0.0151)

-0.0218
(0.0152)

8.75∗∗∗

12.74∗∗∗
1.01
7956

Chow Test χ2 : GED=(1)
Chow Test χ2 : GED=(2)
N

7956

7956

Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Baseline educational attainment is a college diploma, as repeating rates are lowest (6%) for college graduates
– this makes each column comparable. All coefficient estimates should be interpreted as the return relative to a college
diploma.
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Table 1.11.: Wage and Labor Supply Returns to GED and HS Diploma, Experience
and Age
Experience Control
(1)

(2)

Standard
Age
Panel A: Outcome = log(Hourly Wage)

(3)
Standard
+ Reps.

GED

-0.374∗∗∗
(0.0306)

-0.300∗∗∗
(0.0285)

-0.327∗∗∗
(0.0330)

Dropout

-0.436∗∗∗
(0.0379)

-0.349∗∗∗
(0.0357)

-0.393∗∗∗
(0.0396)

HS Grad

-0.139∗∗∗
(0.0193)

-0.140∗∗∗
(0.0193)

-0.135∗∗∗
(0.0193)

Chow Test χ2 : GED=(1)
44.00∗∗∗ 11.68∗∗∗
Chow Test χ2 : GED=(2)
2.37
Panel B: Outcome = log(Annual Hours Worked)
GED

-0.162∗∗∗
(0.0240)

-0.128∗∗∗
(0.0224)

-0.121∗∗∗
(0.0259)

Dropout

-0.204∗∗∗
(0.0297)

-0.164∗∗∗
(0.0281)

-0.166∗∗∗
(0.0311)

HS Grad

-0.0259∗
(0.0152)

-0.0263∗
(0.0151)

-0.0218
(0.0152)

14.24∗∗∗

12.74∗∗∗
0.22
7956

Chow Test χ2 : GED=(1)
Chow Test χ2 : GED=(2)
N

7956

7956

Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Baseline educational attainment is a college diploma, as repeating rates are lowest (6%) for college graduates
– this makes each column comparable. All coefficient estimates should be interpreted as the return relative to a
college diploma. Column (1) uses the conventional potential experience measure (Age-Educational Attainment-6) and
is identical to column (1) of Table 1.10. Column (2) controls for age instead of experience. Column (3) accounts for
repeated grades in the potential experience measure (Age-Educational Attainment-Repeated Grades-6) and controls
for repeated grades; it is identical to column (3) of Table 1.10.
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(a) 1977 Graduation Cohort

(b) 2014 Graduation Cohort

Fig. 1.1.: US Total Enrollment by Grade, 1977 & 2014 Graduation Cohorts
Notes:

Enrollment data are from the NCES Annual Reports Historical Tables (a) and the NCES Common Core

of Data (b). Both graphs show enrollment by projected graduation cohort. Graph (a) shows national 1st grade
enrollment in the 1965-66 AY, 2nd grade enrollment in the 1966-67 AY, etc., ending with 12th grade enrollment in
the 1976-77 AY.
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Fig. 1.2.: 9th Grade Repeating Rate Changes, 1965-2014
Notes: Enrollment data are from the NCES Annual Reports Historical Tables (1965-2003) and the NCES Common
Core of Data (2004-2014). The “Year in 9th Grade” denotes in which October each cohort is enrolled in the 9th
grade. All three lines are directly comparable at the cohort level; for year 1980, the % Change 8th-9th shows the
enrollment change between 8th grade in AY 1979-80 and 9th grade in AY 1980-81, the % Change 9th-10th shows
the enrollment change between 9th grade in AY 1980-81 and 10th grade in AY 1981-82, and the % Change 8th-10th
shows the enrollment change between 8th grade in AY 1979-80 and 10th grade in AY 1981-82.
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Fig. 1.3.: Minimum Dropout Age, 1965-2014
Notes: Average minimum dropout age, weighted by state high school enrollment (9th-12th grades) is shown from
1965-2014. Minimum dropout ages are taken from Oreopoulos (2006) for 1965-2005 and from Mackey & Duncan
(2013) for 2005-2014.
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(a) % Change 8th-9th

(b) % Change 9th-10th

Fig. 1.4.: Event Study, CSL Effects on 9th Grade Retention
Notes: Both graphs show the coefficients from estimation of the dynamic difference-in-differences model in 1.7.
Graph (a) shows coefficients with the enrollment change from 8th to 9th grade as the outcome variable, and graph
(b) shows coefficients with the enrollment change from 9th to 10th grade as the outcome variable. The year that
a minimum dropout age changes is denoted as t = 0. States that change the minimum dropout age multiple times
within 5 years are omitted in both figures. Coefficient estimates are relative to the baseline of 0 at t = −3, 3 years
before a minimum dropout age change.
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2. THE UNEXPECTED EFFECTS OF NO PASS, NO
DRIVE POLICIES ON HIGH SCHOOL EDUCATION
2.1

Introduction
Over the past 30 years, attempting to lower dropout rates and raise graduation

rates has been a central focal point of education policy on both the state and national
level. At first glance, this increased attention has improved these two educational outcomes The National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) Trends in High School
Dropout and Completion Rates in the United States: 19722012 reports that the status dropout rate, or the proportion of 16-24 year-olds who are not enrolled in high
school and do not have a high school diploma or equivalency certificate, fell from
14.6 percent in 1972 to 6.6 percent in 2012. Likewise, the proportion of 18-24 year
olds who have completed high school or an equivalent program has risen from 82.8
percent in 1972 to 91.3 percent in 2012. However, this rise in high school completion
is predominantly due to an increase in GED recipiency. Studies such as Cameron and
Heckman (1993) and Heckman et al. (2011) show both that the value of equivalency
certificates such as the GED is far less than the value of a high school diploma, and
that the rate of GED recipiency has risen dramatically over the past 30 years. In
addition, Haney et al. (2004) show that the on-time graduation rate fell from 79%
in the early 1980s to 74.4% in 2000-01. As a result, public policymakers have shifted
their focus from ensuring teens complete high school or an equivalency program to
ensuring teens graduate from high school on time. This study focuses on No Pass,
No Drive (NPND) laws a widespread, low-cost incentive program tying teens’ ability
to receive and maintain a driver’s license to their enrollment, attendance, behavior,
and/or performance in school and examines how these laws affect dropout rates,
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on-time graduation rates, and grade-by-grade enrollment across the country.

In 1988, West Virginia enacted the first No Pass, No Drive law in response to
growing problems with dropout rates and graduation rates, especially in rural areas.
West Virginia, as do most states with NPND policies, mandates that teenagers must
be enrolled in and attending school regularly in order to receive and maintain a drivers
license. When students fall below a minimum attendance threshold, or withdraw from
school entirely, the school contacts the states licensing office and instructs them to
suspend the teens license. Early anecdotal evidence suggested that NPND policies
were successful in their goal of keeping teens in school. In a 1989 New York Times
article,1 West Virginia school officials credited the enactment of the states NPND
law with a 1-2 percent reduction in the annual dropout rate (from approximately 5
percent to 3.4 percent). Following the early results in West Virginia, 26 more states
enacted their own versions of NPND policies in an effort to recreate the early success of West Virginias policy. I look at the enactment of these 27 policies, exploiting
variation in the timing of their enactment between states and examining differences
between groups of these policies, to identify the causal effects of these policies on
various educational outcomes.

A small group of No Pass, No Drive laws are aimed at preventing truancy – a
student who is enrolled in school and habitually absent will lose his or her driver’s
license. Importantly, however, these teens can drop out of school without penalty,
and a teen who previously lost his or her license due to this law can even have their
license reinstated (after a waiting period in some states). I show that this group of
policies increases the event dropout rate, or the proportion of students who drop out
of school in a single academic year, by between 1.4 and 2 percentage points. These
policies also lower the Averaged Freshman Graduation Rate (AFGR) by 5 percentage
points. In all of the states in this policy group, students can first receive their driver’s
1

“West Virginia Reduces Dropouts by Denying them Drivers License. The New York Times, May
21, 1989.
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license at age 16 and can first drop out of school at age 16, so these policies should
have a greater impact on 10th graders than on other grades in high school, as students
typically turn 16 in their 10th grade year. I show that, from October of 10th grade
to October of 11th grade the following year, enrollment falls by 2.7 percent more
than expected in these states, indicating that students are responding to the threat
of having their license revoked by dropping out of school immediately upon turning 16.

The largest group of policies, in 20 states, targets both truancy and enrollment
– these states close the “dropout loophole” mentioned above and require students
to be enrolled in school and attending regularly in order to receive and maintain a
driver’s license. As expected, these policies do not increase the dropout rate, having
no effect on the likelihood a student will drop out of school. However, these policies
cause a 1.3% reduction in the AFGR, an unintuitive result. I investigate two potential mechanisms for this graduation rate decrease. First, this could be caused by a
reduction in the true four-year graduation rate; that is, these policies could reduce
the likelihood a teen will graduate with a regular high school diploma within four
years. Alternatively, since the AFGR accounts for 9th and 10th grade enrollment in
its denominator, it could fall as a result of students delaying their dropout decisions;
a student who would drop out at the age of 16 in the absence of NPND laws may
instead drop out at 18 in order to keep his or her drivers’ license. If these delayed
dropouts are retained in the 9th and/or 10th grades, then the dropout rate would
be unaffected overall, but the denominator of the AFGR would be larger, causing a
decline in the AFGR. I find that NPND policies cause 9th grade enrollment to be 2.8
percent larger than expected, given 8th grade enrollment the year prior, suggesting
that NPND policies delay student dropout decisions. I additionally test alternative
graduation rate estimates that do not depend on 9th and 10th grade enrollment, and
find no evidence to suggest that the true four-year graduation rate is affected by
NPND policies. Thus, while the “Truancy-Based” policies increase the true dropout
rate and decrease the true likelihood a student will graduate from high school, the
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“Enrollment-Based” policies that target truancy and enrollment cause an artificial reduction in the graduation rate, distorting the perceived quality of education in these
states without actually directly affecting the true quality of education.

My results also inform the literature on behavioral incentive responses, particularly in relation to education incentive schemes. A number of studies have examined
positive educational incentive schemes, such as Mexico’s PROGRESA (Behrman et
al. 2005) and Colombia’s PACES (Angrist et al. 2002), finding that providing monetary incentives for attendance and enrollment successfully increase both attendance
and enrollment. However, these policies are quite expensive to maintain, so many
policymakers have turned to negative incentive schemes in attempts to boost enrollment and attendance. These policies penalize truancy and/or dropping out of school,
and typically have much lower monetary costs to implement and maintain them. One
negative incentive policy, Wisconsin’s Learnfare policy, penalizes students who drop
out of school or fail to meet an attendance target by sanctioning the family’s welfare
grant. Dee (2011) finds that Learnfare had large effects on enrollment and daily attendance when properly implemented, and ambiguous effects when poorly implemented.
No Pass, No Drive laws are an example of a widespread, low-cost negative incentive
scheme, where the incentives are poorly aligned. Both Behavior-Based and TruancyBased NPND policies have easily exploitable loopholes where teens can avoid the
penalty without modifying their behavior in the manner lawmakers intended. This
creates an interesting comparison – positive incentive schemes with misaligned incentives would typically result in wasted money; teens could gain the reward without
modifying their behavior. However, negative incentives schemes with misaligned incentives may motivate students to modify their behavior in undesirable ways. No
Pass, No Drive policies provide a clear example of this rarely-noticed risk of negative
incentive policies – in trying to prevent students from dropping out of school or skipping school, the two main types of NPND policies cause large increases in the 9th
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grade retention rate and the annual dropout rate, respectively.

Only three other papers have empirically examined No Pass, No Drive policies
previously.2 Krimmel (2000) performs a time-series analysis of the initial rollout of
these policies in Kentucky, finding that counties enacting NPND policies saw an 11
percent reduction in their dropout rate, while counties not enacting these policies
only saw an 8 percent reduction. More closely related to my study is Barua and
Vidal-Fernandez (2014), who focus on the effects of NPND policies nationwide on educational attainment and student time use. They show that students decrease leisure
and work hours and increase time allocated to schoolwork. They connect this to an
increase in the fraction of men and black individuals with high school diplomas, as
well as increases in completion rates of grades 10 and 11. A second working paper by
Barua and Vidal-Fernandez (2016) looks at the effects on juvenile crime, finding that
males aged 16 to 18 show a reduction in violent, drug-related, and property crime as a
result of NPND policies. My analysis, in contrast to the previous literature, is the first
national study on how heterogeneous NPND policies affect their targeted educational
outcomes – dropout rates and on-time graduation rates, as well as grade-by-grade retention rates – using data measured contemporaneously with the policies’ enactments.

My analysis of No Pass, No Drive policies makes three main contributions to the
literature on NPND laws, and, more generally, incentive programs and their effects
on teen behavior. First, I perform the first analysis of the effects of NPND policies on
their targeted outcomes – dropout rates and graduation rates. Second, I am the first
to examine how students respond to NPND policies differently at each grade level.3
This study is the first to explore the heterogeneous education requirements of NPND
laws, and is the first national study to analyze NPND effects contemporaneously with
2

These papers are discussed in greater detail in Section 2.2
Barua and Vidal-Fernandez (2014), due to their data structure, cannot examine how promotion
and retention behavior changes within each grade level. They can only examine students’ final
educational attainment.
3
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their implementation. Third, in my grade-by-grade examination, I demonstrate an
issue with using the AFGR, and by extension, any graduation rate estimate that does
not track students year-to-year, as a measure of policy outcomes – that graduation
rates can be significantly biased in the presence of policies and programs that distort
enrollment. Specifically, I show that rather than reducing the number or true rate of
graduates, which would contradict the existing literature, Enrollment-based NPND
policies increase enrollment in 9th and 10th grades relative to their initial cohort size
in 8th grade. Truancy-based NPND policies, however, cause students to drop out
of school and reduce the number of graduates per year. This provides an interesting scenario – both Enrollment- and Truancy-based NPND policies lower graduation
rate estimates, but the decrease in the Enrollment-based states does not stem from
a reduction in the true graduation rate, while the decrease in Truancy-based states
does. This peculiarity with Enrollment-based NPND policies is also not unique to
the AFGR; any estimate that includes 9th and/or 10th grade enrollment in the denominator will be negatively affected by this type of NPND policy. The AFGR was
the benchmark graduation rate statistic used by the U.S. Department of Education
from 2004-2012 under the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) to determine Adequate
Yearly Progress (AYP). NPND policies, by lowering the AFGR, decreased the likelihood of schools, districts, and states of meeting their respective AYP standards, and
likely resulted in a number of schools being designated for “improvement that, in the
absence of NPND policies, would have otherwise met their graduation rate goals.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the history
of No Pass, No Drive policies, including a list of each policy across the country and
their attributes, as well as a review of the relevant literature. Section 3 describes
the data sources and estimation strategy employed. Section 4 presents the primary
results, explains the forces driving my results, and presents a set of robustness checks
to demonstrate validity of my findings, as well as to show a lack of alternative expla-

55
nations for my results. Section 5 discusses the impact of No Pass, No Drive policies
under the No Child Left Behind Act and provides concluding remarks.

2.2

Background

2.2.1

Policy Details

Starting with West Virginia in 1988, 27 states have passed laws linking student behavior, attendance, and performance to their ability to receive and maintain a drivers’
license. Differing from the previous work on these policies, I categorize these policies
into groups to more closely examine the effectiveness of the various incentives. For
example, the first of these policies, in West Virginia, only allows a license to be held
by a student who “maintains current school enrollment and is making satisfactory
academic progress.” 4 The policy in Nevada states that “If a child is adjudicated to be
in need of supervision because the child is a habitual truant, the juvenile court shall
. . . order the suspension of the driver’s license of the child” 5 The policy in West
Virginia requires school enrollment and “satisfactory academic progress,” while the
Nevada policy only requires the student not be a truant. This allows teens to change
their behavior in Nevada to avoid punishment under this policy; truant teens can drop
out of school and no longer be classified as truant, thus allowing them to maintain
their license. Additionally, a third type of policy in Kansas states that “Whenever a
pupil who has attained the age of 13 years has been found in possession of a weapon
or illegal drug at school, . . . the division of vehicles immediately shall suspend
the pupil’s driver’s license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle.” 6 Clearly, these
are three different policies, attempting to curb different problems, and so examining
them as if they were a single policy aimed at reducing dropout rates and raising graduation rates would inaccurately identify the full effect of those policies that do target
these rates. To solve this, I classify the policies into three groups – Enrollment-Based
4

West Virginia Annotated Code, 17B-2-3a(2)(E)
Nevada Revised Statutes, 62E.430
6
Kansas Statute Annotated, 72-89c02(a)-(c)
5
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policies, as in West Virginia, which directly target high school dropouts and truants,
Truancy-Based policies, as in Nevada, which target truants but not dropouts, and
Behavior-Based policies, as in Kansas, which target school discipline. These groupings, as well as some unique features of these policies, are shown in Table 2.1.

Except for the case of Kentucky (see footnote 25), no NPND policy has ever been
repealed; all 27 of these policies are currently ongoing. Implementing these policies
requires coordination between local education agencies and the drivers’ license issuing
offices. For example, some states, such as Kentucky, have an electronic communication system in place between schools and the Kentucky Division of Motor Vehicle
Licensing, so that a student failing to meet the requirements to keep his or her license
at school will be automatically “flagged” in the system (Krimmel 2000). In contrast,
states like Texas have no such electronic communication system in place. Instead,
students in Texas must take a form confirming their enrollment and attendance for
the past 180 days in to the Texas Department of Public Safety in order to receive a
learner’s permit at age 15, to receive a graduated drivers’ license at age 16, and to renew the license at age 17 (TX Transportation Code 7B-521-003). Thus, heterogeneity
across states in reporting student activity and in enforcing these policies is present.
However, due to the subjectiveness of attempting to categorize these systems, as
well as uncertainty on how such electronic systems have been implemented over time,
I am unable to examine the effects of differing reporting systems on student outcomes.

I am also unable to directly link enforcement of these policies to student outcomes,
as data on revocation and suspension of licenses under NPND policies are generally
unavailable. A potential concern would be that the policy (i) does not affect enough
teens, or (ii) is not strictly enforced, so that the impact on education statistics for
the entire population of high school students would be imperceptible. However, a
2006 nationally representative survey of teen drivers estimates that nearly 75% of
9th-11th graders drive regularly, either on their own or with a driving instructor
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or parent (“Driving Through the Eyes of Teens...” 2009). By 11th grade, only
10% of teens do not drive at all, suggesting No Pass, No Drive policies would affect
almost all high school students. The relevant results of this survey are reproduced
in Table C.1 in the appendix. Additionally, although enforcement numbers are not
available in most states for most years, a 2011 policy brief from the Southern Regional
Education Board reports these numbers for four states (Lenard 2011). The full set
of enforcement numbers available is reproduced in Table C.2 in the appendix, as
well as counts of driver’s licenses held by teens in those states from the US Federal
Highway Administration in 2009. Tennessee has the lowest annual suspension rate,
at 2.8% of licenses suspended per year. The other three reporting states suspend over
10% of all teen licenses per year, suggesting these policies are generally enforced, but
with some heterogeneity.7 Although I cannot test the degree of enforcement of these
policies directly, it appears that No Pass, No Drive policies are enforced and, more
importantly, that teens in the United States drive regularly.

2.2.2

Relevant Literature

Only three studies, to my knowledge, have empirically examined the effects of No
Pass, No Drive policies. Krimmel (2000) was the first to perform an empirical study
of the effects of No Pass, No Drive policies on educational outcomes. His time-series
analysis of a quasi-natural experiment in Kentucky showed that counties that enacted
NPND laws saw an 11 percent reduction in the dropout rate, while the comparison
group of counties that did not enact NPND laws only saw an 8 percent reduction in
the dropout rate. My analysis differs from Krimmels in a few key dimensions. First,
my analysis is on a national level, exploiting timing differences in the enactment of
NPND policies to identify their effects, while Krimmels only identifies the effect of
Kentuckys NPND laws. Thus, my results should provide greater external validity in
informing policy decisions. Second, Krimmel only investigates the effects of NPND
7

Florida suspended 3.4% of all licenses in the 3rd quarter of 2009, for an estimated annual suspension
rate of 13.7%.
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laws on dropout rates, while I am able to identify the effects of NPND laws on fouryear graduation rates, individual grade enrollments, and dropout rates. Finally, and
most importantly, Krimmels policy analysis is conflated with the simultaneous enactment of dropout prevention counseling programs in the treatment counties, meaning
that Krimmels results should be interpreted as the effect of NPND laws in conjunction
with dropout prevention counseling, while my analysis, by examining these policies
nationwide and exploiting heterogeneous timing of NPND enactment, is able to identify the impact of NPND policies separately and more accurately.

The only other works to empirically study No Pass, No Drive policies are two
studies by Barua and Vidal-Fernandez (2014, 2016). Their 2014 study examines
NPND policies on a national level, primarily focusing on the effects of NPND policies
on student time use and educational attainment. Using the 2009-11 rounds of the
American Community Survey (ACS), they assign treatment to individuals based on
their age and state of birth. Individuals born in a state with a NPND law who were
under the age of 13 when the policy was enacted are considered treated, and individuals aged 19 or older are untreated.8 Individuals aged 14 to 18 in the year their
state’s NPND law was enacted are omitted from the estimation. The authors perform
difference-in-differences estimation identified using between-state and between-birth
cohort variation. They show that NPND policies increase the proportion of young
adults who have a high school diploma by approximately 1 percentage point, and
demonstrate stronger effects on males (1-2%), blacks (1-4%), and particularly black
males (3-7%). They also demonstrate that educational attainment increases by 0.02
to 0.05 years on average, and that students spend approximately 0.2 more hours per
week on schoolwork as a result of NPND laws.

My work has two clear advantages over that of Barua and Vidal-Fernandez (2014).
First, I can identify the educational effects of these policies contemporaneously with
8

The earliest age at which a person could be affected by a NPND policy is 13, as Alabama, California,
and Kansas provided learner’s permits at age 13 when these NPND laws were enacted.
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their implementation. My data are taken from annual reports from the National
Center for Education Statistics (NCES), meaning that I can identify which state-year
pairs are treated in a much cleaner manner than is possible in the ACS.9 Barua and
Vidal-Fernandez omit individuals aged 14-18 when the NPND policy was enacted,
meaning that any effects in the first three to five years of an NPND policy are unobservable in their study. Second, I separate NPND policies into three types based
on the group of students they target. As previously mentioned in Section 2.1, some
NPND policies target both dropouts and truants, some target only truants, and some
target neither; my study is the first to identify these policies as potentially having
different effects. Furthermore, my study is primarily a policy analysis – I investigate
whether NPND policies are achieving their goals of increasing on-time graduation
rates and lowering dropout rates, while Barua and Vidal-Fernandez look only at the
final educational attainment of teens, then examine the behavioral responses of teens
to these policies. However, though Barua and Vidal-Fernandez show a number of unambiguous positive effects of NPND policies, I demonstrate that the largest group of
laws cause an increase in grade retention in 9th and 10th grades that exceeds any increase in the number of graduates. My estimates suggest that two to three times more
students are retained in the 9th and 10th grades than Barua and Vidal-Fernandez
find graduate due to NPND policies.10 I also show that a smaller group of laws is
extremely problematic, causing a substantial number of students to drop out of school
entirely. Despite these differences, my results do not directly contradict any of Barua
and Vidal-Fernandez’s findings; it is likely that NPND policies moderately increase
high school completion and educational attainment, but cause large increases in 9th
grade retention.

9

A potential threat to this strategy is how to assign treatment when policies are enacted during an
academic year. I use October 1st as the cutoff date for treatment, as enrollment and dropout counts
are measured nationwide in early October, and reported to the NCES in mid- to late October.
10
Barua and Vidal-Fernandez’s results suggest that for every 1,000 students, an additional 12 will
graduate due to NPND policies. I show in Figure 2.1 that for every 1,000 students under an
Enrollment-based policy, an additional 34 will be retained in 9th and 10th grades due to NPND
policies.
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Barua and Vidal-Fernandez (2016) look at the effects of No Pass, No Drive policies on juvenile crime. Using the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports, they examine how
the passage of an NPND policy affected violent crimes, property crimes, drug crimes,
and DUI offenses for teenage males and females aged 16-18. This study examines
NPND policies contemporaneously, unlike their 2014 study, and compares the effects
of NPND policies to the well-known effects of compulsory schooling laws on crime
(Lochner and Moretti 2004, Anderson 2014). Using a difference-in-differences framework with state-specific linear trends, they show that both males and females have
a 0.06 percentage point decrease in crime, primarily driven by drops in violent crime
(0.11 percentage points) and property crime (0.1-0.13 percentage points). They then
perform a triple difference, using variation in 20-24 year olds’ crime rate as a comparison group to remove potential state-year level crime shocks, finding similar, but larger
results. My results complement these results, suggesting retention and incapacitation
as potential mechanisms for the reduction in crime rates among teens affected by
NPND laws.

2.3

Data and Methods

2.3.1

Data Sources

I collected information on the details of these policies from each state’s code of
laws and legislative histories. I then merged this policy information with data on
student outcomes and school spending taken from the National Center for Education
Statistics. The NCES’s Common Core of Data (CCD) has public-use state-level data
on dropout rates, graduation rates, diploma counts, and enrollments.11 Data on grade
enrollments from grade 8 to grade 12, as well as total diploma recipients, were taken
from the State Nonfiscal Public Elementary/Secondary Education Survey datasets
11

Although district-level data are available, they only begin in 1997 and are highly incomplete, and
as such are not used in my analysis.
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available on the NCES website. I assembled a panel dataset from the state-level enrollment files from 1986-87 to 2012-13. The data are missing the number of diplomas
in 1986-87, as well as from 2010-11 to 2012-13. For school years from 2005-06 to
2009-10, data on the number of diploma recipients in each state were taken from the
CCD’s State Dropout and Completion Data Files.

Pre-constructed graduation rates are unavailable in a consistent and accurate form
across all years of my dataset. With the passage of the No Child Left Behind Act
(NCLB) in 2001, the US Department of Education (DoE) mandated that states begin
implementing more accurate measures of four-year graduation rates. As a result,
attempting to link the NCES’s graduation rates, which are self-reported by each
state, and do not follow a consistent formula, before and after 2001 would create
severe inconsistencies in my analysis. To circumvent this issue, I use the Averaged
Freshman Graduation Rate (AFGR), proposed by Greene and Winters (2002), which
is an easily calculable graduation rate statistic that only requires state-level grade
enrollment data. The AFGR was the standard graduation rate used by the US DoE
from 2005-2012 in determining school- and district-level adequate yearly progress
under NCLB, and is generally considered to be a good estimate of on-time graduation
rates, given limited available data.12 The AFGR is calculated for each state (s), in
every year (t) using the formula below:

AF GRs,t =

Diplomass,t ∗ 3
∗ 100
Grade 8s,t−4 + Grade 9s,t−3 + Grade 10s,t−2

Simply put, the AFGR uses the average enrollment for a single cohort from 8th to
10th grade as the “enrollment base” from which the four-year graduation rate is calculated. As a result of this formula and the available data, the AFGR is calculated
from 1990 to 2009. I use the AFGR, as opposed to educational attainment in the
full population as in Barua and Vidal-Fernandez, to provide a policy analysis more
12

See Heckman and LaFontaine (2012) for an overview of various graduation rate statistics used in
the United States, and a comparison of the AFGR to graduation rate estimates from other sources.
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aligned with the interests of policymakers and educational agencies. The US DoE’s
Race to the Top program, implemented in 2011, challenges states to achieve four-year
graduation rates of 90% by the year 2020, so a four-year graduation rate is a more
appropriate statistic to study than overall educational attainment in a state-level policy analysis such as this.13

Dropout rates were taken from the NCES’s annual Dropout Rates in the United
States reports. The NCES uses an event dropout rate definition, which is calculated
as the total number of students that have dropped out of grades 9-12 since October of
the previous academic year, divided by total enrollment in grades 9-12 in that year.
This means event dropout rates have a built-in lag structure, where the event dropout
rate reported in October of academic year t is primarily made up of students who
dropped out of school in academic year t−1. This is in contrast to other agencies that
report status dropout rates, which are the fraction of people of schooling age (typically ages 15-21) that are not currently enrolled in school and have not completed
school. Since these No Pass, No Drive policies often have grandfathering clauses,
where students that have already dropped out of school before the policy takes effect
do not lose their licenses, the event dropout rate is a more appropriate statistic for
examining the early years of the policy. Additionally, status dropout rates typically
consider individuals up to age 21, while NPND policies only affect those under the age
of 18. Event dropout rates are used from 1990 to 2011, as these are the only years
for which data are available. Additionally, approximately 20% of the observations
in this time period are missing. The states with NPND policies are missing fewer
observations, however – approximately 15%. I also took data on total expenditures
on public schooling per pupil from the NCES’s Elementary/Secondary Information
System (ELSi), and state unemployment rates were taken from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics from 1987-2013. All 50 states are used in this study; data are missing for
13

On-time graduation rate estimates also have the advantage of being measured contemporaneously
with NPND policy implementation, while educational attainment must be measured after individuals
complete their education.
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some state-year pairs’ dropout rates and diploma counts, but never for grade-by-grade
enrollment. Summary statistics for the dependent variables and controls are listed in
Table 2.2 below.

2.3.2

Estimation Methods

I aim to identify the impact of No Pass, No Drive laws on state average dropout
rates and graduation rates. This is done by exploiting variation in the time of passage
of these laws among the twenty states with Enrollment-Based policies, the four states
with Truancy-Based policies, and the three states with Behavior-Based policies. The
naı̈ve regression model of interest is below:
Yst = β0 + β1 EnrollBasedst + β2 T ruancyBasedst + β3 BehaviorBasedst + εst
Above, the variables Enroll-Based, Truancy-Based, and Behavior-Based are binary –
EnrollBasedst is set equal to 1 if state s has an Enrollment-Based policy in place
at time t and equal to 0 otherwise, and likewise for Truancy- and Behavior-Based.
The outcome variable, Yst , is either the dropout rate or AFGR, depending on the
regression.14

In order to account for differences in educational quality and economic climate
between the states with and without these policies, I include a pair of control variables mentioned previously – per-student public schooling expenditures and state
unemployment rates. I also include state and year fixed effects to control for baseline
differences between states and the overall downward trends observed in both dropout
rates and graduation rates over the past 25 years. Finally, I include state-specific
14

Given the timing involved in calculation of the AFGR, the first 2 years of NPND policies will only
affect the numerator (number of diplomas), not the denominator (enrollment base). However, ex
ante there is no justifiable reason to reassign the start dates of treatment, as NPND policies have
the potential to affect both the number of diplomas and the enrollment base.
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linear time trends to correct for additional state-level trends in dropout rates and
graduation rates differing from the overall trend. A cursory glance at the data suggests that states that initially have low dropout rates and/or graduation rates saw
those numbers fall to a lesser extent than states with high rates.15 I perform differencein-differences estimation with state-specific linear trends using the regression model
below:
Yst =β0 + β1 EnrollBasedst + β2 T ruancyBasedst + β3 BehaviorBasedst
+ β4 log(Spending)st + β5 U nempst + δt + γs + γs ∗ t + εst
Because I include state and year fixed effects and state-specific linear trends in this
regression model, this estimating equation is well-identified given the “parallel paths”
assumption – that the states without the policy represent a valid counterfactual for
the growth path of the outcome variable in states enacting the policy. The potential
threat to identification then, would be within-state deviations from their linear trends
that are correlated with, but not caused by, the implementation of No Pass, No Drive
policies. The coefficients β1 , β2 , and β3 are the parameters of interest in this regression, and, assuming the identifying assumption above holds, should be interpreted as
the causal effect of these No Pass, No Drive policies on dropout rates and graduation
rates.

2.4

Results
Table 2.3 shows the primary regression results, using the model specification de-

scribed in Section 3.2 and the dropout rate as the dependent variable. In Table 2.3
and the remainder of the paper, all reported standard errors are the typical clusterrobust standard errors. However, the Enrollment-based policies use the typical tdistribution in hypothesis testing, while the Truancy- and Behavior-based policies
use a t-distribution generated from the bootstrap procedure described in Cameron et
15

Section 2.4.2 further discusses why my preferred specification includes state-specific linear time
trends.
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al. (2008).16

Column (1) shows the naı̈ve regression results on dropout rates, demonstrating
that the states with the No Pass, No Drive policies have below-average dropout rates.
This suggests that a difference-in-differences approach, as in columns (2)-(5), is necessary to establish causality. Columns (4) and (5) include the full set of controls, and
are the main results. It is important to note here that, based on the event dropout
rate definition, the dropout rate would only be temporarily influenced by students
delaying their dropout decision. So, for example, if a student subject to one of these
policies at age 16 decides to drop out of school at age 18, when they no longer are
affected by the policy, the policy coefficient would remain unchanged. Looking at
columns (4) and (5), Enrollment-Based policies have no significant effect on dropout
rates, indicating that any students who do change their dropout behavior based on
this policy are delaying their dropout decision. Truancy-Based policies, alternatively,
increase the dropout rate by 1.229 percentage points per year – the mean dropout
rate is 4.42%, so approximately 32% more students drop out of school each year than
would have otherwise. Recall the incentives at work in these policies – a habitual
truant will lose his or her driving privileges, but a dropout will not in these states.
Additionally, as mentioned in the description of my data previously, the event dropout
rate has a built-in lag, meaning my estimates of the policy effect on dropout rates
likely face attenuation bias – the first year of treatment in my analysis often includes
the majority of an academic year in which the policy was not in effect. To test this,
16

Section A in the appendix describes inference for Truancy- and Behavior-based policies. In Table
B.1 in the appendix, placebo testing shows that analysis on the truancy-based policies suffers from
severe type I error; to correct for this, I use the wild cluster bootstrap-t as in Cameron et al. (2008).
This method corrects for type I error in difference-in-differences estimation when implementing
clustered standard errors with rarely-treated clusters, and allows for proper statistical inference. The
cluster-robust standard error estimates are presented, as opposed to a bootstrapped standard error
estimate, because the cluster-robust estimate is used to calculate the Wald statistic used for inference.
The bootstrap procedure tests the typical Wald statistic generated from OLS estimation against a
bootstrap t-distribution of Wald statistics, so the appropriate standard error to report is the typical
cluster-robust standard error estimate. The coefficients and standard error estimates presented in all
tables are unaffected by the bootstrap procedure, and only the p-values and significance indicators
are affected for the Truancy- and Behavior-Based policies.
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and to confirm that the first-year effect is not having an unexpected impact on my
results, in Table C.3 in the appendix I use a “Donut Treatment” specification where
I omit the first year of treatment from my analysis.17 This specification suggests the
Truancy-based policies increase the event dropout rate by 1.98 percentage points. I
interpret these two estimates of the treatment effects as bounds on the true effect –
that Truancy-based policies increase the dropout rate by between 1.4 and 1.98 percentage points, or 32 and 45 percent. Additionally, Figure C.1 in the appendix shows
the raw dropout rates and the rates controlling for all covariates in the main regression
for the three states used for identification. These graphs indicate the effect is primarily occurring in Delaware and New Mexico, with less dramatic effects in Nevada.18

Table 2.4 shows the primary regression results on Averaged Freshman Graduation
Rates. Again, column (1) shows the naı̈ve regression results, demonstrating that the
states with No Pass, No Drive policies have below average AFGRs. Interestingly,
however, after including the full set of controls, column (4) shows the treatment effect of the policy is still negative, implying that these policies are reducing graduation
rates in some meaningful way. Additionally, adding the spending and unemployment
controls in moving from column (3) to column (4) increased the magnitude of the coefficient estimate and decreased the standard error, suggesting that omitted variable
bias is unlikely to be the force driving this surprising result. Moving from column
(4) to (5) removes the significance from the enrollment-based coefficient, with only a
small change on the point estimate. This is likely driven by Louisiana and Oregon, as
they switch from Behavior-based policies to Enrollment-based policies, rather than
from no policy to Enrollment-based policies. Table C.4 excludes Louisiana and Oregon from this analysis, and shows an almost identical Enrollment-based coefficient to
that in column (4), suggesting the effect here is only marginally significant, but still
17

This is preferred to simply reassigning treatment one year later, as the first year of treatment is
partially treated. Reassigning treatment would likely cause similar attenuation bias to my main
specification.
18
California is omitted, as the pre-NPND dropout rate data are not available.
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requires further investigation. Column (4) also shows that the Truancy-based NPND
policies have a negative effect on AFGR, while the other Behavior-Based states have
a positive, but small and insignificant effect; Truancy-based policies, by causing an
increase in the dropout rate, also reduce the true graduation rate. However, this does
not explain the negative coefficient on the Enrollment-Based policy. The following
section discusses the importance of the AFGR, and investigates the potential causes
of this AFGR reduction.

2.4.1

No Pass, No Drive Laws and the AFGR

Upon passage of the No Child Left Behind Act in 2001, states were pushed to
improve test scores, attendance rates, and graduation rates nationwide. Each secondary school was required to report various annual measures of Adequate Yearly
Progress (AYP) – four test score measures and an on-time graduation rate measure–
that would determine the district’s and schools’ levels and status of federal education
funding. From 2005 to 2012, this on-time graduation rate was the AFGR. Given the
effects of the Truancy- and Enrollment-based policies on the AFGR, it is crucial to
investigate the underlying causes and mechanisms of this AFGR reduction.
Based on the way in which AFGR is calculated, there are two mechanisms by
which these No Pass, No Drive policies could be reducing the AFGR in Table 2.4. The
policy could be decreasing the numerator – that is, reducing the number of diplomas
handed out each year. This is likely the cause of the large, negative Truancy-Based
coefficient, but is unlikely for Enrollment-Based policies; the incentives created by
these Enrollment-Based NPND policies would in no way lead me to expect students
to respond by failing to graduate. Alternatively, this policy could be increasing the
denominator – that is, increasing enrollment in 8th, 9th, and/or 10th grades. In
addressing these two possibilities, an important feature of the US education system
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needs to be mentioned – the so-called “ninth grade bottleneck”.

A number of papers have noted that ninth grade retention rates are extremely
high in the United States, and have grown drastically over the past 50-60 years.
McCallumore and Sparapani (2010) estimate that approximately 22% of students
repeat at least some 9th grade classes. This has increased 9th grade enrollment to
the point where it is an entirely inaccurate measure of a single grade cohort’s size.
The AFGR was created, in part, to correct for this very issue; it reduces the impact of
9th grade enrollment on graduation rates by factoring in estimated cohort size, using
8th and 10th grade enrollments to smooth the estimated enrollment base. To identify
the effect the No Pass, No Drive policies have on the AFGR, I first consider how
these policies affect year-to-year enrollment changes for a particular cohort. Using
the CCD enrollment data I construct a number of dependent variables showing yearto-year enrollment changes for a single cohort. For example, the 8th to 9th grade
enrollment change is calculated as:

%Change8th − 9ths,t =

9thGradeEnrollments,t − 8thGradeEnrollments,t−1
∗ 100%
8thGradeEnrollments,t−1

Alternatively, I could use log(Enrollment) as the dependent variable in these regressions. I use the percentage changes in grade enrollment to better account for
between-cohort variation in size, and also to more clearly show the lack of promotion
out of the 9th grade. Table 2.2 demonstrates the “9th grade bottleneck” – 9th grade
is on average nearly 9% larger than 8th grade, indicating a great number of students
repeat the 9th grade at least once. In addition, many students will repeat the 9th
grade until they drop out of school. 9th grade retention rates have fallen since the year
2000, likely due to improvements in school quality and the introduction of policies
directed at reducing this effect. However, it still remains true that 9th grade enrollments are much larger than would be expected given 8th grade enrollments – 7.9%
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larger in 2012 – indicating that 9th grade retention is still a problem. Raw dropout
counts show that 9th grade dropouts and 11th grade dropouts are roughly equal in
number; however, due to compulsory schooling until the age of 16, 9th graders should
be unable to drop out of school unless they have repeated a grade.19 The enrollment
changes in Table 2.2 show that after 9th grade, enrollment numbers fall every year
as one would expect. Although the AFGR was created to reduce the bias caused by
the 9th grade pooling effect, if these policies are causing a disparate impact in any
one grade then the AFGR would be still be influenced, even if the “true” four-year
graduation rate is unaffected. I begin by directly examining the effect of Truancyand Enrollment-based NPND policies on the 9th grade bottleneck, and then show
that a reduction in graduates causes only the Truancy-based policy AFGR reduction,
not the Enrollment-based effect. Table 2.5 looks at the 9th grade bottleneck, showing
results from a regression specified identically to the previous regressions examining
dropout and graduation rates, including the same set of controls, but using percentage enrollment changes as the dependent variable.

Table 2.5 shows important effects of the Enrollment-Based policies. First, note in
column (1) that the coefficient on per-student spending is large and negative. This
indicates that the 9th grade pooling effect is correlated with low-quality, or at least
poorly funded, schooling. Compare this to the Enrollment-Based policy effect; the
policy increases the gap between 8th and 9th grade enrollment, and it may make the
9th to 10th grade attrition rate larger as well, although this coefficient is not significant. Clearly, this is evidence that the Enrollment-Based policy increases the rate of
pooling in 9th grade, constricting the 9th grade bottleneck to an even greater degree
than before the policy was implemented. To understand why this occurs, consider the
type of student affected by this policy – before the policy, many students were dropping out of school at the age of 16, but with the policy, they wait until they turn 18.
The results in Table 2.3 indicated that dropout rates were not significantly affected
19

Numbers and Rates of Public High School Dropouts: School Year 2004-05 shows 125,115 9th
graders and 125,882 11th graders dropped out of school in 2004-05.
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by this policy, so it must be that the policy is simply causing students to delay their
dropout decision. Without the policy, many of these “marginal” students – those
who would have changed their behavior under these No Pass, No Drive policies – are
retained in 9th grade until they drop out at age 16. With the policy, the primary
difference is that these marginal students are retained in 9th grade an additional 1 or
2 years, eventually dropping out at age 18.

Additionally, Table 2.5 verifies the results from Table 2.3 regarding the effects of
Truancy-based policies on dropout rates. The majority of states in the time period
examined, including all Truancy-based states, had compulsory schooling until the
age of 16, and also allowed students to receive their driver’s license at the age of 16.
Since students who are progressing through school normally will be 16 years old in
the 10th grade, the result in column (3) is entirely expected – truant teens drop out
of school at the first available opportunity, making the gap between 10th and 11th
grade enrollment larger.

An alternative explanation for the AFGR falling due to the Enrollment-based
policies is a decrease in the numerator of the AFGR statistic – that these policies
reduce the number of diplomas given out in some meaningful way. I test for this in
two ways; first, by using the 12th grade graduation rate, calculated as before as the
ratio of diplomas to 12th grade enrollment in a given academic year. I also consider
a simple five-year graduation rate – calculated as the ratio of diplomas to 8th grade
enrollment five years prior. The five-year graduation rate should not be affected by
9th grade pooling, so while it may be an overall noisier measure of on-time graduation than the AFGR, Enrollment-based policies should not affect this estimate, while
Truancy-based policies should. If these policies are truly making students graduate
at a lower rate, instead of artificially lowering the AFGR statistic via increasing 9th
grade enrollments, the coefficient estimates for these two specifications, especially the
five-year graduation rate, should be negative, significant, and equal in magnitude to
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the estimates in Table 2.4. Table 2.6 shows the effects of NPND policies on these two
graduation rate estimates.

Column (1) shows the effect on the percentage of 12th graders that graduate in
a given year. No policy has a significant effect, but magnitude of the coefficient on
Enrollment-based policies is less than 1, while the coefficient on Truancy-based policies is nearly 2.5. However, this is a far less accurate measure of a possible effect
of these policies on graduation than the five-year graduation rate. If some of the
“marginal” students under Enrollment-based policies – those who would drop out at
age 16 without the policy but instead wait until they turn 18 – move through school
on-track, meaning they are in 12th grade when they turn 18, then it is reasonable
to assume that not only might these students drop out of the 12th grade, but also
the average ability of 12th graders would decrease as a result of the policy. A more
accurate measure of how these policies affect on-time graduation rates is the fiveyear graduation rate. Column (3) shows that the Enrollment-Based policy effect is
negative, relatively small, and insignificant. Truancy-based policies appear to cause
extremely large, but insignificant decreases in the five-year graduation rate, but the
other policies do not have an effect. All of this evidence suggests that, while the
Truancy-Based policies reduce actual graduation rates and increase dropout rates,
the Enrollment-Based policies only artificially reduce the AFGR by increasing 9th
grade enrollment.

Additionally, these results do not directly conflict with the findings on educational
attainment in Barua and Vidal-Fernandez’s previous work. I find small and insignificant effects on the alternative graduation rate estimates in Table 2.6, while Barua
and Vidal-Fernandez find a small, but significant increase in the proportion of the
population with a high school diploma. In Appendix Table C.5 I replicate Barua and
Vidal-Fernandez’s estimation of the effects of NPND policies on high school completion in the ACS 2009-2011, categorizing policies into three groups as in my study,
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and compare to my analogous results. In the full sample, I find comparable results to
Barua and Vidal-Fernandez for Enrollment-based policies.20 Truancy-based policies
appear to have larger effects than Enrollment-based policies, but further investigation in column (2) shows this is driven by California. California’s policy is likely to
cause similar responses to Enrollment-based policies, as the minimum dropout age
in California is 18, meaning students cannot legally exploit the “dropout loophole”
available in Delaware, Nevada, and New Mexico.21 California is missing dropout data
before their NPND policy, and as a result is not used for identification in my dropout
rate estimation. However, California is not missing in my AFGR and enrollment
data; my results presented in Panels B and C of Table C.5 are not sensitive to the
omission of any individual state with a Truancy-based policy. This suggests that the
differences between my findings and those of Barua and Vidal-Fernandez are driven
primarily by our classification of policies and choices of outcome variables, and that
my study complements theirs, giving a more complete description of the effects of
NPND policies on teen educational choices.

To demonstrate the effects NPND policies have on grade-by-grade enrollment more
clearly, Figure 2.1 shows, for every 1,000 8th graders, how many students are expected
to be enrolled at each grade level.

In Figure 2.1, the “Without NPND” bars show the average year-to-year enrollment changes among all 23 states that never begin a NPND policy. The “With
NPND” bars add the Enrollment- or Truancy-based regression results from Table
2.5 to the “Without NPND” averages, meaning that the “With NPND” effects show
the expected results of a state enacting NPND laws among the states that do not
currently have NPND laws. The number atop each bar shows the estimated size of
20

Here I replicate their most restrictive specification, allowing for state-specific linear and quadratic
trends.
21
The minimum dropout age in Delaware is 16, in Nevada is 17, with exemptions given to working
teens as young as 14, and in New Mexico is 18, with exemptions given to working teens and teens
enrolled in GED study programs.
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the gap between the states with and without NPND policies. There are a few key
effects of the NPND policies that clearly reveal themselves in this graph. First, looking at Graph (a), Enrollment-based NPND laws have the largest effect in 9th grade.
For every 1000 8th graders, 9th grade enrollment increases by about 28 students as
a result of these policies. Second, the negative coefficient on the 9th to 10th grade
enrollment change does not cancel out the large, positive coefficient on the 8th to
9th grade enrollment change – 10th grade enrollment is also larger than expected,
given 8th grade enrollment. Finally, the remaining coefficients essentially cancel out
the remaining effect. That is, 11th and 12th grade enrollments and diploma counts
are essentially identical when comparing NPND states to their counterparts without
NPND laws. Additionally, recall that none of the coefficients after the 8th to 9th
grade change were significantly different from zero. As a result, Figure 2.1 (a) may
be underestimating the size of 10th, 11th, and 12th grades, as well as the number
of diplomas. Overall, the massive increase in 9th grade enrollment and the smaller
increase in 10th grade enrollment are much more likely to be the causes of the AFGR
reduction than a decline in high school graduates.

Looking at Figure 2.1 (b), the Truancy-based policies show the opposite effect
from the Enrollment-based policies. 9th and 10th grades are unaffected by Truancybased policies, and there is a substantial decrease in 11th and 12th grade enrollment
(20-30 students per 1,000 8th graders) and in the number of graduates caused by
these policies. This indicates Truancy-based policies truly cause an increase in the
dropout rate, and that many of the teens who drop out because of these policies
would have otherwise graduated from high school. There appears to be an additional
reduction in the number of graduates, relative to the number of 12th graders. This
is likely caused by students who become older than their state’s minimum dropout
age – in California and New Mexico, the minimum dropout age is 18 (with numerous
exemptions in New Mexico), and in Nevada, the minimum dropout age is 17. Given
this, it is reasonable to expect students to drop out at their first available opportunity,
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which occurs in the 10th grade in Delaware or if exempt from compulsory schooling
in Nevada and New Mexico, and occurs in the 12th grade otherwise. So while both
Enrollment-based and Truancy-based policies decrease the AFGR, Enrollment-based
policies are distorting enrollment without truly decreasing the number of graduates,
while Truancy-based policies are increasing the number and rate of dropouts and
decreasing the true likelihood a teen will graduate.

2.4.2

Event Studies

A potential concern with these results is the validity of the identifying assumption
– that, after removing the effects of the spending and unemployemnt controls and
state-specific linear time trends, the dependent variables have parallel trends between
states with and states without No Pass, No Drive policies. To test this, I estimate
dynamic diff-in-diff models analogous to the following:

Yst =β0 +

−2
X
i=−3

ηi EnrollStarteds,t+i +

5
X

ηi EnrollStarteds,t+i

i=0

+
6+
+ φ− EnrollStarted4−
s,t + φ EnrollStarteds,t + β2 T ruancys,t + β3 Behaviors,t

+ β4 log(Spending)s,t + β5 U nemps,t + δt + γs + γs ∗ t + εs,t
In the equation above, the terms EnrollStarteds,t+i are binary, equal to 1 i years
after the Enrollment-based policy was first implemented in state s.

The terms

6+
EnrollStarted4−
s,t and EnrollStarteds,t are binary, equal to 1 when the policy be-

gins in 4 or more years22 or has been in place 6 or more years, respectively. This
model normalizes the coefficient 1 year before the policy begins to zero, for ease of
visual interpretation. I collect the coefficient estimates ηt and their standard errors
and graph them in a series of plots in Figures 2.2 and 2.3. I also estimate the above
22

This is chosen primarily to avoid endpoint effects. For Truancy-based policies, I do not have AFGR
or enrollment data for California for 5+ years before the policy begins. For enrollment policies, 3 of
the 20 states do not have data 5 or more years before the policy begins.
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equation without including state-specific linear time trends (γs ∗ t), and present the
estimates in Figure 2.4

In Figure 2.2, the parallel paths assumption holds well for the dropout rate, as the
pre-policy trend is flat and near zero. Additionally, following implementation of the
Truancy-based NPND policies, the dropout rate rises substantially. For the AFGR
and 10th-11th grade enrollment changes, the pre-policy trend is somewhat concerning. However, if I omit state-specific linear trends as in Figure 2.4, the pre-policy
trend for the AFGR is flat and near zero, and the pre-policy trend for the dropout
rate is concerning. Considering both of these results together, both model specifications suggest the same effects of Truancy-based NPND policies on event dropout
rates and the AFGR, with the strength of my identification varying depending on the
specification used.

In Figure 2.3, the parallel paths assumption holds well for both the dropout rate
and the AFGR – Enrollment-based NPND policies appear to not affect the annual
dropout rate, but decrease the AFGR. The 8th-9th grade enrollment change is potentially concerning, as the preexisting trend appears to continue after the policy
begins, but the combination of a decline in the AFGR and no change in dropout
rates suggest early high school retention as the most likely cause. In Figure 2.4(d),
the pre-policy noise in estimation for the AFGR makes identification difficult, as the
states with Enrollment-based NPND policies do not appear to satisfy the parallel
trends assumption. Overall, comparing Figures 2.2 and 2.3 to Figure 2.4 shows why
I prefer a specification with state-specific linear trends to one without trends. I find
qualitatively and quantitatively similar effects of Truancy-based policies regardless of
which specification I choose, and state-specific linear trends allow proper identification
of the Enrollment-based policies’ effects on the AFGR.
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2.5

Conclusion
Overall, No Pass, No Drive policies do not appear to be as unambiguously bene-

ficial to educational outcomes as previous studies have found. Of immediate concern
to policymakers should be the effects of Truancy-Based policies, which I am the first
to separately identify and study, on teen decision-making. These policies distort
incentives, making absence from school much more costly without directly altering
the costs of dropping out of school. As a result, Truancy-based policies result in
a massive increase in the annual dropout rate, and an associated decrease in the
four-year graduation rate, as well as 11th and 12th grade enrollment. Important to
note is that the students who drop out of school as a result of these policies are
ones who likely would have completed high school without this policy intervention –
the dropout rate rises and the true graduation rate falls, indicating that these new
dropouts would have completed high school if not for the policy intervention. This
means that Truancy-based NPND policies have strong implications beyond the contemporaneous education effects, and in fact beyond the teenage years into adulthood.
Also important to note is the magnitude of the impact of these policies; I calculate
that Truancy-based policies increase the number of dropouts in the United States by
over 27,000 teens per year,23 showing that, despite the relative rarity of these policies,
the overall effect is quite large.

Looking at Enrollment-based No Pass, No Drive policies, the effects are more
subtle, yet still quite important. While my analysis is unable to refute previous results that educational attainment increases due to the enactment of Enrollment-based
NPND policies, this increase seems to, at most, marginally improve the number of
high school graduates in the population, and does not seem to improve the number
of on-time high school graduates. This slight increase in educational attainment also
carries with it some significant, but previously unnoticed, costs. Enrollment in 9th
23

High school enrollment for California, Delaware, Nevada, and New Mexico in 2012-13 was about
2.2 million, multiplied by the Truancy-based coefficient from Table 2.3.

77
grade, relative to 8th grade, increases by nearly 3 percent, and enrollment in 10th
grade increases by approximately 1 percent. This puts pressure on state and local
education budgets, as higher student enrollment numbers would require the hiring of
additional teachers and staff, as well as increased overall spending on student services
and needs ranging from cafeteria lunches to textbook purchases. Additionally, the
students being retained in school as a result of these NPND policies are the “marginal
dropouts who are nearly indifferent between dropping out of school and remaining
in school in the absence of the NPND policies. These students likely have an increased prevalence of behavioral and learning issues, which may be imposing negative
externalities on their peers (Carrell and Hoekstra 2010), raising the cost of NPND
policies by reducing educational quality for the students who otherwise have their
behavior unaffected by these policies. Add to this the fact that, for nearly a decade,
NPND policies increased the likelihood for schools to fail to meet their Adequate
Yearly Progress standards under the No Child Left Behind Act, and Enrollmentbased NPND policies do not appear to be as unambiguously beneficial as previously
thought.

Moving forward, policymakers need to reevaluate the goals of No Pass, No Drive
policies and examine how the results of these policies align with their goals. If the goal
is simply to keep teenagers in school, potentially causing improvements in outcomes
such as juvenile crime rates (Barua and Vidal-Fernandez 2016), then Enrollmentbased NPND laws appear to successfully achieve this goal 9th and 10th grade enrollment increases, without bringing associated decreases in 11th or 12th grade enrollment. However, if the goal of NPND policies is to improve students educational
outcomes, then a revision of these policies is needed. Although Enrollment-based
NPND policies increase educational attainment for marginal dropouts, they likely
impose substantial costs on their schools and the overall student population; Truancybased NPND policies cause teens to drop out of school, but potentially reduce costs on
schools and the overall student population. Enrollment-based NPND policies increase
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retention by incentivizing enrollment and attendance, Truancy-based policies directly
decrease enrollment by inducing students to drop out of school, and yet neither fully
achieves its stated goal. In an interview with the New York Times, the West Virginia
official in charge of enforcing the nation’s first NPND policy stated, “We expect our
graduation rate to climb steadily from here on out... Ultimately, that means we’re
going to have a better educated labor force” (Ayres 1989). NPND policies, in their
current form, are weakly effective at achieving these goals.
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Table 2.1.: No Pass, No Drive Policies in the United States
State Name

Policy
Enactment Year

Hardship/Working
Exemption

GED
Exemption

Other

1993
1989
1997
1998
1996
2007
1991
1994
1990, 200725
2009
1994
1998
1992
1996
2000
1998
1990
1995
1988
1988
Policy
Start Year

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No24
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
Truants
Only

No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
Discipline
Only

Teen parents exempt

1992
2000
2003
2005

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
No
No

1999
200426
199526
2005
1996

No
No
No
No
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Enrollment-Based
Alabama
Arkansas
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kentucky
Louisiana
Mississippi
North Carolina
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
South Carolina
Tennessee
Texas
West Virginia
Wisconsin
State Name
Truancy-Based
California
Delaware
Nevada
New Mexico
Behavior-Based
Kansas
Louisiana
Oregon
Rhode Island
Virginia

24

Only some counties enacted policy
Other

Exempt with parental permission

In the original version of this policy, Iowa had an exemption for working students. This exemption
was removed in 2005.
25
Kentucky instituted this policy in 1990 in some counties; however, the law was struck down by
the Kentucky Supreme Court in 2003 (D.F. v Codell ). A new law, identical to the original for the
purposes of this research, was implemented in 2007.
26
Louisiana and Oregon initially had Behavior-Based policies focusing on discipline, but then
changed to Enrollment-Based policies focusing on dropouts at a later date.
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Table 2.2.: Summary Statistics
Variable
Mean
St. Deviation
Dependent Variables
Dropout Rate
4.42%
1.90%
AFGR
75.69%
8.15%
% Change 8th-9th
8.79%
6.47%
% Change 9th-10th
-7.24%
6.02%
% Change 10th-11th
-7.96%
5.54%
% Change 11th-12th
-6.16%
5.37%
12th Grade Grad. Rate 90.44%
6.03%
5-Year Grad. Rate
77.45%
8.31%
Control Variables
Unemp. Rate
5.61%
1.88%
Per-Student Spending
$7620.13
$2853.20

Min

Max

1.1%
13.7%
53.47%
97.72%
-10.57%
47.10%
-38.16%
13.84%
-35.90%
9.00%
-38.63%
9.97%
63.00% 100% (cut off)
53.92% 100% (cut off)
2.3%
$2767

13.7%
$20910

N
869
1018
1326
1326
1326
1326
1171
1018
1122
1071
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Table 2.3.: Effects of No Pass, No Drive Policies on Dropouts
Dropout Rate
Enrollment-Based

Other Policies

(1)
-0.929∗∗
(0.351)

(2)
-0.446
(0.449)

(3)
0.125
(0.346)

(4)
0.272
(0.375)

-0.250
(0.513)

0.538
(0.536)

1.018∗∗∗
(0.295)

1.050∗∗∗
(0.276)

(5)
0.174
(0.364)

Truancy-Based

1.229∗∗
(0.263)

Behavior-Based

0.393
(0.648)
Yes
Yes
Yes
818

Fixed Effects
State-Specific Trends
School and Macro Controls
N

869

Yes

Yes
Yes

869

869

Yes
Yes
Yes
818

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state.
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Behavior- and Truancy-based p-values are bootstrapped as in Cameron et al. (2008)
“Fixed Effects” refers to both state and year fixed effects. “School and Macro Controls”
are controls for log(per-student spending) and unemployment rate.
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Table 2.4.: Effects of No Pass, No Drive Policies on AFGR
Averaged Freshman Graduation Rate
Enrollment-Based

Other Policies

(1)
-3.667∗
(1.932)

(2)
(3)
-0.127 -1.133
(0.685) (0.816)

(4)
-1.330∗
(0.763)

-4.949∗∗
(2.244)

-2.412 -2.628∗
(1.782) (1.461)

-2.732∗
(1.448)

(5)
-1.139
(0.764)

Truancy-Based

-4.999∗
(2.365)

Behavior-Based

0.597
(1.103)
Yes
Yes
Yes
1018

Fixed Effects
State-Specific Trends
School and Macro Controls
N

1018

Yes

Yes
Yes

1018

1018

Yes
Yes
Yes
1018

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state.
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Behavior- and Truancy-based p-values are bootstrapped as in Cameron et al. (2008)
“Fixed Effects” refers to both state and year fixed effects. “School and Macro Controls”
are controls for log(per-student spending) and unemployment rate.
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Table 2.5.: Effects of No Pass, No Drive Policies on Grade Enrollments
Percentage Change in Enrollment
8th-9th
(1)
2.792∗∗
(1.281)

9th-10th
(2)
-1.651
(1.040)

10th-11th
(3)
-0.653
(0.710)

11th-12th
(4)
0.333
(0.539)

Truancy-Based

-0.0158
(2.021)

-0.169
(1.927)

-2.769∗
(1.677)

0.859
(1.434)

Behavior-Based

-0.260
(0.748)

1.673
(0.671)

-1.444
(1.119)

0.955
(0.565)

log(Spending)

-14.43∗∗
(6.241)

3.864
(6.248)

-1.659
(5.989)

-5.341∗
(3.041)

Unemp. Rate

-0.575
(0.352)
1071

-0.177
(0.244)
1071

-0.166
(0.305)
1071

-0.0017
(0.196)
1071

Enrollment-Based

N

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Behavior- and Truancy-based p-values are bootstrapped as in Cameron et al. (2008)
All specifications include state and year fixed effects, controls for
log(per-student spending) and unemployment rate, and state-specific time trends.
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Table 2.6.: Effects of No Pass, No Drive Policies on Alternative Graduation Rates
12th Grade
Grad. Rate
Enrollment-Based

Other Policies

(1)
-0.829
(1.093)

(2)
-0.747
(1.086)

-1.230
(0.719)

5-Year
Grad. Rate
(3)
-0.738
(0.729)

(4)
-0.479
(0.724)

-3.657
(1.827)

Truancy-Based

-2.488
(1.065)

-6.422
(2.981)

Behavior-Based

0.078
(1.167)
1018

0.0187
(0.862)
1018

N

1018

1018

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Behavior- and Truancy-based p-values are bootstrapped as in Cameron et al. (2008)
All specifications include state and year fixed effects, school and macro controls,
and state-specific time trends.
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(a) Enrollment-Based Policies

(b) Truancy-Based Policies

Fig. 2.1.: No Pass, No Drive Enrollment Effects
NOTE: The hashed blocks above show average enrollment and diplomas per 1,000
8th graders for states without NPND policies. The solid blocks add the estimates
from Table 2.5 to these averages.
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(a) Dropout Rate

(b) AFGR

(c) % Change 10th-11th

Fig. 2.2.: Truancy-Based Policy Trends
NOTE: Time=0 is the first year of the policy. A vertical line appears at Time=-0.5, so that all
points lying to the left are untreated, and all points lying to the right are treated. Year-by-year
point estimates and 95% confidence intervals are displayed.
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(a) Dropout Rate

(b) AFGR

(c) % Change 8th-9th

Fig. 2.3.: Enrollment-Based Policy Trends
NOTE: Time=0 is the first year of the policy. A vertical line appears at Time=-0.5, so that all
points lying to the left are untreated, and all points lying to the right are treated. Year-by-year
point estimates and 95% confidence intervals are displayed.

88

(a) Truancy – Dropout Rate

(b) Truancy – AFGR

(c) Enrollment – Dropout Rate

(d) Enrollment – AFGR

Fig. 2.4.: Policy Effects, Without Linear Trends
NOTE: Time=0 is the first year of the policy. A vertical line appears at Time=-0.5, so that all
points lying to the left are untreated, and all points lying to the right are treated. Year-by-year
point estimates and 95% confidence intervals are displayed.
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3. THE LINKS BETWEEN TEEN BEHAVIOR,
EDUCATION, AND DRIVING – EVIDENCE FROM NO
PASS, NO DRIVE POLICIES
3.1

Introduction
Policymakers have long been interested in encouraging teen behaviors that have

positive long term effects and eliminating behaviors that have adverse effects on young
people’s futures. This policy focus seems to have been effective; teen fertility has decreased from around 6.2% in 1972 to 2.7% in 2013.1 During the same period, the
high school completion rate among 18 to 24 year olds increased by 8.5 percent and
the “status dropout rate”, the percent of 16-24 year olds not enrolled in school and
without a high school diploma, fell by 8 percent.2 An obvious question, and one
asked frequently in economics, is how teen behavior and teen education are linked.
Schooling has an incapacitation effect – restricting the freedom of teens, and preventing engagement in risky behaviors. Education can also have a direct effect, teaching
students to make better choices. However, it is difficult to identify the causal effect
of education on teen behavior due to the endogeneity of educational choice (Becker,
1962; Willis & Rosen, 1979) – teens who are more likely to be well-behaved are also
more likely to attend school. In this study, we focus on No Pass, No Drive (NPND)
policies- a program that ties teens’ ability to receive and maintain a driver’s license
to their enrollment, attendance, and/or behavior in school – and examine how these
policies affect teen behavior, given the educational effects found in the literature.

1

Source: National Center for Health Statistics.
Source: The National Center for Education Statistics’ (NCES) Trends in High School Dropout and
Completion Rats in the United States: 1972-2012
2
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Over the past 30 years, 27 states have passed No Pass, No Drive (NPND) laws
in United States. In order to receive and maintain a driver’s license, teenagers must
fulfill some requirements related to their education – typically enrollment and attendance. As a result, NPND policies can operate teenagers through three channels: (1)
Education – changing the educational attainment of teenagers; (2) Incapacitation –
keeping teenagers in school during school hours; and (3) Mobility – restricting the
driving eligibility of teenagers. There are three types of NPND laws. Enrollmentbased policies require teens under 18 to be enrolled in and attending school in order
to receive and maintain a driver’s license – their driver’s license is revoked if they
fail to enroll, drop out of school, or fail to meet the minimum attendance requirements set by their state. Truancy-based policies, however, only revoke the licenses
of truants – students who are enrolled in school but are not attending. Importantly,
truant teens can have their licenses reinstated by dropping out of school, as dropouts
are exempt from this policy. Behavior-based policies target teen behaviors, typically
juvenile crime, without targeting education.

We study three outcomes – teen births, teen-involved fatal traffic accidents, and
teen employment – that are likely to be affected by changes in teen education and/or
mobility. For Enrollment-based policies, we find that births by black and hispanic
teen girls increase by 5.6 percent and 20 percent, respectively. These policies reduce
the mobility of teens and keep them in school, but increase interactions between atrisk teens and the general teen population. In addition, Enrollment-based policies
reduce fatal traffic accidents with at least one teen driver involved by 3%, with larger
effects for white teens (16%). We also find a larger reduction in fatal accidents in later
years (12% after 1999), with no difference between school hours and non-school hours.
This suggests Enrollment-based policies primarily change teen behavior by revoking
the licenses of dropouts and truants, as the other plausible mechanisms would cause
differential effects during school hours compared to outside of school. Behavior-based
and truancy-based policies do not have significant effects on teen fertility or teen in-
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volved traffic fatal accidents.3

NPND policies have no effect on overall teen employment; full-time teen employment is also unaffected.4 However, Enrollment- and Truancy-based policies increase
black teen employment by 5 percentage points and 7 percentage points, respectively.
Enrollment-based policies increase the school enrollment (i.e. reduce the dropout
rate) of all teens by 1.1 percentage points. This causes an increase in available jobs
in the “teen labor market” – low-skill, predominantly part-time jobs – as more teens
are enrolled in school instead of working, or are working fewer hours. Interestingly,
if most of the newly available jobs were filled by black teens, relative population size
differences between white and black teens5 would suggest that a 1 percentage point
increase in job availability coming from white teens could increase black teen employment by up to 7 percentage points. This racial disparity in teen employment after
NPND policies shock teen labor supply suggests that NPND policies are weakening
racial frictions present in low-skill, teen labor markets.6 We plan to investigate these
racial frictions further in future work.

There is a rich literature focusing on identifying factors that affect teen behavior.
Manlove (1998) finds a positive association between high school dropouts and schoolage pregnancy among white and Hispanic teens. Carrell & Hoekstra (2010) find that
increased interaction with children from troubled families decreases academic performance of their peers and increases misbehavior in the classroom. Deza (2016) finds
a decrease in teen fertility caused by graduated driver licensing (GDL) programs,
programs that, like NPND policies, restrict the freedom and mobility of teen drivers.
Based on previous studies, the anticipated effect of NPND policies on teen births is
3

Behavior-based policies show a small, marginally significant increase in black teen-involved fatal
traffic accidents, but the rarity of the policy suggests this result may suffer from Type I error as
shown by Bertrand et al. (2004).
4
Only 15 percent of employed teens work full-time.
5
In our sample, there are about 7 times as many white teens as black teens.
6
We additionally show that the effects on black teen employment are greater in the South than in
the rest of the country, lending further evidence to this claim.
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ambiguous. While enrollment-based policies temporarily reduce dropouts, they retain students who would have dropped out and who likely have higher probability
of misbehavior, potentially increasing the risk of pregnancy. Truancy-based policies
increase dropouts but limit negative peer effects from trouble-makers. Thus, it is
not very clear how we should expect NPND policies to affect teen pregnancy without
further investigation.

We additionally investigate teen driver-involved fatal traffic accidents. Previous
studies find a strong link between changing the legal minimum drinking age, juvenile
crime, and fatal traffic accidents (O’Malley & Wagenaar, 1991). Barua & VidalFernandez (2016) finds that NPND laws significantly reduce the incidence of teen
involved crimes. They argue that the decrease in teen involved crimes is mainly
driven by an increase in education rather than incapacitation that caused by NPND
laws. Deza & Litwok (2016) find that crime rates of teenagers aged 16 and 17 are decreased by 6 percent because of the implementation of a Graduated Driver Licensing
system. Lowering of the legal minimum drinking age increased male juvenile crime
by 20- 25 percent in Australia (Smith & Burvill, 1987). States that lowered their
legal drinking age in the early 1970s experienced an increase in fatal accidents for
drivers directly affected by the law and for those younger than the minimum drinking age (Williams et al., 1983). Previous studies show that limiting teen driving can
substantially limit risky teen behaviors and reduce teen-involved traffic accidents.
Barua & Vidal-Fernandez (2016) find that NPND laws reduces crime rates among
teen boys, especially property crime and violent crime. There are several channels
by which NPND laws may affect teen driving. First, NPND laws incapacitate teen
drivers by keeping them in school and off the roads. Thus, fatal traffic accidents with
teen drivers involved are likely to be reduced by adopting NPND policies. Second,
as shown by Barua & Vidal-Fernandez (2014), NPND policies increase educational
attainment, which decreases impulsiveness (Becker & Mulligan, 1997) and thus would
reduce fatal traffic accidents caused by teen drivers. Third, NPND policies revoke
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the licenses of teens already engaged in risky behavior – depending on the policy,
dropouts, truants, and/or criminals lose their licenses. Combining the effects of these
three mechanisms, NPND policies should cause a substantial decrease in teen driverinvolved fatal traffic accidents.

The existing literature focuses primarily on how job opportunities affect high
school dropouts (Lee & Staff, 2007; Stearns & Glennie, 2006). More job opportunities and higher minimum wage give teens incentives to cease their education.
However, changes in dropouts may also affect job opportunities of teens, especially
under NPND policies. In most cases, particularly in non-urban areas, driving to the
workplace is necessary. Both enrollment- and truancy-based NPND policies revoke
the driver’s licenses of some teens. (Ihlanfeldt & Sjoquist, 1991) find that longer
commuting time reduces teen employment and it matters more for black teens. Their
results suggest that if the value of commuting drops from the highest to lowest, it will
induce 70 percent increase in job probability for black and 30 percent for white. Any
NPND policies that effectively reduce driving possibilities of teens may also reduce
teen employment. Additionally, the schooling requirements of NPND policies restrict
the time available for teens to work, which would decrease overall teen employment.
However, the effects could be heterogenous by race. As there is rich literatures about
racial discrimination in the labor market, it is reasonable to consider racial discrimination of labor market for teens. If black teens are under-employed due to racial
discrimination and the NPND policies increase students school retention disproportionally by race, employment of black and white teens may be affected differently by
NPND policies.

For Enrollment-based policies, it reduces driving possibilities for dropouts. Kennedy
(2018) finds it deters dropouts by revoking drivers license. Thus, it reduces time available to work for those who would have dropped out of school and therefore lowers the
employment for these teens. If the effect of Enrollment-based policies on retention
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is different for black and white, and jobs used to hold by one side go to the other
side after the NPND policies, teen employment of black and white could change in
different directions. For Truancy-based policies, it restricts driving possibilities of
truants. Nonetheless, it encourages truants to drop out by reinstating drivers licenses
and allowing more time available for work. Thus, teen employment is expected to
increase under Truancy-based policies. In additional, as commuting time matters
more for black teen employment, we would expect that black teens are more likely to
take advantage of Truancy-based policies and be employed.

Our primary contribution is filling in the gap in the literature about the effects of
NPND policies on teen outcomes. As these laws are implemented to target student
educational choice, these policies create a quasi-experimental setting allowing us to
evaluate how changes in teen behaviors stemmed from changes in educational choice
and driving eligibility. As a result of this quasi-experimental setting, we can also make
a broader contribution to the literature linking education and behavioral outcomes.7

The remainder of this paper is laid out as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the
history and background about No Pass, No Drive laws, and provides an in-depth
discussion of the existing literature on NPND laws. Section 3.3 describes our data and
methodology. Empirical results are presented and discussed in Section 3.4. Finally,
Section 3.5 provides concluding remarks.

3.2

Background

3.2.1

No Pass, No Drive Policies

Since 1987, there have been 27 states that have passed a No Pass, No Drive law,
tying teen driver’s licenses to their educational choices. Following Kennedy (2018),
7

Unfortunately, we are limited by available data in our ability to disentangle the education and
driving mechanisms. Data on license revocations under NPND policies, which could be used for
estimation of the effect of licenses on teen behavior, are generally not available.
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we categorize these laws into 3 groups based on their targeted educational outcomes.
Enrollment-based policies, in 20 states, require teens under age 18 maintain current
school enrollment and abide by the school attendance laws of their states in order
to maintain a driver’s license – both high school dropouts and truant teens have
their licenses revoked under these policies. Truancy-based policies, in 4 states, only
require teens meet their state’s school attendance law in order to maintain a driver’s
license. This means that a truant teen (i.e. one who is skipping school) is penalized
under these laws. However, a legal dropout would not be penalized under these laws;
potentially, truant teens who had their licenses revoked could instead drop out of
school altogether and have their licenses reinstated. Behavior-based policies, in 5
states, target teen behaviors – primarily crime (either at school or in general) or
non-crime violations resulting in school suspension. The policies are listed in Table
2.1.
All 27 No Pass, No Drive (NPND) policies are currently ongoing, and only 1,
in Kentucky, has ever been repealed (see footnote 25). There is heterogeneity in
exemptions to these policies, as shown in Table 2.1, but we do not exploit this variation
because it is unclear how widely these exemptions were enforced and utilitzed, and
it is also unclear whether other states had similar exemptions. Additionally, there is
heterogeneity in the reporting mechanisms used in these states; for example, Kentucky
uses an automatic electronic reporting system where students who drop out of school
or fall below the minimum attendance threshold are “flagged” in the system and
a notice is immediately sent to the state licensing office. Texas, however, requires
teens submit a form to the licensing office each year signed by their school’s registrar
stating the teen has met all of the attendance requirements over the previous year.
Due to the subjective nature of attempting to categorize these systems, and due to
uncertainty in how these electronic systems were implemented over time, we also do
not exploit variation in reporting systems.
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3.2.2

No Pass, No Drive Literature

To our knowledge, only four empirical studies have been performed on No Pass,
No Drive policies, and all three study educational outcomes. Krimmel (2000) studies the initial rollout of the policy in Kentucky, where counties could opt-in to the
policy for the first few years of the policy’s life. He shows that counties enacting
Kentucky’s Enrollment-based NPND policy saw an initial 11 percent reduction in the
dropout rate, compared to an 8 percent reduction in counties choosing not to implement the policy. This is consistent with the mechanisms we discuss in our study,
where “marginal dropouts” delay their dropout decision, at least temporarily, under
Enrollment-based NPND policies.

Barua & Vidal-Fernandez (2014) study NPND policies on a national level, looking
at high school completion, completed grades, and some student time use outcomes.
They find that years of schooling increases by 0.05 and the probability of graduating high school by 1 percentage point. They also look at the Monitoring the Future
teen time use survey, and find that NPND policies reduce the probability of skipping school (-1.8%), increase weekly hours of homework (+0.2 hours), reduce weekly
working hours (-0.1 hours), increase the proportion of teens with licenses (+0.7%),
and marginally decrease the probability of having a traffic accident (-1.6%). Similarly, Barua & Vidal-Fernandez (2016) study the effects of NPND policies on juvenile
crime, finding that NPND policies cause declines in violent, property, and drug crimes
among teenage males.

We look at similar outcomes, particularly teen employment and teen-involved fatal traffic accidents, but our analysis differs along a few key dimensions. First, and
most importantly, our data is representative of all teenagers, while the Monitoring
the Future survey used by Barua and Vidal-Fernandez is only representative of teen
high school students, and does not include any high school dropouts. Given that all
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papers in the NPND literature show that NPND policies cause marginal dropouts to
change their decisions, it is crucial to include high school dropouts in our sample to
avoid selection issues. This issue is most easily seen in Barua and Vidal-Fernandez’s
result on the proportion of teens with driver’s licenses – NPND policies increase the
proportion of teens with a driver’s license by 0.7 percentage points among teens enrolled in school, but the NPND policies, if perfectly enforced, revoke the driver’s
licenses of all teen dropouts. Given that 5-10% of all teens drop out of high school,
Enrollment-based NPND policies would only need to revoke the licenses of one fifth of
all dropouts to cancel out the increase shown by Barua and Vidal-Fernandez. Second,
we categorize NPND policies into three groups based on their targeted educational
outcomes, as mentioned in the previous section. Given that the three policies have
different effects on educational outcomes, they will presumably have different effects
on teen behavior as well.

The final study on NPND policies is Kennedy (2018), which studies how NPND
policies affect their targeted educational outcomes, and demonstrates the unique education policy environment we exploit in our study. He studies how NPND policies
affect retention and dropout behavior, showing that Enrollment-based NPND policies
cause a false reduction in many common graduation rate estimates, caused by a 2.8
percentage point increase in 9th grade enrollment. Enrollment-based policies increase
school enrollment by causing marginal dropouts to repeat the 9th grade instead of
dropping out of school. Truancy-based policies have an near-opposite effect – these
policies induce students to drop out of school by revoking the driver’s licenses of truant teens. The annual event dropout rate increases by 1.4 to 2 percentage points, and
decreases 11th grade enrollment, corresponding to teens dropping out of school at the
first available opportunity. We exploit these opposing effects on school retention and
dropouts to link educational choice with teen behaviors. Bar graphs summarizing the
grade-by-grade effects of Enrollment- and Truancy-based No Pass, No Drive policies
are displayed in Figure 2.1. It shows that Enrollment-based policies have little effect
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on late high school enrollment, causing large increases in 9th and 10th grade enrollment, while Truancy-based policies have no effect on early high school enrollment,
causing large decreases in 11th and 12th grade enrollment and graduation.

3.3

Data and Methods

3.3.1

Data

We collected details about each No Pass, No Drive policy across the country from
Kennedy (2018). We collected these details, including the date of implementation
and the categorization of policies into groups, from each state’s code of laws and
legislative histories. We then merge this information, detailed in Table 2.1 with data
on student outcomes and state-level control variables to perform our estimation.

To begin, we look at No Pass, No Drive policies’ effects on teen births. Teen births
for each state and year are taken from the National Center for Health Statistics Vital
Statistics program (1985-2002) and the Center for Disease Control’s Natality Data
(2003-2014). We perform our analysis by race and ethnicity, separately testing the
effects on white, black, and hispanic teen births. Since the NPND policies only apply
to teens between 15 and 17 years old and there is a 9-month gap between getting
pregnant and giving birth, teen births are defined as births by teens aged 15 to 18.
White teens account for twice as many births as black and hispanic teens, despite
the fact that black and hispanic teen birth rates are generally higher than white teen
birth rates.

We next look at teen driver-involved fatal traffic accidents. Using the NBER
Collection of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s (NHTSA) Fatal
Accident Reporting System (FARS) dataset, we observe every fatal traffic accident
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in the United States from 1979 to 2015.8 We further restrict this to include only fatal accidents where a teen driver, aged 15-17, was involved so that we can accurately
identify the effect of No Pass, No Drive policies on teen driving behavior. Importantly,
this restriction does not remove cases where a teen driver was involved in a fatal accident, but did not die; it also counts each fatal accident involving multiple teen drivers
as a single fatal traffic accident. In this way, we can accurately identify the effect of
No Pass, No Drive policies on teen-involved fatal traffic accidents. Additionally, the
FARS data includes information about the sex and race9 of the teen driver, as well
as the date and time of the accident. We exploit this to examine heterogeneous effects of the policy, as well as to investigate the mechanisms by which the policy works.

We also analyze how NPND policies affect total teen employment. Data of teen
employment of each state is taken from the Current Population Survey. We observe
around 260,000 teenagers aged between 15 and 17 from 1985 to 2014. A teenager is
employed if number of weeks worked is more than 16. We also further investigate on
the effect of NPND laws on how teens are employed- that is, full-time and part-time
employed. A full-time employed teen is defined as worked more than 30 hours per
week and more than 16 weeks last year, while a teenager is part-time employed if
worked more than 16 weeks but less than 30 hours per week.

10

We additionally

analyze the likelihood of a teen being employed, either full-time or part-time, based
on demographic characteristics, such as gender and race.
In our regressions, we control for some state time-variant characteristics that could
affect our outcome variables, and may be correlated with implementation of a NPND
policy. Teen population by sex and by race is from the Survey of Epidemiology and
End Results (SEER) U.S. State and County Population data.
8

11

State specific eco-

When combined with our per-student spending control, our fatal accident data spans from 1986 to
2013.
9
The FARS data did not begin reporting race until 1999. This is explored further in Section 3.4.2.
10
Based on our definition, students who only worked for summer job are excluded.
11
For teen birth analysis, we control for teen population aged 15 to 18 because of the 9-month gap;
for teen employment , we control for teen population aged 15 to 17.
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nomic characteristics that may be time varying are captured in state average income
and unemployment rate, which are collected from the US Census Bureau and Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS), respectively. Table 3.1 provides summary statistics for teen
driver-involved fatal traffic accidents, teen births, teen employment, teen population,
and state average income and unemployment rate.

In our teen birth analysis, we drop states that report zero black or Hispanic teen
births in more than 8 years of our sample – Alaska, Hawaii, Maine, Montana, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
We drop these states due to concern that there may be errors in the data collecting
process. For instance, during the 30-year period, Vermont has 21 years with zero
Hispanic teen births and New Hampshire and West Virginia have 16 years with no
Hispanic teen births. Even though these states have small Hispanic and black populations, we still question the accuracy of data from these states. Of these states, only
West Virginia has a No Pass, No Drive policy, so we believe omitting these states
should not pose a threat to the validity of our results.

3.3.2

Methods

Using our monthly fatal traffic accident data, we perform difference-in-differences
estimation to identify the causal effect of No Pass, No Drive policies on teen driverinvolved fatal traffic accidents using the estimating equation below:
log(F atal Accidentss,m + 1) =α + βP oliciess,m + γlog(Incomes,y )
+ ηlog(P er Student Spendings,y ) + δm + λs + εs,m
(3.1)
In the equation above, the subscript s indexes states, m indexes month-by-year, and y
indexes year. We add 1 to our outcome variable before taking the log to avoid omitting
state-month pairs that did not have any teen-involved fatal traffic accidents. This ac-
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counts for approximately 20 percent of our dataset. The term P oliciess,m is a dummy
variable containing our three NPND policy categories, and is equal to 1 if state s has
a policy in month m. The terms log(Incomes,y ) and log(P er Student Spendings,y )
denote per-capita income in a state-year pair and average per-student spending in a
state-year pair. We also include state and month-by-year fixed effects (λs and δm ,
respectively) to control for unobserved time invariant characteristics of each state,
and national time variant characteristics.

We perform analogous estimation on teen employment and teen births. Our data
for teen births are at the state-year level and for teen employment are cross-sectional
at individual level , so we modify our fixed effects as below:

Outcomes,y =α + βP oliciess,y + γlog(Incomes,y ) + ηU nemp. Rates,y +

(3.2)

δlog(T eenpops,y ) + ρy + λs + εs,y
where outcome variables are log of teen births of each state and employment status
for each teen.
Our identifying assumption here, as in all of our estimates, is the typical parallel
trends assumption – that states without No Pass, No Drive policies provide a valid
counterfactual for the trend that states with No Pass, No Drive policies would have
followed, had they not enacted a policy. Given the identifying assumption holds, our
estimates of β are the causal effects of No Pass, No Drive policies on teen driverinvolved fatal traffic accidents, teen births, and teen employment.

3.4

Results

3.4.1

Teen births

We first examine how teen fertility (ages 15 to 18) is affected by NPND laws.
Table 3.2 reports OLS estimates of the effects of NPND laws on log(teen births),
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broken down by race and ethnicity subgroups. Enrollment-based policies cause small
increases in both total and white teen births, but not statistically significant; however, they increase black teen births by 5.6 percent and Hispanic teen births by 20.6
percent. These findings fit into the literature. Skiba et al. (2011) find that students
from African American and Latino families are more likely to exhibit poor discipline
in school than their white peers. Additionally, teen birth rates for black and Hispanic
teens are higher than for white teens. Retaining at-risk students in school increases
interaction between these teens and their peers, and thus may have adverse effects on
their peers.

Behavior-based policies, which were only implemented in five states, have no effects among all racial and ethnic groups. Truancy-based policies have positive effects
on total and white teen births and negative effects on black and Hispanic births; however, none are statistically significant. However, only four states have ever adopted a
truancy-based policy. This lack of information may lead us to improper inference, so
we test our identification strategy. Figure 3.1 presents tests of our “parallel trends”
identifying assumption on teen births. To test this in these and all other similar
figures, we estimate versions of the models presented in Section 3.3.2 modified as
below:
log(Ys,t ) = α+

5
X

βj P olicy Starts,t−j +ρOther P oliciess,t +ΓXs,t +δm +λt +εs,t (3.3)

j=−5

In the equation above, the variable P olicy Starts,t−j is a dummy variable equal to 1
if the first year of the policy is j years away from the observation. At the endpoints
of -5 and +5, the P olicy Start variable is 1 if the policy begins more than 5 years
after or before the observation, respectively. We then set the coefficient β−1 as the
baseline, for ease of visual interpretation.
In Figure 3.1, we see that enrollment-based policies exhibit relatively smooth and
flat pre-policy trends, providing evidence that our identifying assumption is valid.
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The policies cause a small initial increase in teen births, with the effect growing over
time – this suggests that as at-risk teens forgo dropping out of school and build up
in the 9th grade over the first few years of the policy, the risk of pregnancy for these
teens and their peers exhibits a corresponding increase. Figure 3.1d shows that for
truancy-based policies, there are strong pre-existing trends in the teen birth rate that
differ from the national trend. As a result, our assumption of parallel trends is invalid,
and we cannot accurately identify the effect of truancy-based policies on teen births.

3.4.2

Fatal Traffic Accidents

Table 3.3 shows the primary regression results from the model described in Section
3.3.2, using log(Teen driver-involved fatal traffic accidents + 1) as the dependent
variable.12
Enrollment-based policies cause teen driver-involved fatal traffic accidents to fall
by 3%, although this effect is not statistically significant. This result aligns well with
the mechanisms created by this policy. Enrollment-based policies have an incapacitation effect on teens, where by increasing teen retention in schools,13 teens are not
driving during midday business hours. Additionally, all 3 policies have the potential
to cause an enforcement effect, as some teens will lose their driver’s licenses under all
of these policies. With Enrollment-based policies, these two forces work together to
reduce fatal traffic accidents.

Disentangling incapacitation and enforcement can be achieved by exploiting some
unique characteristics of these laws, as well as the richness of the FARS dataset. First,
we test if the policy’s effectiveness improves over time. Early NPND policies were
enforced without the use of automated tracking systems – these typically involved
teens presenting a form verifying their compliance with the NPND policy when ap12

Our results in Table 3.3 are robust to omitting observations with 0 fatal traffic accidents, and
simply using log(Accidents) as the dependent variable.
13
As shown in Figure 2.1
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plying for a driver’s license or learner’s permit, and the school submitting a form to
the licensing office when a teen failed to meet the NPND requirement. Today, most
states use a computerized system allowing the licensing office to access school enrollment records directly when issuing licenses, and automatically flagging the records
of teens who do not comply with the NPND requirement. A simple test of enforcement’s effect on teen behavior, then, is to determine if the policy’s has become more
effective over time. To do this, we reestimate column (7) in Table 3.3, but cut the full
sample into “Early” and “Late” subsamples, where the “Early” subsample includes
only observations before 1999.14 Table 3.4 presents the results from this regression.

From this regression, we clearly see that Enrollment-based policies have larger
effects in later years than in earlier years.15 This implies a change in enforcement
technology is driving the reduction in traffic fatalities, and it also implies that a hypothetical new NPND policy today would be highly effective at reducing teen-involved
fatal traffic accidents. However, these findings do not rule out an incapacitation effect. Teens responding optimally to the increase in NPND enforcement will stay in
school at a greater rate over time, suggesting that the incapacitation effect would
also be greater in later years. To test incapacitation separately from enforcement,
we investigate the date and time of all fatal traffic accidents. A reduction in accidents during school hours, greater than the reduction on nights, weekends, and in
summer months, would suggest incapacitation is driving the effect found. We define
“non-school hours” as occurring during summer months (June, July, and August),
during weekends, or from 6 PM to 6 AM.16 Results for these regressions, restricting
14

We choose 1999 as our cutoff because it is both the midpoint of our sample, and it is the first year
when race is observable in the FARS dataset. To assuage concerns about data manipulation, we
change the cutoff year in the late subsample from 1994 to 2003 in Table D.1. This shows a consistent
increase in the policy’s effectiveness, suggesting that enforcement technology is steadily improving
over this time period.
15
The Truancy-based result in column (1) is an artifact of the rarity of this policy – the only state
with a Truancy-based policy in the early time period is California.
16
These hours are broader than a typical school day, to account for teens participating in extracurricular activities immediately before and after school.
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the sample from 1999 to 2013 as in column (2) of Table 3.4, are presented in Table 3.5.

Table 3.5 shows no substantial differences between fatal traffic accidents during
school hours and outside of school hours for Enrollment-based policies, suggesting the
reduction is driven by enforcement, not by incapacitation.17 Interestingly, Truancybased policies appear to cause a large, significant increase in fatal accidents during
school hours, with no change outside of school hours. Although the policy here
is quite rare (only Delaware, Nevada, and New Mexico change their policy during
the post-1999 sample), the mechanism is plausible – Truancy-based policies cause
an increase in the dropout rate, reducing incapacitation only during school hours.
Enrollment-based policies revoke the licenses of high school dropouts, while Truancybased policies often return licenses to high school dropouts. These results suggest
that high school dropouts are at high risk of fatal traffic accidents, and that revoking
their licenses is an effective measure to reduce traffic fatalities.

We can also break down the change in fatal accidents by race and sex. A study by
the Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia and State Farm (2009) shows that white teens
are more likely to drive than black teens, and male teens are more likely to drive than
female teens. Table 3.6 shows regression results for accidents separated by sex and by
race. We that the effects of Enrollment-based NPND policies are overwhelmingly felt
by male and white teens. Given that we believe the force causing this result is the
revocation of licenses of truants and dropouts, this is entirely expected. White teens
are more likely to drive than black teens, and male teens are more likely to drive and
more likely to be truants or dropouts than female teens.
Figure 3.2 shows tests of pre-existing trends in fatal traffic accidents for our major
specifications of interest. Although there is a high level of noise in these figures, there
are no obvious pre-existing trends in fatal traffic accidents present. Furthermore,
graphs (b) and (c) show decreases in fatal accidents following the implementation of
17

Although Column (2) is significantly different from 0, these two coefficient estimates are not
significantly different from each other.
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the Enrollment-based NPND policy. Figure D.1 in the Appendix shows the same test
for our examination of the month, day, and time of accidents. Again, there is no clear
pre-existing trend in fatal accidents present in these data, suggesting the validity of
difference-in-differences estimation.

3.4.3

Teen Employment

NPND policies cause changes in teens’ time availability and mobility, which are
both directly related with their ability to work. Table 3.7 reports the effects of
NPND polices on the probability of being employed as well as being full-time and
part-time employed. Columns (1), (3), and (5) report the effect of NPND policies
on the probability of being employed for all teens. As shown in column (1), overall
teen employment is not affected by any NPND laws. Similarly in column (3), since
there are few teenagers that are employed full-time, full-time teen employment is only
marginally affected by NPND laws. Howver, column (5) shows that part-time teen
employment increases by about 1 percentage point due to enrollment-based policies,
and 0.5 percentage points due to truancy-based policies, though not statistically significant.18

We then examine racial differences in responses to NPND laws; the corresponding
results are reported in columns (2), (4), and (6) of Table 3.7. Though NPND laws
have no effects on overall or white teen employment, black teen employment increases
by 5 percentage points due to enrollment-based polices, 3.9 percentage points due to
behavior-based policies,19 and 7 percentage points due to truancy-based polices. Few
teens are employed full-time – around 2.5 percent in our sample. Therefore, any effects
on full-time employment would likely be too small to detect. Most teen employment
is part-time; 14 percent of all teens are employed part-time, about 85 percent of all
18

Though the effects of truancy-based policies are not statistically significant, we cannot reject that
the effects of truancy-based laws are the same as the effects of enrollment-based laws.
19
Since behavior-based policies are relatively rare and their enforcement is uncertain, we do not
further explore the impact of behavior-based policies on teen employment.
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employed teens. The increases in black teen employment are entirely driven by increases in part-time employment – part-time employment of black teens increases by
5 percentage points due to enrollment-based laws, and 7 percentage points due to
truancy-based policies.

We further examine the impacts of NPND laws on teen employment by race and
gender. Table D.2 in the Appendix reports the effects of NPND policies on employment by gender and race. Overall teen employment is not affected by any NPND
laws, nor is employment of teen boys nor teen girls, as shown in column (2). Further,
column (4) of Table D.2 shows that the total employment black girls and black boys
are not differently affected by any NPND laws. The effects of NPND policies on fulltime and part-time teen employment by gender and race are reported in Tables D.3
and D.4, respectively. Table D.3 shows small changes in full-time teen employment
by race. Teen boys are slightly less likely to be full-time employed under NPND laws
(0.4 to 0.7 p.p.), with comparable increases in the full-time employment of teen girls.
Table D.4 shows part-time employment of teen boys increases by about 1.3 percentage points under enrollment-based laws and about 1.1 percent under truancy-based
laws,20 with smaller, insignificant increases for teen girls. Columns (3) and (4) show
that black boys and girls have identical increases in part-time employment due to
NPND laws.

We next examine pre-existing trends in teen employment. In Figure 3.3, we see
that enrollment-based policies have flat and smooth pre-policy trends in teen employment; all four of our primary outcomes in this figure show no discernible pre-existing
trend in teen employment. A similar exercise for full-time employment is shown in
Appendix Figure D.2.21
20

Though the effect of Truancy-based laws on part-time employment for boys is not statistically
significant, we cannot reject that the effect of Truancy-based laws is the same as the Enrollmentbased.
21
We also test the parallel trends for truancy-based policies in all teen employment specifications.
Results are reported in Appendix Figures D.3, D.4, and D.5. Most specifications of teen employment
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Previous studies (Barua & Vidal-Fernandez, 2014; Kennedy, 2018) find that Enrollmentbased laws increase high school enrollment. Given this, Enrollment-based policies
increasing black teen employment is potentially explained by Enrollment-based laws
shifting jobs from white teens in school to black teens out of school. We test this by
investigating differences in school retention between black and white teens. Columns
(1) and (2) of Table 3.8 show that Enrollment-based policies increase teen school attendance by 1.3 percentage points, with no significant differences between black and
white teens. Although black and white teens are equally affected by these policies,
the white teen population is about 7 times larger than the black teen population. If
the change in school enrollment is the same for white and black teens, then for every
one job opening caused by a black teen enrolling in school, there are 7 caused by white
teens. Column (3) shows that these newly available jobs are taken by black teens,
and that these jobs are more likely to be taken by black teens not enrolled in school,
though not significantly so. The overall increase in employment for black dropouts is
about 7 percentage points, which corresponds to the number of white teens returning
to school.22

Based on this evidence, we consider the possibility of discrimination against black
teens in the labor market, which is partially resolved by NPND policies. Column
(4) of Table 3.8 provides suggestive evidence, showing heterogeneity by region. Compared to other regions, the employment of black teens goes up by 3.8 percentage
points in southern states after the implementation of Enrollment-based policies. This
difference between southern states and non-southern states suggests the existence of
racial discrimination in teen labor markets, as numerous studies show stronger racial
bias in the South than in other regions of the United States (Fossett & Kiecolt, 1989;
show no pre-existing trends. However, in Figure D.3a truancy-based policies have strong pre-existing
trends that differs from the national trend in overall teen employment. Nonetheless, Table 3.7 column
(1) shows the impact of truancy-based policy on total teen employment is not statistically significant.
22
Adding the coefficients on Enrollment, Enrollment × Black, Enrollment × Outschool, and
Enrollment × Black × Outschool gives a total effect of 7.3 percentage points. Joint hypothesis
testing shows significance at the 5% level (F-Statistic = 4.05).
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Taylor, 1998). We plan to further investigate this issue in future work. In Figure D.6
in the Appendix, we show tests of pre-existing trends in school enrollment. There
are no evident pre-existing trends for both overall teen enrollment and black teen
enrollment.

3.5

Conclusion
We investigate how educational choices and driving eligibility affect teen behavior

by evaluating the effects of NPND laws on teen births, teen-involved fatal traffic accidents, and teen employment. Kennedy (2018) and Barua & Vidal-Fernandez (2014)
identified large effects of NPND laws on educational choice. Our results shows that,
in addition to educational decisions, NPND policies also affect teen behavior by affecting their time outside of school and their driving eligibility. Enrollment-based
policies, by retaining students who would have otherwise dropped out of school, increase teen births among black and Hispanic teen girls. Though most of these retained
dropouts are teen boys, this finding is consistent with previous literature (e.g. Carrell
& Hoekstra 2010) that at-risk teens may impose negative externalities on their peers.
Enrollment-based policies also cause a decrease in teen driver-involved fatal traffic
accidents, particularly for white teens, consistent with the effects of these policies on
both education and driver’s licenses. Enrollment-based policies do not affect overall
teen employment, but they have positive effects on black teen employment, especially
part-time employment. Truancy-based policies do not appear to have large effects
on teen births or fatal accidents, but their relative rarity leaves their effects undetermined. Under both Enrollment- and Truancy-based policies, our results suggest
the existence of racial discrimination against black teens, which will be our primary
interest in future work.

Teen behavior, and its links to education, is always an important topic in economics. We know that education does not just affect labor productivity, but also
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affects many other aspects of people’s lives. However, policies targeting increasing
educational attainment are not always effective and may even have adverse effects.
NPND policies have mixed effects on teen behavior, in large part because of their
mixed effectiveness in preventing dropouts and increasing graduation. Retaining more
at-risk teens in school does not necessarily increase teenagers’ educational attainment,
nor does it necessarily benefit the community overall. Our results suggest that, while
increasing the educational attainment of at-risk teens may be a desirable goal, simply retaining teens in school without addressing their risky behaviors can result in
undesirable outcomes.
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Table 3.1.: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Outcomes
Yearly
Total
White
Black
Hispanic
Monthly
Total
White
Black
Percent
Total
Male
Female
White
Black

Teen births (birth by female aged 15-18)
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
6783.51
7170.77
310
45411
3601.05
3711.75
191
29054
1947.06
1882.90
11
7835
1962.38
4604.35
4
27797
Teen Driver-Involved Fatal Traffic Accidents (Ages 15-17)
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
3.64
4.03
0
32
2.30
2.97
0
32
0.45
0.78
0
6
Teen employment (aged 15-17)
Sample Employed Full-time Employed Part-time Employed
100
16.69
2.53
14.15
51.24
16.17
2.94
13.23
48.76
17.23
2.10
15.13
80.75
18.65
2.73
15.92
12.08
7.45
1.72
5.73

Panel B: Controls
Teen population (aged 15-18)
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
389431
434122.1
25369
189482.7 209849.4
12883
117931.8 130495.7
2910
24358.44 29065.07
50
25539.37 68400.31
135
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Income
28994.86 11005.99
9940
Unemployment rate
5.805
1.915
2.3

Yearly
Total
Female
White female
Black female
Hispanic female

Max
2834241
1371445
836517
122207
527233
Max
70379
13.7

Notes: This table shows summary statistics for the major variables discussed in this paper. Panel A shows the
mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum for our three outcome variables: annual teen births, monthly
teen driver-involved fatal traffic accidents, and annual teen employment rates. Panel B shows the same summary
statistics for our control variables: teen population, per-capita income, and unemployment rate.
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Table 3.2.: Teen Birth
(1)
Total
0.0253
(0.0226)

(2)
White
0.0111
(0.0422)

(3)
(4)
Black
Hispanic
0.0556∗
0.206∗∗
(0.0295) (0.0966)

Behavior

0.00184
(0.0469)

-0.0347
(0.0535)

0.0309
(0.0300)

0.0226
(0.105)

Truancy

0.0656
(0.0499)
1170

0.360
(0.259)
1170

-0.0518
(0.0405)
1170

-0.134
(0.134)
975

Enrollment

Observations

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: This table shows the effects of NPND policies on log(teen births), as in Equation 3.2. Column (1) shows the
impact of NPND policies on total teen births. Columns (2),(3), and (4) show effects for white, black, and Hispanic
teens, respectively. State average annual income, unemployment rate, teen population, and state and year fixed effects
are included in all specifications.
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Table 3.3.: Effects of No Pass, No Drive Policies on Fatal Traffic Accidents
(1)
All Crashes
0.178
(0.119)

(2)
All Crashes
-0.349∗∗∗
(0.0354)

(3)
All Crashes
0.476∗∗∗
(0.143)

(4)
All Crashes
0.00300
(0.0407)

(5)
All Crashes
-0.0298
(0.0328)

Behavior

-0.135
(0.140)

-0.233∗∗∗
(0.0523)

0.157
(0.140)

0.0405
(0.0535)

0.0443
(0.0558)

0.0352
(0.0488)

0.0403
(0.0541)

Truancy

0.146
(0.564)

-0.371∗∗
(0.142)

0.497
(0.555)

0.0103
(0.150)

0.0576
(0.116)

0.0451
(0.102)

0.0544
(0.104)

Enrollment

-0.0371∗∗∗
(0.00952)

Unemp. Rate

log(Per-Student Spending)
Observations

(6)
(7)
All Crashes All Crashes
-0.0289
-0.0312
(0.0338)
(0.0307)

19988

19988

19988

19988

16589

-0.0326∗∗∗
(0.00865)
0.410∗∗∗
(0.146)
15084

0.260∗
(0.139)
15084

Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

Notes: This table shows regression results from estimating the model in equation 3.1 on the full sample of fatal
accident data from FARS. Column (1) shows results from a naı̈ve regression with no state or time fixed effects, columns
(2), (3), and (4) include only state fixed effects, time fixed effects, or both state and time fixed effects, respectively.
Columns (5), (6), and (7) additionally include controls for state unemployment rate, log(per-student spending), and
both, respectively.
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Table 3.4.: Fatal Traffic Accidents – Early and Late Effects
(1)
Early Policies
0.0170
(0.0258)

(2)
Late Policies
-0.122
(0.0847)

Behavior

-0.00464
(0.0331)

0.00819
(0.107)

Truancy

-0.154∗∗∗
(0.0335)

0.0740
(0.0687)

-0.0120
(0.158)

0.625∗∗∗
(0.217)

-0.0408∗∗∗
(0.00806)
7199

-0.0208∗
(0.0109)
7885

Enrollment

log(Per-Student Spending)

Unemp. Rate
Observations
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

Notes: This table shows regression results from estimating equation 3.1 on an “early” and “late” subsample of the
FARS data. Column (1) shows results only using data from 1979 to 1998, and column (2) shows results from only
using data from 1999 to 2015.
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Table 3.5.: Fatal Traffic Accidents – School Hours
(1)
Not School Hours
-0.102
(0.0855)

(2)
School Hours
-0.125∗
(0.0650)

Behavior

0.0319
(0.0991)

-0.0558
(0.0912)

Truancy

0.0370
(0.0751)

0.162∗∗∗
(0.0351)

log(Per-Student Spending)

0.501∗∗
(0.215)

0.720∗∗∗
(0.256)

-0.0249∗∗
(0.0116)
7885

-0.0168
(0.0133)
5826

Enrollment

Unemp. Rate
Observations
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes:

This table shows regression results from estimating equation 3.1 on subsamples of the FARS data from

1999-2015. Column (1) includes fatal accidents that were not during school hours – during summer months (June,
July, and August), on Saturday and Sunday, and between 6 PM and 6 AM on weekdays. Column (2) includes fatal
accidents during school hours – non-summer months, weekdays, between 6 AM and 6 PM.
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Table 3.6.: Fatal Traffic Accidents – Sex and Race
(1)
Male
-0.167∗∗∗
(0.0564)

(2)
Female
-0.0543
(0.131)

(3)
Black
-0.0228
(0.0363)

(4)
White
-0.152∗
(0.0756)

Behavior

0.0176
(0.0794)

-0.0433
(0.123)

0.0145
(0.0296)

-0.0774
(0.123)

Truancy

0.0323
(0.0445)
7885

0.146∗
(0.0778)
7885

0.0381∗∗
(0.0179)
7833

0.0651
(0.0474)
7833

Enrollment

Observations

Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: This table shows regression results from estimating equation 3.1 on subsamples of the FARS data from 19992015. Columns (1) and (2) include fatal accidents that involved a male or female teen driver, respectively. Columns
(3) and (4) include fatal accidents that involved a black or white teen driver, respectively.

117
Table 3.7.: Teen employment
(2)
Total
-0.000809
(0.00605)

(3)
Full-time
-0.00187
(0.00214)

(4)
Full-time
-0.00254
(0.00217)

(5)
Part-time
0.01000∗
(0.00555)

(6)
Part-time
0.00174
(0.00563)

Behavior

0.00498 -0.0000747
(0.00881) (0.00739)

-0.00185
(0.00371)

-0.00248
(0.00335)

0.00683
(0.00623)

0.00241
(0.00551)

Truancy

0.00634
(0.00932)

0.0000435
(0.00372)

-0.000314
(0.00394)

0.00629
(0.00838)

0.00109
(0.00902)

Enrollment

(1)
Total
0.00813
(0.00616)

0.000774
(0.0102)

Enrollment × Black

0.0508∗∗∗
(0.00860)

0.00384∗
(0.00222)

0.0469∗∗∗
(0.00773)

Behavior × Black

0.0385∗∗∗
(0.0138)

0.00465
(0.00403)

0.0338∗∗
(0.0130)

Truancy × Black

0.0696∗∗∗
(0.0104)

0.00442
(0.00322)

0.0652∗∗∗
(0.0126)

Black

-0.113∗∗∗
(0.00610)

-0.00966∗∗∗
(0.00174)

-0.103∗∗∗
(0.00617)

Observations

248379

248379

248379

248379

248379

248379

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

Notes: This table shows results from estimating Equation 3.2 on teen employment. Effects on total teen employment
are shown in Columns (1) and (2), columns (3) and (4) show the impact of NPND polices on full-time teen employment,
and results on part-time teen employment are presented in Columns (5) and (6). Columns (2), (4), and (6) present
the impact of NPND policies on black teen employment. All specifications control for state average annual income,
unemployment rate, teen population, and state and year fixed effects.
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Table 3.8.: Differences between white and black teens
(1)
In school
0.0126∗∗∗
(0.00401)

(2)
In school
0.0113∗∗∗
(0.00356)

(3)
(4)
Employed Employed
-0.00396
-0.0110
(0.00731)
(0.0100)

Behavior

-0.00439
(0.00601)

-0.00439
(0.00607)

0.00384
(0.00845)

0.00494
(0.00832)

Truancy

-0.00324
(0.00500)

-0.00328
(0.00499)

0.00165
(0.0149)

0.00706
(0.00936)

Enrollment × Black

0.00733
(0.00511)

0.0427∗∗∗
(0.0135)

0.00563
(0.0215)

Black

-0.000510
(0.00435)

-0.126∗∗∗
(0.0106)

-0.105∗∗∗
(0.0111)

Enrollment

Enrollment × Outschool

0.0192
(0.0189)

Black × Outschool

-0.00575
(0.0193)

Enrollment × Black × Outschool

0.0147
(0.0339)

Outschool

0.0731∗∗∗
(0.0154)

Enrollment × South

0.0191∗
(0.0105)

South

-0.0480
(0.0462)

South × Black

0.00957
(0.0121)

Enrollment × South × Black

0.0379∗
(0.0222)

Observations

156781

156781

156781

23

248379

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes:

This table explores potential mechanisms for how NPND policies affect black teen employment. Columns

(1) and (2) show the effect of NPND policies on the probability of teens attending school. Column (3) examines
heterogeneity in teen employment by school enrollment status. Column (4) shows heterogeneity in teen by school
enrollment and region of residence. All specifications control for state average annual income, unemployment rate,
teen population, and state and year fixed effects.
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(a) Enrollment: Total Births

(b) Enrollment: Black Births

(c) Enrollment: Hispanic Births

(d) Truancy: Total Births

Fig. 3.1.: No Pass, No Drive Policies Teen Births Trends
Notes:
These figures show dynamic difference-in-differences estimates from estimating Equation 3.3, testing for
pre-existing trends in teen births. All policies begin at time t = 0, and the coefficient at time t = −1 is normalized to
0.
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(a) Enrollment: Total Fatal Accidents

(b) Enrollment: White Fatal Accidents

(c) Enrollment: Male Fatal Accidents

(d) Enrollment: Post-1999 Fatal Accidents

Fig. 3.2.: No Pass, No Drive Policies Fatal Accident Trends
Notes:
These figures show dynamic difference-in-differences estimates from estimating Equation 3.3, testing for
pre-existing trends in teen driver-involved fatal traffic accidents. All policies begin at time t = 0, and the coefficient
at time t = −1 is normalized to 0.
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(a) Overall Teen Employment

(b) Black Teen Employment

(c) Overall Teen Part-time Employment

(d) Black Teen Part-Time Employment

Fig. 3.3.: Enrollment-based Policies Teen Employment Trends
Notes: These figures show dynamic difference-in-differences estimates from estimating Equation 3.3, testing for preexisting trends in teen employment. All policies begin at time t = 0, and the coefficient at time t = −1 is normalized
to 0.

122

REFERENCES
Acemoglu, D., & Angrist, J. (2000). How Large are Human-Capital Externalities?
Evidence from Compulsory Schooling Laws. NBER macroeconomics annual , 15 ,
9–59.
Allensworth, E. M., & Easton, J. Q. (2005). The On-Track Indicator as a Predictor
of High School Graduation. Consortium on Chicago School Research, University of
Chicago Chicago, IL.
Anderson, D. M. (2014). In school and out of trouble? the minimum dropout age
and juvenile crime. Review of Economics and Statistics, 96 (2), 318–331.
Angrist, J., Bettinger, E., Bloom, E., King, E., & Kremer, M. (2002). Vouchers for
private schooling in colombia: Evidence from a randomized natural experiment.
American Economic Review , 92 (5), 1535–1558.
Angrist, J. D., & Krueger, A. B. (1991). Does Compulsory School Attendance Affect
Schooling and Earnings? The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106 (4), 979–1014.
Aragon, S. (2015). Free and Compulsory School Age Requirements.
Ayres, B. D. (1989). West virginia reduces dropouts by denying them drivers license.
The New York Times, 21st May.
Barua, R., & Vidal-Fernandez, M. (2014). No pass no drive: Education and allocation
of time. Journal of Human Capital , 8 (4), 399–431.
Barua, R., & Vidal-Fernandez, M. (2016). Wheeling into school and out of crime:
Evidence from linking driving licenses to minimum academic requirements.

123
Becker, G. S. (1962). Investment in human capital: A theoretical analysis. Journal
of political economy, 70 (5, Part 2), 9–49.
Becker, G. S., & Mulligan, C. B. (1997). The endogenous determination of time
preference. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112 (3), 729–758.
Behrman, J. R., Sengupta, P., & Todd, P. (2005). Progressing through progresa:
An impact assessment of a school subsidy experiment in rural mexico. Economic
development and cultural change, 54 (1), 237–275.
Bertrand, M., Duflo, E., & Mullainathan, S. (2004). How much should we trust
differences-in-differences estimates? The Quarterly journal of economics, 119 (1),
249–275.
Bound, J., & Freeman, R. B. (1992). What Went Wrong? The Erosion of Relative
Earnings and Employment Among Young Black Men in the 1980s. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 107 (1), 201–232.
Bound, J., Jaeger, D. A., & Baker, R. M. (1995). Problems with Instrumental Variables Estimation when the Correlation Between the Instruments and the Endogenous Explanatory Variable is Weak. Journal of the American statistical association,
90 (430), 443–450.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor. (2015). National longitudinal
survey of youth 1997 cohort, 1997-2013 (rounds 1-16).
Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, and National Institute for
Child Health and Human Development. (2015). Children of the NLSY79, 19792014.
Cameron, A. C., Gelbach, J. B., & Miller, D. L. (2008). Bootstrap-based improvements for inference with clustered errors. The Review of Economics and Statistics,
90 (3), 414–427.

124
Cameron, A. C., Gelbach, J. B., & Miller, D. L. (2011). Robust Inference with
Multiway Clustering. Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 29 (2), 238–249.
Cameron, S., & Heckman, J. (1993). The Nonequivalence of High School Equivalents.
Journal of labor economics, 11 (1, Part 1), 1–47.
Carrell, S. E., & Hoekstra, M. L. (2010). Externalities in the classroom: How children
exposed to domestic violence affect everyone’s kids. American Economic Journal:
Applied Economics, 2 (1), 211–228.
Dee, T. S. (2011). Conditional cash penalties in education: Evidence from the
learnfare experiment. Economics of Education Review , 30 (5), 924–937.
Deza, M. (2016). Graduated driver licensing and teen fertility. In 6th biennial
conference of the american society of health economists.
Deza, M., & Litwok, D. (2016). Do nighttime driving restrictions reduce criminal
participation among teenagers? evidence from graduated driver licensing. Journal
of Policy Analysis and Management.
D.F. v. Codell. (KY 2003).
127 S.W.3d 571 .
Eckstein, Z., & Wolpin, K. I. (1989). Dynamic Labour Force Participation of Married
Women and Endogenous Work Experience. The Review of Economic Studies,
56 (3), 375–390.
Elementary/Secondary Information System. (2017).
Fossett, M. A., & Kiecolt, K. J. (1989). The relative size of minority populations and
white racial attitudes. Social Science Quarterly, 70 (4), 820.
Greene, J. P., & Winters, M. A. (2002). Public school graduation rates in the united
states. Center for Civic Innovation at the Manhattan Institute.

125
Haney, W., Madaus, G., Abrams, L., Wheelock, A., Miao, J., Gruia, I., & Gruia, I.
(2004). The Education Pipeline in the United States, 1970-2000.
Hanushek, E. A., Machin, S. J., & Woessmann, L. (2016). Handbook of the economics
of education. Elsevier.
Hauser, R. M., Frederick, C. B., & Andrew, M. (2007). Grade Retention in the Age
of Standards-Based Reform. Center for Demography and Ecology, University of
Wisconsin.
Heubert, J. P., & Hauser, R. M. (1998). High Stakes: Testing for Tracking, Promotion, and Graduation. National Research Council Committee on Appropriate Test
Use, National Academies Press.
Historical Tables & reports: Elementary and secondary enrollment. (2017).
Ihlanfeldt, K. R., & Sjoquist, D. L. (1991). The effect of job access on black and white
youth employment: A cross-sectional analysis. Urban Studies, 28 (2), 255–265.
Imbens, G. W., & Angrist, J. D. (1994). Identification and Estimation of Local
Average Treatment Effects. Econometrica, 62 (2), 467–475.
Kansas Statute Annotated. (2018). 72-89c02(a)-(c).
Kena, G., Hussar, W., McFarland, J., de Brey, C., Musu-Gillette, L., Wang, X., . . .
others (2016). The Condition of Education 2016. NCES 2016-144. National Center
for Education Statistics.
Kennedy, K. J. (2018). The effects of no pass, no drive policies on high school
education. (Working Paper)
Kreitzer, A. E., Madaus, G. F., & Haney, W. (1989). Competency Testing and
Dropouts.
Krimmel, J. T. (2000). An examination of kentucky’s” no pass–no drive bill”. Educational Research Quarterly, 23 (4), 27.

126
Lee, J. C., & Staff, J. (2007). When work matters: The varying impact of work
intensity on high school dropout. Sociology of Education, 80 (2), 158–178.
Lenard, M. (2011). Strengthening attend ndrive laws to reduce truancy and dropouts.
SREB Policy brief .
Lochner, L., & Moretti, E. (2004). The Effect of Education on Crime: Evidence
from Prison Inmates, Arrests, and Self-Reports. The American Economic Review ,
94 (1), 155–189.
Mackey, P. E., & Duncan, T. G. (2013). Does Raising the State Compulsory School
Attendance Age Achieve the Intended Outcomes. Washington DC. Retrieved from
http://ies. ed. gov/ncee/edlabs.
Manlove, J. (1998). The influence of high school dropout and school disengagement
on the risk of school-age pregnancy. Journal of Research on Adolescence, 8 (2),
187–220.
McCallumore, K. M., & Sparapani, E. F. (2010). The importance of the ninth grade
on high school graduation rates and student success in high school. Education,
130 (3), 447–456.
O’Malley, P. M., & Wagenaar, A. C. (1991). Effects of minimum drinking age laws on
alcohol use, related behaviors and traffic crash involvement among american youth:
1976-1987. Journal of studies on Alcohol , 52 (5), 478–491.
Oreopoulos, P. (2006). Estimating Average and Local Average Treatment Effects
of Education when Compulsory Schooling Laws Really Matter. The American
Economic Review , 96 (1), 152–175.
Oreopoulos, P. (2007a). Do Dropouts Drop Out Too Soon? Wealth, Health and
Happiness from Compulsory Schooling. Journal of public Economics, 91 (11), 2213–
2229.

127
Oreopoulos, P. (2007b). Would More Compulsory Schooling Help Disadvantaged
Youth? Evidence from Recent Changes to School-Leaving Laws. In The problems of
disadvantaged youth: An economic perspective (pp. 85–112). University of Chicago
Press.
Planty, M., Hussar, W. J., & Snyder, T. D. (2009). Condition of Education 2009.
Government Printing Office.
Sable, J., Gaviola, N., & Hoffman, L. (2007). Numbers and Rates of Public High
School Dropouts: School Year 2004-05. First Look (NCES 2008-305). National
Center for Education Statistics.
Shepard, L. A., & Smith, M. L. (1989). Flunking Grades: Research and Policies on
Retention (New York, NY: Falmer).
Skiba, R. J., Horner, R. H., Chung, C.-G., Rausch, M. K., May, S. L., & Tobin, T.
(2011). Race is not neutral: A national investigation of african american and latino
disproportionality in school discipline. School Psychology Review , 40 (1), 85.
Smith, D., & Burvill, P. W. (1987). Effect on juvenile crime of lowering the drinking
age in three australian states. Addiction, 82 (2), 181–188.
Statistical Reports: Grade Retention. (2017).
Stearns, E., & Glennie, E. J. (2006). When and why dropouts leave high school.
Youth & Society, 38 (1), 29–57.
Taylor, M. C. (1998). How white attitudes vary with the racial composition of local
populations: Numbers count. American Sociological Review , 512–535.
The Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia and State Farm. (2009). Driving through
the eyes of teens, a closer look. The Young Driver Research Initiative Team.
West Virginia Annotated Code. (2018). 17B-2-3a(2)(E).

128
Williams, A. F., Zador, P. L., Harris, S. S., & Karpf, R. S. (1983). The effect of raising
the legal minimum drinking age on involvement in fatal crashes. The Journal of
Legal Studies, 12 (1), 169–179.
Willis, R. J., & Rosen, S. (1979). Education and self-selection. Journal of Political
Economy, 87 (5, Part 2), S7–S36.

APPENDICES

129
A: Additional Tables and Figures for Chapter 1

Table A.1.: CSL Effects on 9th Grade Retention, Clustering
% Change 9th - 10th

Dropout Age
Observations

Robust
-0.696∗∗∗
(0.141)
2352

2-Way Clustering,
2 years per cluster
-0.696∗∗∗
(0.232)
2352

3-Way Clustering,
3 years per cluster
-0.696∗∗
(0.278)
2352

State Clustering
-0.696
(0.421)
2352

Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: N -Way clustering in columns (2) and (3) refers to overlapping, but non-nested clustering over time horizons
of size N in a state as in A. C. Cameron et al. (2011). For example, 2-way clustering allows for serial correlation
between consecutive years within a state, but does not allow for direct correlation between year t and year t + 2 in a
state; year t and t + 2 are assumed to only be correlated through the pairwise correlations of t and t + 1, and t + 1
and t + 2.
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Table A.2.: Black-White Residual Wage Gap, Returns to Experience
2000-2005

2006-2011

Black

-0.208∗∗∗
(0.0281)

-0.184∗∗∗
(0.0282)

-0.214∗∗∗
(0.0181)

-0.201∗∗∗
(0.0181)

Exp. = 1

0.204∗∗∗
(0.0487)

0.203∗∗∗
(0.0419)

0.0832
(0.0767)

0.0828
(0.0743)

Exp. = 2

0.451∗∗∗
(0.0484)

0.381∗∗∗
(0.0418)

0.278∗∗∗
(0.0714)

0.281∗∗∗
(0.0688)

Exp. = 3

0.601∗∗∗
(0.0497)

0.558∗∗∗
(0.0434)

0.453∗∗∗
(0.0696)

0.444∗∗∗
(0.0671)

Exp. = 4

0.734∗∗∗
(0.0514)

0.600∗∗∗
(0.0463)

0.572∗∗∗
(0.0693)

0.555∗∗∗
(0.0667)

Exp. = 5

0.738∗∗∗
(0.0561)

0.693∗∗∗

0.688∗∗∗
(0.0691)

0.658∗∗∗
(0.0665)

Exp. = 6

0.776∗∗∗
(0.0629)

0.740∗∗∗
(0.0583)

0.741∗∗∗
(0.0697)

0.689∗∗∗
(0.0673)

Exp. = 7

0.869∗∗∗
(0.0761)

0.800∗∗∗
(0.0974)

0.800∗∗∗
(0.0701)

0.760∗∗∗
(0.0676)

Exp. = 8

0.880∗∗∗
(0.0708)

0.847∗∗∗
(0.0684)

Exp. = 9

0.917∗∗∗
(0.0715)

0.851∗∗∗
(0.0696)

Exp. = 10

0.917∗∗∗
(0.0732)

0.873∗∗∗
(0.0734)

N
8430

Y
8430

Account for
Repeating
N

N
3874

Y
3874

Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Data source is the NLSY97. All regressions include controls for educational attainment and urban status. Experience in columns (1) and (3) is included as min(Age-Educational Attainment-6, Age-18). Experience in columns (2)
and (4) is included as min(Age-Educational Attainment-Repeated Grades-6, Age-Repeated Grades-18). Individuals
enrolled in school are dropped from these regressions, as well as women and non-white, non-black individuals.
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Table A.3.: Black-White Residual Employment Gap, Returns to Experience
Outcome = Employment Status
2000-2005
2006-2011
-0.0921∗∗∗
(0.00978)

-0.0929∗∗∗
(0.00976)

-0.0627∗∗∗
(0.00769)

-0.0618∗∗∗
(0.00769)

Exp. = 1

-0.0114
(0.0155)

-0.0169
(0.0135)

0.00366
(0.0236)

0.00459
(0.0234)

Exp. = 2

-0.00568
(0.0156)

-0.0000431
(0.0139)

0.000762
(0.0225)

0.0166
(0.0219)

Exp. = 3

-0.0185
(0.0166)

-0.0294∗
(0.0153)

0.0216
(0.0216)

0.0272
(0.0213)

Exp. = 4

-0.0321∗
(0.0182)

-0.0340∗
(0.0174)

0.00647
(0.0215)

0.0358∗
(0.0211)

Exp. = 5

-0.0214
(0.0201)

-0.0344∗
(0.0202)

0.0301
(0.0214)

0.0399∗
(0.0211)

Exp. = 6

-0.0155
(0.0237)

-0.0515∗∗
(0.0262)

0.0294
(0.0217)

0.0486∗∗
(0.0213)

Exp. = 7

0.000300
(0.0327)

0.0610∗
(0.0364)

0.0376∗
(0.0220)

0.0488∗∗
(0.0217)

Exp. = 8

0.0327
(0.0224)

0.0534∗∗
(0.0221)

Exp. = 9

0.0357
(0.0230)

0.0556∗∗
(0.0231)

Exp. = 10

0.0331
(0.0241)

0.0572∗∗
(0.0256)

N
13229

Y
13229

Black

Account for
Repeating
N

N
8463

Y
8463

Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Data source is the NLSY97. All regressions include controls for educational attainment and urban status. Experience in columns (1) and (3) is included as min(Age-Educational Attainment-6, Age-18). Experience in columns (2)
and (4) is included as min(Age-Educational Attainment-Repeated Grades-6, Age-Repeated Grades-18). Individuals
enrolled in school are dropped from these regressions, as well as women and non-white, non-black individuals.
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B: Placebo Testing and Bootstrapping
A possible concern with my results is that the data may be structured in a way
that causes a high rate of type I error. For example, data with an extremely high
level of variation in the dependent variables could cause overrejection of the null
hypothesis, and thus any regression results would be largely uninterpretable. Bertrand
et al. (2004) demonstrate that difference-in-difference estimation often suffers from
overrejection of the null hypothesis, caused by serial correlation in the dependent
variable. Since my dependent variable certainly has serial correlation, this could be
causing my standard errors to be too small, creating type I error. To examine this
problem, I mimic the methodology of Bertrand et al., by creating a group of “placebo
policies,” where the policies are randomly assigned to various states, but in a similar
way to how they are actually distributed across the United States. For EnrollmentBased policies, each state is given a 40% chance to begin the placebo policy so that in
expectation, the number of states with the policy will be 20, the same as the number
of Enrollment-Based states. In testing Truancy-Based policies, states are given an
8% chance to begin the placebo policy. After these states are selected, a “policy
enactment year” is randomly selected from the discrete uniform distribution, with
the earliest possible start year being 1987. Then, regression models identical to my
main specifications are run and the placebo policy treatment coefficient is tested at
the same significance level of my actual result to see the degree to which my results
are at risk of type 1 error. In addition, I test for symmetry by performing both 1- and
2-tailed significance tests. If the data are structured in a way that causes overrejection
of the null hypothesis in only one direction, this could also be cause for concern. For
regression models where I did not find significance, I test for type II error by running
these models and testing the placebo policy treatment coefficient at the p<0.1 level.
I simulate these placebo policy assignments for 10,000 replications, and calculate the
simulated rejection rate I observe. The results of these placebo tests are summarized
in Table B.1.
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Table B.1.: Placebo Policy Testing Results
Significance Level (Tails)

Rejection Percentage

0.1 (2)
0.05 (1)
0.1 (2)
0.1 (2)
0.1 (2)

11.19%
5.68%
11.27%
10.90%
10.85%

0.025 (1)
0.05 (2)
0.1 (2)
0.1 (2)
0.1 (2)

2.63%
4.94%
10.35%
10.38%
10.78%

0.005 (1)
0.01 (2)
0.05 (2)
0.025 (1)
0.05 (2)
0.025 (1)
0.1 (2)
0.05 (1)

8.93%
21.05%
26.21%
12.05%
24.18%
11.47%
25.44%
11.61%

Enrollment-Based – 40% Chance to Begin Placebo Policy
Dropout Rate
AFGR
AFGR
12th Grade Grad. Rate
5-Year Grad. Rate
Percentage Changes
8th-9th
8th-9th
9th-10th
10th-11th
11th-12th
Truancy-Based – 8% Chance to Begin Placebo Policy
Dropout Rate
Dropout Rate
AFGR
AFGR
12th Grade Grad. Rate
12th Grade Grad. Rate
5-Year Grad. Rate
5-Year Grad. Rate
Percentage Changes
8th-9th
9th-10th
10th-11th
11th-12th

0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1

(2)
(2)
(2)
(2)

30.13%
31.90%
25.45%
30.39%

NOTE: All rejection percentages are for 10,000 replications.

The Enrollment-Based placebo testing yielded no unexpected results – in all regression models, the rejection probability was extremely close to its expected level.
However, the Truancy-Based placebo testing demonstrated severe type I error – testing dropout rates at the 1% significance level, the null hypothesis was rejected over
20% of the time. All other measures also showed high rates of rejection for TruancyBased policies. This indicates that using OLS standard errors is inappropriate for
this analysis. The Enrollment-Based policy results, however, do not seem to face this
problem, and are therefore unlikely to be driven by pure chance.

To correct for the type I error demonstrated by my placebo testing, I follow the
methodology of Cameron et al. (2008) and use the wild restricted cluster bootstrap t-
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statistic for statistical inference on Truancy-based policies. In their analysis, Cameron
et al. test the setup of Bertrand et al. (2004), and show that by using the wild
cluster bootstrap-t, they can achieve rejection rates with little to no Type I error. In
performing this test, the standard cluster-robust variance estimate is used to calculate
the standard errors, but the Wald statistic generated from this estimate is tested
against the bootstrap distribution of Wald statistics. Table B.2 shows the Wald
statistic for each regression, and the p-value from testing this against the bootstrap
Wald distribution (B=10,000).
Table B.2.: Bootstrapping Results
Dependent Variable
Dropout Rate
AFGR
% Change 9th-10th
% Change 10th-11th
% Change 11th-12th
5-Year Grad. Rate
12th Grade Grad. Rate

t-statistic

p-value

5.90
-2.36
0.60
-1.90
-0.56
-2.15
2.43

0.011
0.071
0.603
0.074
0.627
0.307
0.522

All specifications test Truancy-Based policies.
NOTE: All Behavior-Based policies were not significant
at the p < 0.1 level, and are omitted from this table.

All Truancy-based policies in the main body of the paper reflect these bootstrapped p-values. From these results, three of the seven main regressions in my
analysis show statistical significance for at least p < 0.1, and two, the 5-Year Graduation Rate and the 12th Grade Graduation Rate, are statistically significant in the
typical OLS Wald test but are not significant when performing wild cluster bootstrapt testing.
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C: Additional Tables and Figures for Chapter 2

Table C.1.: Teen Driving Status by Grade
9th Grade
Drive on Their Own
10%
Learning to Drive
44%
Affected by NPND
54%
Do not Drive
46%

10th Grade
33%
50%
83%
17%

11th Grade
67%
23%
90%
10%

SOURCE: Driving Through the Eyes of Teens, A Closer Look. 2009.

Table C.2.: No Pass, No Drive Enrforcement, 2009-10 School Year
State

Type of Enforcement

Number

Total Teen Drivers
(Under Age 18 in 2009)
343,250

Florida – 3rd Quarter ONLY
Notices of Ineligibility for License Issued
Notices of Intent to Suspend License Issued
Suspensions Issued
Second Suspensions Issued to Repeat Violators

7,557
2,219
1,844
100

Georgia

Suspensions Issued

16,000

91,179

Kentucky

Suspensions Issued

2,317

20,220

Tennessee

Suspensions Issued

3,697

132,210

SOURCE: Columns 2-3 Strengthening Attend ‘n’ Drive Laws to Reduce Truancy and Dropouts (2011).
Column 4 US Federal Highway Administration (2009).
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Table C.3.: Donut Treatment Effects on Event Dropout Rates
Dropout Rate
Excluding 1st Year
0.120
(0.398)

Excluding 1st Year
and California
0.123
(0.398)

Truancy-Based

1.979∗∗
(0.544)

1.990∗∗
(0.543)

Behavior-Based

0.639
(0.227)
816

0.640
(0.227)
806

Enrollment-Based

N

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Behavior- and Truancy-based p-values are bootstrapped as in Cameron et al. (2008)

Table C.4.: Effects on AFGR and Enrollment,
Excluding Louisiana and Oregon
(1)
AFGR
-1.081
(0.807)

(2)
8th-9th
Enrollment Change
2.465∗
(1.247)

Truancy-Based

-4.464∗
(3.354)

-2.206
(1.362)

Behavior-Based

0.622
(1.143)
978

-0.296
(0.804)
1029

Enrollment-Based

N

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Behavior- and Truancy-based p-values are bootstrapped as in Cameron et al. (2008)
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Table C.5.: Replication of Barua and Vidal-Fernandez
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
All States Omit CA Omit DE Omit NV
Panel A: BVF Data – High School Completion

(5)
Omit NM

Enrollment

0.00947∗
(0.00564)

0.0120∗∗
(0.00541)

0.00955∗
(0.00565)

0.00962∗
(0.00566)

0.00958∗
(0.00564)

Truancy

0.0336∗∗∗
(0.00484)

-0.0272
(0.0181)

0.0342∗∗∗
(0.00527)

0.0341∗∗∗
(0.00514)

0.0334∗∗∗
(0.00493)

-0.00547∗ -0.00201 -0.00557∗
(0.00324) (0.00260) (0.00329)
N
1821191
1636657
1817644
Panel B: NCES Data – Dropout Rate

-0.00534
(0.00331)
1817509

-0.00546∗
(0.00324)
1811864

Behavior

Enrollment

0.174
(0.364)

0.178
(0.364)

0.160
(0.378)

0.182
(0.365)

0.150
(0.371)

Truancy

1.229∗∗
(0.263)

1.236∗∗∗
(0.263)

0.974∗∗∗
(0.111)

1.290∗∗∗
(0.324)

1.239∗∗∗
(0.355)

0.393
0.389
(0.648)
(0.652)
N
818
808
Panel C: NCES Data – AFGR

0.366
(0.628)
799

0.342
(0.656)
799

0.355
(0.664)
798

Enrollment

-1.139
(0.764)

-1.108
(0.775)

-1.151
(0.769)

-1.051
(0.742)

-1.207
(0.772)

Truancy

-4.999∗
(2.365)

-5.969∗∗
(2.466)

-5.545∗
(2.770)

-2.843∗
(1.695)

-6.194∗∗
(2.570)

Behavior

0.597
(1.103)
1018

0.615
(1.158)
998

0.586
(1.109)
998

0.563
(1.141)
998

0.561
(1.122)
998

Behavior

N

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state of birth (Panel A)
or state of residence (Panels B, C)
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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(a) No Controls

(b) Residual of Controls

Delaware

(c) No Controls

(d) Residual of Controls

New Mexico

(e) No Controls

(f) Residual of Controls

Nevada
Fig. C.1.: Pre- and Post-Policy Dropout Rate Trends for Truancy-based States
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D: Additional Tables and Figures for Chapter 3

Table D.1.: Late NPND Policy Effects on Fatal Traffic Accidents – 1994-2003
(1)
1994
-0.0447
(0.0474)

(2)
1995
-0.0727
(0.0504)

(3)
1996
-0.104∗
(0.0524)

(4)
1997
-0.0971
(0.0646)

(5)
1998
-0.122
(0.0732)

(6)
(7)
(8)
1999
2000
2001
-0.122
-0.153∗∗ -0.178∗∗
(0.0847) (0.0729) (0.0787)

(9)
2002
-0.155∗
(0.0825)

(10)
2003
-0.130
(0.0846)

Behavior

0.0389
(0.0462)

0.0229
(0.0542)

-0.00468
(0.0683)

0.0228
(0.0794)

0.0162
(0.0876)

0.00819
(0.107)

0.0368
0.0448
(0.0916) (0.0969)

0.0695
(0.0820)

0.101
(0.0903)

Truancy

0.103
(0.0909)

0.0920
(0.0865)

0.0833
(0.0760)

0.0795
(0.0695)

0.0820
(0.0593)

0.0740
0.0520
0.0300
(0.0687) (0.0632) (0.0713)

-0.000875
(0.0592)

0.0607
(0.0430)

log(Per-Student Spending)

0.486∗∗∗
(0.169)

0.548∗∗∗
(0.173)

0.604∗∗∗
(0.174)

0.583∗∗∗
(0.187)

0.624∗∗∗
(0.205)

0.625∗∗∗
(0.217)

0.638∗∗∗
(0.223)

0.701∗∗∗
(0.244)

0.734∗∗∗
(0.263)

0.667∗∗
(0.265)

-0.0280∗∗∗
(0.00963)
10647

-0.0233∗∗
(0.0101)
10102

-0.0212∗∗ -0.0217∗∗ -0.0222∗∗
(0.00991) (0.00994) (0.0101)
9556
9001
8444

-0.0208∗
(0.0109)
7885

-0.0211∗
(0.0115)
7333

-0.0228∗
(0.0120)
6786

-0.0234∗
(0.0122)
6241

-0.0266∗∗
(0.0126)
5698

Enrollment

Unemp. Rate
Observations

Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

Notes: This table shows regression results from estimating equation 3.1 on a “late” subsample of the FARS data, as
in Table 3.4. Each column is labeled with a different year determining the initial year of the “late” subsample, with
the sample ending in 2015 in all specifications. For example, Column (6), labeled “1999”, is identical to Column (2)
of Table 3.4.

(a) Enrollment: Fatal Accidents not during School Hours

(b) Enrollment: Fatal Accidents During
School Hours

Fig. D.1.: Fatal Accident Trends, School Hours
Notes:
These figures show dynamic difference-in-differences estimates from estimating Equation 3.3, testing for
pre-existing trends in teen driver-involved fatal traffic accidents. All policies begin at time t = 0, and the coefficient
at time t = −1 is normalized to 0.
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Table D.2.: Total Teen employment
(1)
(2)
0.00813
0.00917
(0.00616) (0.00681)

(3)
-0.000809
(0.00605)

(4)
0.0000361
(0.00672)

Behavior

0.00498
(0.00881)

-0.0000747
(0.00739)

-0.0123
(0.0119)

Truancy

0.00634
0.00841
(0.00932) (0.00884)

0.000774
(0.0102)

0.00335
(0.00971)

Enrollment

-0.00705
(0.0135)

Enrollment × Female

-0.00219
(0.00394)

-0.00186
(0.00414)

Behavior × Female

0.0254∗∗
(0.0114)

0.0260∗
(0.0129)

Truancy × Female

-0.00449
(0.00366)

-0.00550
(0.00383)

Female

0.0106∗∗∗
(0.00262)

0.0117∗∗∗
(0.00287)

Enrollment × Black

0.0508∗∗∗
(0.00860)

0.0534∗∗∗
(0.00977)

Behavior × Black

0.0385∗∗∗
(0.0138)

0.0369∗∗∗
(0.00991)

Truancy × Black

0.0696∗∗∗
(0.0104)

0.0660∗∗∗
(0.0108)

Black

-0.113∗∗∗
(0.00610)

-0.110∗∗∗
(0.00712)

Female × Black

-0.00525
(0.00539)

Enrollment × Black × Female

-0.00509
(0.00692)

Behavior × Black × Female

0.00132
(0.0133)

Truancy × Black × Female

0.00715
(0.00549)

Observations

248379

248379

248379

248379

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: This table shows the effects of NPND policies on teen employment. Column (1) presents the impact of
NPND policies on overall teen employment. Columns (2) and (3) show heterogeneity by gender and race, respectively.
Column (4) shows heterogeneity by both gender and race. All specifications control for state average annual income,
unemployment rate, teen population, and state and year fixed effects.
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Table D.3.: Full-time Teen employment
(1)
-0.00187
(0.00214)

(2)
-0.00394∗
(0.00208)

(3)
-0.00254
(0.00217)

(4)
-0.00434∗
(0.00221)

Behavior

-0.00185
(0.00371)

-0.00704∗
(0.00402)

-0.00248
(0.00335)

-0.00856∗∗
(0.00365)

Truancy

0.0000435
(0.00372)

-0.00245
(0.00323)

-0.000314
(0.00394)

-0.00323
(0.00364)

Enrollment

Enrollment × Female

0.00427∗∗∗
(0.00143)

0.00376∗∗
(0.00155)

Behavior × Female

0.0106∗∗∗
(0.00174)

0.0125∗∗∗
(0.00178)

Truancy × Female

0.00533∗∗
(0.00229)

0.00615∗∗∗
(0.00216)

Female

-0.0107∗∗∗
(0.00114)

-0.0116∗∗∗
(0.00126)

Enrollment × Black

0.00384∗
(0.00222)

0.00355
(0.00311)

Behavior × Black

0.00465
(0.00403)

0.0119∗∗
(0.00489)

Truancy × Black

0.00442
(0.00322)

0.00800
(0.00690)

-0.00966∗∗∗
(0.00174)

-0.0139∗∗∗
(0.00246)

Black
Female × Black

0.00880∗∗∗
(0.00250)

Enrollment × Black × Female

0.000504
(0.00315)

Behavior × Black × Female

-0.0149∗∗∗
(0.00314)

Truancy × Black × Female

-0.00722
(0.00783)

Observations

248379

248379

248379

248379

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes:
This table shows the effects of NPND policies on full-time teen employment. Column (1) presents the
impact of NPND policies on overall teen employment. Columns (2) and (3) show heterogeneity by gender and race,
respectively. Column (4) shows heterogeneity by both gender and race. All specifications control for state average
annual income, unemployment rate, teen population, and state and year fixed effects.
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Table D.4.: Part-time Teen employment
(1)
0.01000∗
(0.00555)

(2)
0.0131∗∗
(0.00617)

(3)
0.00174
(0.00563)

(4)
0.00437
(0.00618)

Behavior

0.00683
(0.00623)

-0.0000113
(0.00994)

0.00241
(0.00551)

-0.00370
(0.00882)

Truancy

0.00629
(0.00838)

0.0109
(0.00820)

0.00109
(0.00902)

0.00658
(0.00887)

Enrollment

Enrollment × Female

-0.00645∗
(0.00368)

-0.00561
(0.00395)

Behavior × Female

0.0148
(0.0104)

0.0135
(0.0121)

Truancy × Female

-0.00982∗∗∗
(0.00356)

-0.0116∗∗∗
(0.00336)

0.0213∗∗∗
(0.00260)

0.0233∗∗∗
(0.00274)

Female
Enrollment × Black

0.0469∗∗∗
(0.00773)

0.0498∗∗∗
(0.00829)

Behavior × Black

0.0338∗∗
(0.0130)

0.0249∗∗
(0.00957)

Truancy × Black

0.0652∗∗∗
(0.0126)

0.0580∗∗∗
(0.0159)

Black

-0.103∗∗∗ -0.0961∗∗∗
(0.00617) (0.00660)

Female × Black

-0.0141∗∗∗
(0.00451)

Enrollment × Black × Female

-0.00559
(0.00599)

Behavior × Black × Female

0.0162
(0.0124)

Truancy × Black × Female

0.0144∗
(0.00812)

Observations

248379

248379

248379

248379

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: This table shows the effects of NPND policies on part-time teen employment. Column (1) presents the
impact of NPND policies on overall teen employment. Columns (2) and (3) show heterogeneity by gender and race,
respectively. Column (4) shows heterogeneity by both gender and race. All specifications control for state average
annual income, unemployment rate, teen population, and state and year fixed effects.
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(a) Total Teen

(b) Black Teen

Fig. D.2.: Enrollment-based Policies Teen Full-time Employment Trends
Notes:
These figures show dynamic difference-in-differences estimates from estimating Equation 3.3, testing for
pre-existing trends in teen full-time employment. All policies begin at time t = 0, and the coefficient at time t = −1
is normalized to 0.

(a) Total Teen

(b) Black Teen

Fig. D.3.: Truancy-based Policies Teen Employment Trends
Notes: These figures show dynamic difference-in-differences estimates from estimating Equation 3.3, testing for preexisting trends in teen employment. All policies begin at time t = 0, and the coefficient at time t = −1 is normalized
to 0. employment.
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(a) Total Teen Full-time

(b) Black Teen Part-Time

Fig. D.4.: Truancy-based Policies Teen Full-time Employment Trends
Notes:
These figures show dynamic difference-in-differences estimates from estimating Equation 3.3, testing for
pre-existing trends in teen full-time employment. All policies begin at time t = 0, and the coefficient at time t = −1
is normalized to 0.

(a) Total Teen Part-time

(b) Black Teen Part-Time

Fig. D.5.: Truancy-based Policies Teen Part-time Employment Trends
Notes:
These figures show dynamic difference-in-differences estimates from estimating Equation 3.3, testing for
pre-existing trends in teen part-time employment. All policies begin at time t = 0, and the coefficient at time t = −1
is normalized to 0.
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(a) Total Teen

(b) Black Teen

Fig. D.6.: Enrollment-based Policies Teen School Enrollment
Notes: These figures show dynamic difference-in-differences estimates from estimating Equation 3.3, testing for preexisting trends in teen enrollment. All policies begin at time t = 0, and the coefficient at time t = −1 is normalized
to 0.
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